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Abstract
Online Social Networks (OSNs), such as Facebook and Google+, are network-based
communication systems. They allow their users to create persistent digital representa-
tions of themselves, called user profiles, and to establish explicit connections to other
user profiles within a bounded system. OSNs have become popular services that attract
more than one billion users. The ubiquity of mobile devices, which support accessing
OSNs from anywhere, causes OSNs to be powerful communication tools that change
the way how people interact with each other. OSNs gain importance for the daily life
of their users by becoming an access channel to parts of their social environment.
However, using OSNs puts users at the risk of various undesired side-effects, such as
cyber bullying, being forced to grant content use licenses to OSN providers, facilitating
social engineering attacks, losing the job due to improper public comments and even
imprisoning in autocratic countries. In addition, users of OSNs are subject to crowd
engineering1. These side-effects are caused by both: sharing data with too many or the
wrong recipients and implications of the fact that OSNs are operated by commercial
companies.
This thesis contributes to understand the origin of these side-effects and approaches
to mitigate the latter without limiting the power of the OSN. We elaborate user be-
havior in the most popular OSN, Facebook, and introduce a color-based interface that
simplifies audience selection in OSNs. Furthermore, we improve decentralized OSNs
(DOSNs) that are not operated by commercial OSN providers to avoid ownership im-
plications.
Our first step is to gain understanding of the sources of adverse effects by evaluat-
ing OSN usage in detail. We answer the questions: How intensive do users use the
most popular OSN, Facebook? How do users orchestrate the variety of communication
functions? With whom do users communicate? On the way to understand causes of
side-effects, a second step is to investigate the content sharing preferences amongst
users from various countries. Since users are unable to choose their audience properly,
evaluating the actual settings is insufficient. To circumvent this issue, we developed a
browser plug-in that simplifies the audience selection.
Decentralizing OSNs is a way to avoid implications of commercial companies being
the owner and operator of the OSNs. In spite of their potential to avoid adverse ef-
1 http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/4901/4097, accessed 2015-07-13
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fects, DOSNs are not widely adopted. They suffer from the lack of performance and
functionality, compared with their popular counterparts. We contribute to mitigate the
lack by surveying the state-of-the-art in the field of DOSNs, introducing a search mech-
anism that allows to find user handles without leaking sensible information, allowing
P2P-based DOSNs to be operated under high churn and by prefetching videos based on
locally-available information.
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Zusammenfassung
Online Social Networks (OSNs), wie z.B. Facebook oder Google+, sind netzwerk-
basierte Kommunikationssysteme, die es innerhalb eines geschlossenen Systems er-
möglichen Nutzerprofile zu erstellen, und diese mittels expliziten Freundschaftserk-
lärungen zu verbinden. OSNs sind derzeit sehr beliebt. Sie haben mehr als eine Mil-
liarde Nutzer. Die Ubiquität von mobilen netzwerkfähigen Endgeräten macht OSNs
zu mächtigen Kommunikationswerkzeugen, die die Art der Kommunikation im Alltag
ihrer Nutzer ändern, da sie es erlauben, OSNs unabhängig vom Aufenthaltsort des
Nutzers zu verwenden.
Die Nutzung von OSNs birgt jedoch das Risiko unerwünschter Nebenwirkungen. Das
Spektrum der möglichen Nebenwirkungen umfasst z.B. Mobbing, das Gewähren von
Nutzungsrechten an Kommunikationsinhalten, das Fördern von Social Engineering An-
griffen, der Verlust des Arbeitsplatzes und sogar Verhaftung in autokratisch regierten
Ländern. Nutzer von OSNs sind außerdem Versuchen ausgesetzt die öffentliche Mein-
ung zu beeinflussen2. Diese Nebenwirkungen werden dadurch verursacht, dass Nutzer
Informationen mit den falschen bzw. mit zu vielen Rezipienten teilen, sowie durch
den Umstand dass OSNs von einem einzigen Akteur - einem Unternehmen - betrieben
werden.
Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist die Verminderung und Vermeidung von Nebenwirkun-
gen die sich aus der Nutzung von OSNs ergeben. Zu diesem Zweck darf die Funk-
tionsvielfalt der OSNs jedoch nicht eingeschränkt werden, um deren Attraktivität für
die Nutzer nicht zu gefährden. Dieses Ziel wird sowohl durch ein neuartiges Inferface
zur Vereinfachung der Privatsphäreneinstellungen, als auch durch die Verbesserung
alternativer, dezentraler OSNs erreicht.
Der erste Schritt dieser Arbeit ist das Erforschen der genauen Ursachen der uner-
wünschten Nebenwirkungen, indem das Nutzerverhalten untersucht wird. Dabei wer-
den die folgenden Fragestellungen betrachtet: Wie intensiv nutzen Nutzer das derzeit
populärste OSN, Facebook? Wie orchestrieren sie die angebotene Funktionsvielfalt?
Mit wem kommunizieren die Nutzer? Des Weiteren wurden die Vorlieben der Face-
booknutzer bzgl. des Teilens von Inhalten untersucht. Da viele Nutzer nicht in der
Lage sind das originale Interface zum Einstellen der Sichtbarkeit von Inhalten fehler-
arm zu nutzen, reicht es nicht aus die aktuellen Privatsphäreneinstellungen von Face-
2 http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/4901/4097, Zugriff am 13.07.2015
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booknutzern zu untersuchen. Statt dessen wurde ein neues, auf einer ampelähnlichen
Farbkodierung basierendes Interface in Form einer Browsererweiterung veröffentlicht
und anschließend zu Studienzwecken verwendet.
Ein Weg um Auswirkungen des Umstandes, dass OSNs von kommerziellen Un-
ternehmen betrieben werden, zu vermeiden ist das Dezentralisieren von OSNs. OSNs,
die nicht von einer einzigen Organisation betrieben werden und auf einer dezentralen
technischen Infrastruktur basieren, werden in dieser Arbeit DOSNs genannt. Diese sind
derzeit jedoch kaum verbreitet, weil sie gegenüber den heutzutage populären OSNs im
Funktionsumfang und der Performanz zurück stehen.
In dieser Arbeit werden daher ausserdem Ansätze vorgestellt, die dabei helfen die
Nachteile von DOSNs gegenüber den OSNs zu verringern. Dazu wird zuerst der Stand
der Forschung untersucht und anschließend werden drei Beiträge zur Verbesserung
von DOSN vorgestellt. Der erste Beitrag ist ein Algorithmus der das Finden von
Adressen anderer Nutzer erlaubt, ohne dabei Daten der gesuchten Person Preis zu
geben. Der zweite Beitrag verbessert die Verfügbarkeit von Profildaten in P2P-basierten
DOSNs unter herausfordernden Bedingungen. Der letzte Beitrag dieser Arbeit unter-
sucht das Laden von Inhalten in DOSN aufgrund von Prognosen, die ausschließlich
mithilfe von lokal beim Nutzer verfügbaren Daten erstellt wurden.
iv Zusammenfassung
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Chapter1
Introduction
Online Social Networks (OSNs), such as Facebook or Google+, are network-based
communication systems that allow their users to create persistent digital representa-
tions of themselves, called user profiles, and to establish explicit connections to other
user profiles within a bounded system. Those connections, called friendships, are as-
sumed to reflect acquaintances among users of OSNs. State-of-the-art OSNs (in 2015)
encompass plenty of communication and sharing functionalities. The range of commu-
nication features is spanning from asynchronous one-to-one messaging to sophisticated
event organization tools. Media files, such as photos or videos can also be shared with
friends or strangers.
OSNs have become popular services that attract more than one billion users1. The
ubiquity of mobile devices, which support accessing OSNs from anywhere, causes OSNs
to be powerful communication tools that change the way how people interact with
each other. OSNs gain importance for the daily life of their users by becoming an
access channel to parts of their social environment. The social nature of the service
facilitates users to share plenty of personal information on OSN platforms.
However, by sharing personal data in OSNs, users become content publishers. It puts
OSN users at the risk of suffering undesired side-effects. We denote those undesired
side-effects adverse effects in this thesis. The spectrum of adverse effects that can be
found in the literature encompasses granting content use licenses to OSN providers2,
cyber bullying [Campbell, 2005, Zych et al., 2015], having too many party guests3,
facilitating social engineering attacks [Huber et al., 2009], undesired effects in job in-
terviews (human resource managers may use OSNs to investigate the personality of ap-
plicants [Rosenblum, 2007, McDonald and Thompson, 2015]), loosing the job due to
improper public comments and even imprisoning in autocratic countries4. The power
of OSNs is thus accompanied with the responsibility for content publishers to decide
which bit of information shall be shared with whom.
1 http://allfacebook.de/userdata/, accessed on 2015-03-06
2 https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms?, accessed on 2015-07-06
3 http://www.stern.de/digital/online/facebook-fans-stuermen-geburtstagsparty-im-vorgarten-von-
thessa-1692209.html, accessed on 2015-03-06
4 http://www.firstpost.com/politics/goa-facebook-user-faces-jail-for-anti-modi-holocaust-comment-
1538499.html, accessed on 2015-07-17
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OSNs provide access control mechanisms to adjust the level of accessibility of in-
formation and content items. However, despite their importance for reputation and
integrity of individuals, privacy controls commonly are very difficult to use and under-
stand. Multiple studies showed users to be unable to handle privacy controls to meet
their sharing needs [Liu et al., 2011b, Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2008]. As a result,
many bits of information are shared with too many recipients (over sharing).
Fang et al. [Fang et al., 2010] proposed to decrease the frequency of explicit acts of
audience selection by applying methods from machine learning to pre-configure the
privacy settings. Lipford et al. [Lipford et al., 2008] proposed to check the correctness
of the chosen settings by allowing the users to view their profiles as their audience
would do and Egelman et al. [Egelman et al., 2011] suggested to employ Venn dia-
grams to determine sets of recipients. However, users still need to understand and
handle the existing privacy controls. To that end, we propose a new interface, that
simplifies the audience selection by applying a color coding. In contrast to the related
work, the new interface is based on a mental model that is similar to well-known traffic
lights. It thus reduces the cognitive overhead when selecting the audience. Both the
errors and the effort in selecting the audience are drastically reduced when the new
interface is used instead of Facebook’s original privacy controls.
Beside adverse effects which potentially occur in case of sharing bits of informa-
tion with the wrong or too many recipients, users of today’s popular OSNs are subject
of ownership implications: The market dominating OSNs are each owned by a sin-
gle commercial company which is the explicit authority in the network. We denote
these explicit authorities OSN providers. Users need to trust the latter not to mis-
use the power, accompanied with being the operator of the system, as well as to be
able to protect the system against attackers both from outside and from inside the
provider’s organization itself. Economic pressure to earn money due to provider-side
infrastructure and maintenance costs and the provider’s legitimate profit interests lead
to strong incentives for OSN providers to monetize user data far beyond the user’s
content sharing interests [Falch et al., 2009].
Avoiding those ownership implications is the scope of decentralized OSNs (DOSNs).
The common ground of multifarious DOSN approaches is that they need to find a way
to satisfy the demand for technical resources to realize OSN functionalities, without
relying on technical infrastructure that is owned by an explicit network-wide authority
(i.e. OSN provider). For example, maintaining user profiles requires storage resources.
In addition, messaging as well as content sharing requires network bandwidth. DOSNs
thus either apply P2P technology, enabling direct communication amongst OSN users,
or introduce federation protocols to realize decentralized client-server architectures
(e.g. RFC-822). Also, a combination of both, federation and P2P, has been suggested
[Paul et al., 2014a].
In general, DOSNs approaches suffer from the necessity to integrate decentralized
resources to realize OSN functionalities. In addition, P2P-based DOSN suffer from the
fact that nodes that provide resources are individually unreliable. Resources thus need
to be efficiently replicated to provide a reliable service. These DOSN challenges are
addressed by complex sets of communication protocols that embody different DOSN
architectures. However, compared with today’s popular OSN such as Facebook or
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Google+, DOSNs still lack functionalities and performance. Even paramount features,
such as finding user handles with privacy, are missing.
Spurred by the ambition to mitigate the side effects, resulting from the existence
of omnipotent OSN providers, we endeavor to contribute DOSNs to become widely
adopted. We contribute a search scheme for finding user handles with privacy, suggest
a storage mechanism to help P2P-based DOSNs to be applied under challenging en-
vironments and propose to prefetch videos, based on social relations, to improve the
performance of DOSNs.
1.1 Problem Statement and Research Questions
The problem, which is addressed in this thesis, is to mitigate adverse effects of using
OSNs. Derived from this problem, we work on the following research questions:
1. As a first step, we need to understand how users use OSNs and quantify behavior
and threats. To that end, we perform a measurement campaign that sheds light
on: How intensive do users use OSNs? How do users orchestrate (combine) the
multifarious functionalities within OSNs? Which information do users share with
whom in OSNs?
2. The measurement campaign highlights the usability of privacy controls to be one
major source of adverse effects. We thus ask: How can we simplify the audience
selection to avoid errors when setting the visibility of content? How can we
minimize the necessary effort in operating privacy controls? The answer to those
questions is the new color-based privacy control interface C4PS.
3. Regardless of privacy controls, OSN users are still at the system operator’s mercy
not to misuse their data. To that end, we contribute to improve DOSN by answer-
ing the questions: What is the state-of-the-art in the field of DOSNs? How we can
improve DOSNs? What are the remaining challenges of decentralizing OSNs? We
thus survey the state-of-the-art in Chapter 4.
4. We further detail the the question of how we can improve DOSNs by asking the
following subquestions:
a) How can we find user handles without leakage of private information? We
present a privacy preserving search scheme in Section 5 without leveraging
a search index that encompass user-linkable information.
b) How can user profile availability be improved in P2P-based OSNs? To answer
this question, we present Lilliput in Section 6.
c) How can we avoid delays in DOSNs to improve their user experience? Video
prefetching can reduce startup delays. Prefetching requires predictions on
which content will be consumed in the near future. We examine the feasibil-
ity of predicting future video consumption based of locally available data in
Section 7.
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1.2 Contributions
This thesis presents a diverse set of contributions in different fields (Figure 1.2), each
of them aims to help users to avoid side effects of OSN usage by keeping control over
their data.
This set of contributions can be divided into two major groups: The first group of
contributions consists of exploratory contributions (denoted Ex). They shed light on
how users use OSNs and identify potential technical improvements of DOSNs. To
that end, we conduct user studies and survey the technological state-of-the-art of al-
ternative OSN architectures (DOSNs). The second group of contributions (denoted
Tx) technically improves DOSN by proposing building blocks that target remaining
challenges in the field of DOSN.
  
Decentralized OSNUser Behavior
Contributions
Exploratory Technical
E1
(FPA)
E2
(FPW)
E3
(Survey)
T1
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Figure 1.1: Thesis contributions
The following exploratory contributions help to understand the user behavior and
the research area of DOSN:
E1: We argue that it is crucial to understand OSN user behavior to estimate the scale
and the exact origin of the occurring adverse effects to avoid the latter. Previous
studies in the field of OSN user behavior are either based on crawled public profile
data, surveys or observed network traffic, thus suffering the limitations of these
data collection methods. We contribute a user study with 2071 participants that
is based on client-side data collection. We examine how users orchestrate OSN
functionality in today’s most popular OSN, Facebook, hence acting in their natural
environment on their own data for their own reasons equipped with users’ access
rights.
E2: With the goal in mind to contribute in building privacy preserving OSNs that
fit user’s needs as good as possible, we elaborate the user’s privacy desiderata.
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While other studies ask for preferences, we gather a large dataset directly from
users who are actually setting their real settings, on their own, for their own rea-
sons. This dataset contains data from Facebook users originated from a variety
of countries. Our results show information sharing desiderata to strongly depend
on the user’s country of origin. In spite of the explicit support for group manage-
ment, study participants tend to remove fine-grained access rules for their bits of
information. They tend to either publish a bit amongst the complete set of friends
or to hide it completely.
E3: We present the most widespread survey [Paul et al., 2014a] on decentralized
OSNs that examines the state-of-the-art in the field of decentralized OSNs. In this
survey, we discuss (D)OSN definitions, identify a minimum set of functionality
which needs to be supported by a system to be an OSN and classify the state-
of-the-art with respect to the type of decentralized storage, the access control
mechanisms and the interaction and signaling mechanisms. We further present
a publication timeline to illuminate the temporal development of the field and
highlight the uniqueness of each considered DOSN approach in an extra para-
graph.
We further provide an evaluation of DOSN weaknesses compared with state-of-
the-art centralized OSNs to identify the challenges in the field of DOSNs to tackle
for becoming a realistic choice for users. For the sake of completeness, we discuss
related approaches that do not constitute a new type of DOSN architecture but
aim to improve a certain aspect such as encryption or user profile availability.
The exploratory contributions are the basis for four technical contributions. These
technical contributions aim to improve the usability, performance and functionality of
DOSNs without negative effects on user’s privacy.
T1: Research on the usability of privacy controls figured out that many users are un-
able to perform the audience selection process for their content in OSNs. Thus, a
mechanism that simplifies the audience selection has immanent impact on the pri-
vacy. We developed C4PS, a new interface that simplifies the audience selection
process to avoid mistakes and to decrease the effort of selecting the audience.
T2: As an insight of surveying the state-of-the-art in the field of DOSNs, we realized
that the existing approaches either do not discuss search functionality or assume
the search index to be public by leveraging standard DHTs to find user handles.
Since an important argument for DOSNs is privacy protection, we decided to de-
velop a search scheme that allows to find user handles with privacy. Our scheme
allows to find user handles in systems of decentralized client-server architectures,
without disclosing any data that is linked to the permanent user handle (ID or ad-
dress). The novelty is to avoid building a search index that contains user-linkable
data entries.
T3: DOSNs that are based on P2P technology leverage non-reliable resources to
store user content. Reliably storing data on unreliable resources requires data
replication. In the related work, this is done either by storing and replicating
the user data in a DHT or by statically replicating the data within a replication
group e.g. at friend’s nodes. Authors of approaches that rely on static group
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replication mechanisms [Koll et al., 2013, Shahriar et al., 2013] assume at least
a small subset of nodes to exhibit long online durations. In contrast, DHT-based
approaches encounter difficulties to incentivise resource provision.
We present Lilliput that combines the advantages of friend-based and DHT-based
replication. Its dynamic group replication facilitates tit-for-tat cooperation by
keeping the number of interacting nodes small. Moreover, it reduces resource
consumption to mitigate free-riding incentives by avoiding stale content to be
stored and by naturally supporting re-joining of nodes to the set of replication
nodes in case of churn.
T4: Since OSNs are widely used to share user-generated videos and DOSNs suf-
fer performance disadvantages as a result of the lack of an information media-
tor with global knowledge, we examined video prefetching strategies, based on
locally-available information. Metadata, such as likes or comments, is technically
attached or linked to the respective user-generated media items. We discovered
evidence that this information is no feasible fundament for precise predictions of
future content consumption and identified two alternative approaches that allow
to predict a subset of the content to be later consumed. The first approach is to
prefetch content that is authored by a small subset of close friends. The second
approach is to evaluate the pre-click time. Users tend to spend more time for
scanning those content items that they will consume later. User attention can
thus be leveraged to initiate the download process to reduce the video startup
delay.
1.3 Thesis Structure
This thesis is structured by eight chapters. Subsequent to this introductory chapter, we
present two user behavior studies in chapters 2 and 3 that explore the problem space,
followed by contributions to improve DOSNs.
Since the general topic of avoiding adverse effects of OSN usage is very broad, in-
cluding a comprehensive related work chapter that covers every contribution seems
to be impossible. Thus, every chapter contains a related work section that integrates
the respective contributions into the related work. Each chapter also encompasses a
summary. Below, we depict the content of each chapter in the remainder of this thesis
at a glance and highlight the connections amongst these chapters.
• Chapter 2: Feature Orchestration and Service Usage in Facebook
Mitigating adverse effects of using OSNs requires an understanding of how users
use OSNs. The remainder of this thesis hence starts by evaluating how users or-
chestrate the multifarious OSN functionality in the most popular OSN, Facebook,
and the content sharing and consumption habits. We elaborate who publishes
which types of content and who communicates with whom, how and how often.
The results of this chapter are published in [Paul et al., 2015b].
• Chapter 3: Privacy Preferences of Facebook Users
In this chapter, we elaborate the privacy preferences of Facebook users and the
actual exposure of their data. Since users are commonly unable to correctly
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choose their preferred audience, evaluating actual privacy settings in Facebook
does not necessarily reflect user’s content sharing preferences. To be able to
study content sharing preferences on Facebook in spite of its incomprehensible
audience selection mechanism, we introduce and publish a new interface in
the shape of a browser extension. It simplifies audience selection and reduces
oversharing of content which is caused by audience selection errors. Hence, the
browser extension is both: a tool to study privacy preferences and a first solu-
tion to mitigate adverse effects. The chapter is based on [Paul et al., 2012c] and
[Paul et al., 2015a].
• Chapter 4: Improving Privacy by Decentralizing OSN
DOSNs abolish OSN providers together with their implications and adverse ef-
fects. Nevertheless, DOSNs have not been widely adopted so far. In this chap-
ter, we survey their state-of-the-art and classify the surveyed solutions. We
identify remaining challenges in the field of DOSN. The chapter is based on
[Paul et al., 2014a].
• Chapter 5: Finding User Handles with Privacy
OSNs allow users to find other users’ profiles. The OSN provider is the mediator
who makes sure that the search mechanism protects users from mass data col-
lection while allowing legitimate requests to be performed. DOSN approaches
avoid introducing mediators that need to be trusted. They either rely on out-of-
band communication to exchange user handles or define information, which is
necessary to specify sought users, to be public. The latter case allows to leverage
P2P-based search mechanisms to find user handles.
However, assuming data that allows to identify users to be public is in conflict
with the design goal of DOSNs to protect user data. To this end, we develop a
search scheme that allows to find user handles with privacy. The results of this
chapter are published in [Paul et al., 2014b].
• Chapter 6: Increasing Profile Availability in P2P-OSN
We also identified the availability of user profiles in P2P-based DOSNs to be an
open issue while surveying the state-of-the-art. Furthermore, we use the findings
of the user behavior study in Chapter 2 to envision a lightweight DOSN. We argue
that it is beneficial to store only the latest updates instead of the whole history of
news in the user profiles.
• Chapter 7: Leveraging Locally-available Data to Apply Video Prefetching
Collecting information from several different sources causes delays in DOSN and
sharing user-generated content, such as photos and videos, is an important func-
tionality of OSNs. Furthermore, there is a trend to access OSNs from mobile
devices. This mixture of different facts motivate us to investigate the feasibility
to avoid delays, caused by both the architecture of DOSN and the downsides of
cellular networks by prefetching videos based on locally available information.
In Chapter 7, we present a twofold user study that shows popularity measures,
such as comments and likes in Facebook, not to be a feasible basis to predict
future video consumption. In contrast, close social relations are strong moti-
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vators for users to watch videos. The results of this chapter are published in
[Paul et al., 2015c].
• Chapter 8: Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, we first summarize the thesis, draw conclusions from our work
and depict future research directions.
1.4 Work and Collaboration
This thesis is an original work that I did by myself. However, this work would not be
the same without collaborations with my supervisor, Professor Strufe, my colleagues
in Darmstadt and Dresden, the co-authors of my publications and the students with
whom I worked together. Beside the tradition in science to use active voice in plural
even in case of a single author, these collaborations are an additional strong reason
to use the plural term (we) instead of the singular in this thesis. In contrast, this
section explicates the role of myself as well as the input from my collaborators for the
contributions in this thesis. It is the only section in the main body of this thesis, where
I use a first-person narrator in singular.
Chapters 2 and 3 are collaborative works with Daniel Puscher who wrote his Bache-
lor thesis and his Master thesis under my supervision. During the work at his Bachelor
thesis, he built a prototypical realization of the idea of the color-coding based audi-
ence selection interface which was suggested by Professor Strufe. After finishing the
Bachelor thesis, he kept working with us as a student helper and developed a browser
extension that implements the interface. The second browser extension that allows to
study user behavior in detail as well as the R-scripts to evaluate the collected data were
part of his Master thesis of Daniel Puscher which he did under my supervision.
The “C4PS” study (Section 3.1) was also supported by Matin Stopcynski and Melanie
Volkamer who helped to extend the study, previously conducted in the Bachelor thesis
of Daniel Puscher. Martin also helped to improve parts of the publication, acquired
participants for the study and helped in data evaluation and visualization.
The DOSN survey in Chapter 4 was a collaborative work with Antonino Famulari,
who presented the first version of the classification. The final version of the classifica-
tion as well as the final text of the respective publication are my own work, guided by
Professor Strufe. The visualization of the publication timeline was done by the student
helper Stephen Stephen under by supervision.
Lilliput was my own idea. However, Niklas Lochschmidt developed the churn gener-
ator, the communication protocols and the simulation model under my supervision in
his master thesis. The publication was realized with the help of Professor Anwitaman
Datta from NTU in Singapore, who suggested the split design of Lilliput during our
discussions and contributed text improvements.
The Search scheme, including the algorithms, also was my own idea. The implemen-
tation in Tigase as well as the evaluations were done by Marius Hornung during works
for his Bahelor thesis under my supervision.
Leveraging the data from our user studies to improve prefetching of videos in OSNs
is a result of discussions with Stefan Wilk. He supervised a student’s Bachelor the-
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sis work with the goal to improve video prefetching. Stefan’s study with 34 partici-
pants was conducted by creating an application for mobile phones. It was too small
to be meaningful but a perfect supplement for our data which was collected by using
a browser extension for Firefox and Chrome. We combined our results and published
them together at the CCNC thereafter.
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Chapter2
Feature Orchestration and Service
Usage in Facebook
Social networking is a fascinating phenomena. It supports basic human needs such as
communication, socializing with others and reputation building. However, the usage of
OSNs is still not deeply understood and avoiding adverse effects by developing better
OSNs requires an understanding of how users interact with the systems. To this end,
we present a study to understand how users orchestrate Facebook’s functions to gain
benefit for themselves. We also take the changes of user behavior from 2009 till 2014
into account to understand the success and aging process of Facebook, and compare
our findings with user behavior assumptions in the literature.
Our study is based on data, which is collected at the client-side. We gath-
ered it from 2,071 users via a web-browser plug-in to overcome limitations
of crawled datasets ([Catanese et al., 2011, Meo et al., 2014, Jiang et al., 2013,
Gyarmati and Trinh, 2010]), click streams [Schneider et al., 2009] or social net-
work aggregator data [Benvenuto et al., 2009]. Our plug-in is able to measure
client-side activity such as scrolling or deactivating tabs to estimate the time that users
invest to examine newsfeed posts. The plug-in has access to profile details endowed
with user’s rights and is able to read activity logs that encompass historical actions
regardless of their origin from mobile or stationary devices.
To find volunteers for this study who are eager to install our plug-in, we sent a
solicitation to join this study to users of our previous work where we created a new
interface to simplify audience selection. In the previous work, we published a browser
extension (plug-in) for Firefox and Chrome, called Facebook Privacy Watcher (FPW),
which implements this new type of interface with the purpose to yield benefit to people.
Both versions (Chrome and Firefox) of the FPW together were installed by more than
44,000 Facebook users.
We asked the FPW users to join a user study about user behavior in Facebook by
installing a second browser extension that anonymously collects the data for this study.
2,071 FPW users allowed us to evaluate their user behavior in detail by installing a
second browser extension, called Facebook Privacy Analyzer (FPA). We collected basic
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demographical data such as gender and age, data on usage patterns with respect to
functionalities, data about communication partners w.r.t. to the social graph distance
as well as metadata about the shared content. This metadata consists of the type
of content, the time when it was created or watched as well as its size in bytes (if
available). We respect the privacy of all probands by not storing or evaluating any
content or identifier!
To understand the user behavior on Facebook, we evaluate the dataset with focus on
the questions: How do people orchestrate the vast variety of functions? Who produces
content in Facebook? How much and which kind of information do people share on
Facebook? Who consumes which content? How old is the shared content until it is
viewed and how long is it commonly consumed? How does the observed user behavior
change over time?
The main findings are that Facebook sessions are very short, compared with assump-
tions in the literature and users’ content contributions are extremely disparate in type
and quantity. A major share of newsfeed stories is posted by a minority of users and
consists of reshared, liked or commented issues rather than original user-generated
content. Facebook manages to compensate this lack of high quality content by trans-
forming commercial posts into regular newsfeed content that is accepted by FPA users
equally beside user-generated content.
With this work, we contribute at shedding light on the usage of Facebook with respect
to churn, content contribution and consumption, as well as communication patterns.
We also help developers of alternative (e.g. P2P-based) OSN architectures to make
well-founded design choices. Moreover, we provide evidence for Facebook to be an ag-
ing network by analyzing dynamics of user behavior over time. Evaluating the history
of user actions from 2009 till 2014, we show that users tend to befriend with less other
users. Also, actions that cause little effort and commitment, such as reshares and likes,
recently became more popular than status updates and comments.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: We first describe the exper-
imental setup in Section 2.1. Thereafter, we examine the attention that users pay to
Facebook by evaluating the session durations and frequencies (churn) in Section 2.2
and evaluate the popularity of different functionalities in Facebook in Section 2.3. Fur-
thermore, we elaborate the newsfeed with respect to content creation, composition
and consumption in Section 2.4, evaluate communication patterns of FPA users in Sec-
tion 2.5 and examine dynamics in user behavior in Section 2.6. In Section 2.8, we
summarize our work and draw major conclusions.
2.1 Experimental Setup
In this section, we describe our ethical considerations regarding this study, the data
collection process, the amount and the composition of the data that we collected. We
further describe the bias of the data with respect to the differences to the complete set
of Facebook users.
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2.1.1 Ethical Considerations
We acquired our participants by asking FPW users to participate in this study. Be-
fore installing the FPA, we explained the reason for collecting the data to our study
participants and allowed users to access and verify all data before sending it to our
server with consent. We further did not violate any rule on Facebook since we directly
gathered our data from our participant’s browser.
All data that we used for this study is anonymized and encrypted for transmission
with state-of-the-art technology. We did not collect or store any content or messages
but metadata about the user behavior such as content types, time stamps and hashes of
ids to be able to distinguish amongst actors without being able to identify individuals.
Nevertheless, we keep the collected data confidential to protect all study participants
from deanonymization attempts and do only publish aggregated data.
2.1.2 Sample Generation
We published the browser extension (FPW) to simplify audience selection for posts on
Facebook. Enclosed into an FPW update, we asked our users whether they would be
willing to help us with a user behavior study and thus share the necessary data with
us. 11,572 FPW users filled out the questionnaire: 11.8% of the users answered “yes”
21.3% answered with “maybe” and the rest answered with “no”. This questionnaire
was intended to be a risk reducing pre-test before developing the data collection plug-
in to make sure that a reasonable number users are willing to help us.
Subsequently to this successful pretest, the development of the data collection plug-
in started as a statistic module of the Facebook Privacy Watcher and was thus called
Facebook Privacy Analyzer. However, we decided the FPA to be a stand-alone plug-in.
The FPA version for the Chrome browser was published at Chrome web store on 24th
of November 2013. After fixing several bugs, the Firefox version was published on 16th
of January 2014. FPW users who previously agreed to join the study were immediately
asked to install the plug-in by showing a pop-up window in FPW. All other FPW users
were asked a second time again two weeks later. To incentivise study participation, the
data collecting plug-in FPA provided statistics to users about their own behavior. The
statistics also could be shared on Facebook and compared with friends.
2.1.3 Sample Bias
Since we cannot force any randomly chosen person to join our study, we only studied
persons who were eager to help us in doing research. The data that we collected is
thus neither a result of a random sampling process nor the complete Facebook dataset.
We thus suffer from a bias that is evaluated in this section.
The majority of our participants joined us by following an invitation via pop-up mes-
sage in the FPW. The FPW became popular by newspaper articles and radio station
broadcasts that reached also less technology-savvy people of several ages. Beside some
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international media such as “tech.tavaana.org” or “Der Standard”, the center of FPW
news coverage was in Germany. Hence, the overwhelming majority of the FPA users are
originated from Germany (84.87%), too. The rest of the participants are - according
to the information in their profiles - from 45 other countries.
Figure 2.1: Friend relations amongst FPA users; singletons are excluded
The structure of friend relations amongst our study participants is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.1. It includes all (621) FPA users who have at least one friend who is also
participating our study. Singletons, which represent 68.02% of the graph, are not part
of this illustration to keep it simple. This figure shows that our set of participants is
not consisting of a closed community, since only three bigger clusters of 31, eleven and
eight users exist. Instead, it is heterogeneous sample.
To further estimate the sample bias, we recorded the gender and the year of birth of
our participants from their user profiles. 77.6% of the participants are male, 21.13%
are female and the rest did not share this information with us. Some users claimed to
be born before 1925 or after 2010. However, we assume the majority of age informa-
tion to be correct. The majority of our participants was born between 1960 and 1985.
Our median participant is a 44 years old male Facebook user. Compared with average
Facebook users1, our participants are older and males are overrepresented.
1 http://www.prdaily.com/Main/Articles/The_average_Facebook_user_is_getting_
olderand_more_13483.aspx, accessed on 2015-11-02
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2.1.4 Details of Collected Data
To understand the Facebook usage, we require data that describes both components of
interaction together with the respective timing information: the actions performed by
users as well as the information flow from Facebook to the users. We mainly collected
four data types, using the FPA: the performed actions of users, the friend lists of users,
activity logs and basic demographic information about the FPA users. Furthermore, we
measured exact session durations by storing the time when activating and deactivating
browser tabs in case of active Facebook sessions. In the remainder of this section, we
explain the four main types of collected information and their necessity for our study.
Performed Actions
The occurrence of every action that a user performed in Facebook was recorded in
the (local) database, together with a timestamp and the browser tab ID. We recorded
further metadata about the actions such as the hashes of persons who are involved in
those actions.
Friend Lists
We recorded the friend list as set of UIN hashes. We needed this information for
several reasons: We checked whether two-sided actions such as messaging or profile
views are performed amongst friends or strangers, we counted the number of friends
of each FPA user to calculate the node degree within the ego-graph and we checked
newsfeed posts whether they are originated from friends.
Activity Logs
The FPA can only gather data in case the user uses a web browser based Facebook
access. However, Facebook maintains an activity log as a part of the user profiles.
This activity log contains activity records back till the time of registration at Facebook
independent from the access channel (e.g. mobile app or browser).
These records contain almost all actions which have been performed on Facebook
together with the timestamp and some metadata such as communication partners.
Private messaging e.g. is not included in the activity logs. Nevertheless, it is a very
valuable data source for our analysis since it allows us to estimate the fraction of
actions that we can observe in the browser. We can thus bridge the gap that would
appear in case of only evaluating data from Firefox or Chrome browsers.
Furthermore, due to the activity log’s long term records, we can evaluate changes in
user behavior during time. We can thus trace the learning process of new users joining
Facebook.
User Demographics
Based on ethical considerations to protect user’s privacy, we only stored basic user
data such as age and gender. We need this data to estimate the bias of our sample.
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2.1.5 Data Quantification
Since we changed parts of the code basis through updates after the first publication of
the plug-in, we decided to use only data that was collected after 1st of January 2014.
During our observation period of 123 days, 2071 users installed the FPA. However,
not every study participant joined at the first day and not every participant stayed the
whole rest of the time. We thus observed our participants on average 34 days.
2.1.6 Mobile Device Usage
In 2014, 68% of all Facebook’s users accessed the OSN at least once per month using a
mobile device2. Since the FPA is an extension for the Firefox and Chrome, no data can
be collected while using the Facebook application on Android or Apple devices.
However (as explained in 2.1.4), we obtain activity logs from our users that contain
all actions that are performed in the respective account. This also encloses actions on
mobile devices or stationary devices without an installed FPA instance. One downside
of evaluating activity logs is that we cannot precisely distinguish between actions, per-
fomed on stationary and mobile usage. We can only estimate the mobile device usage
by comparing the FPA included records with those from the activity logs.
In addition to the activity logs, the FPA can read the whole user profile, independent
of the devices that have been used to create the content. The participant only needs
to access her profile at least once within a browser with an active FPA instance. We
thus assume most of our analyses to be unaffected by mobile device usage even though
the data is obtained via browser. Evaluations, that suffer drawbacks due to the gap in
mobile device usage, are marked accordingly.
2.2 Churn
Churn denotes one component of our user behavior measurements. It describes session
starting and ending patterns. This is important, since churn reflects intensity of users
using Facebook and hence is a measure of the total attention Facebook receives. More-
over, realistic churn assumptions are the basis to evaluate P2P-based DOSNs, since only
nodes that are connected to the system are able to contribute resources. In this section,
we describe the churn behavior that we observed by evaluating the session durations
and the average session frequency per day.
Caused by the properties of web-based systems in which communication is triggered
by user activity (events), different methods exist to measure churn (Figure 2.2). The
related work (e.g. [Schneider et al., 2009]) use inter alia the absence of activity (time-
outs) as an indicator for users to leave the system. In contrast to the related work,
the browser plug-in FPA has access to more precise information such as whether a tab
is activated or not. To ensure comparability, we include four different measurements
2 http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/380636/umfrage/
prognose-des-anteils-mobiler-nutzer-an-den-facebook-nutzern-in-den-usa/, accessed
on 2015-11-01
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of churn measurement methods; (adapted from [Puscher, 2014])
instead of only presenting the most precise measurements. We distinguish amongst
the following four churn measures:
• Basic: A session always starts with the login on Facebook and ends either with a
logout or with closing the last open browser tab with an open Facebook session.
However, this session definition leads to extreme cases of sessions lengths lasting
several days. It does not realistically reflect the user’s attention. We thus included
a timeout of three hours starting after the last action was performed by the user.
• Timeout: The timeout measurements are conform to the previous mea-
surements, using a more aggressive timeout of five minutes. We ague that
this short timeout reflects user attention better than the basic churn measure
[Schneider et al., 2009].
• Basic without timeout: We included the previous measurements without time-
out to quantify the effect of the timeouts on our basic measurements. Comparing
’basic’ and ’basic without timeout’ indicates how many users log themselves off or
close Facebook tabs while leaving.
• Precise: Since the FPA notices tabs to be activated and deactivated, the most
precise measurement is to count a session to start as soon as either a users per-
forms a login action on Facebook or a browser tab on Facebook is activated. The
session ends in case the browser (or the tab) is either closed or deactivated or a
logout action is performed.
Figure 2.3 shows the duration of sessions. The ’precise’ and ’timeout’ measurements
depict very short Facebook sessions of 2:16 minutes on average (median: 0:17) for
’precise’ and an average of 5:32 (median 2:21) for ’timeout’. The average results of the
’basic’ measurements (31:40 minutes) are roughly in line with the results of Schneider
et al. [Schneider et al., 2009] and the measurements without timeout show unrealistic
lengths of 240:01 minutes.
Beside the session duration, the average number of sessions is important, too. Mul-
tiplying the averages of both measures results in the average total online time per day.
Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of average session numbers. The ’precise’ measure-
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of session durations with respect to four different measure-
ment methods on a logarithmic scale
Figure 2.4: Average number of sessions per day
ment indicates an average of 2.97 sessions, the ’timeout’ method 1.28 and the ’basic’
indicates an average of 0.79 sessions per day.
2.3 Function Popularity
Beside its third-party app ecosystem, Facebook itself comprises a rich compilation of
functions which characterize the service. Figure 2.5 contains box-whisker plots which
show the relative fraction of time that users spend with each function. The box-whisker
plots are ordered by the median time that users spend with each function.
The newsfeed, called ’Timeline’, dominates Facebook usage, followed by viewing
other users’ profiles. Viewing pictures is very popular, too. Surprisingly, users spend
more time with topic-related interest groups (named ’groups’ in Figure 2.5) and the
enclosed newsfeeds (’list newsfeed’) than with exchanging messages with others. The
median FPA user spends more time with maintaining the own profile than with running
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Figure 2.5: Fraction of time that FPA users spent using different Facebook
functionalities
apps on Facebook. However, running apps is not unpopular in general. A minority of
users spends a big fraction of their time with apps.
The page transition matrix in Figure 2.6 shows relations among different functions
in Facebook by depicting page type transitions. Two main findings can be quickly
realized: Users tend to repeat actions several times (e.g. view a picture after viewing
a picture) and the newsfeed is the dominating functionality getting the most page hits
from other transition sources.
Third Party Applications
In this section, we evaluate the usage of third party applications (apps) which are
completely integrated into Facebook itself and leverage the Facebook platform to pro-
vide benefit to their users. For these evaluations, we only included data from users
who never accessed their newsfeed to exclude strangers and those who joined our
experiment for less than one week. We thus only used the data of 1,068 users.
The mutual benefit of the app creator and Facebook are that Facebook’s functional-
ity is extended by third parties and the third parties can leverage Facebook platform
functionality. Based on the platform functionality, the App instances of different users
can communicate with each other and the platform allows the apps to receive informa-
tion about the users, such as the friendship connections or interests, in case of user’s
consent. The apps can thus leverage the social graph to fortify collaboration amongst
friends and to establish or support a feeling of togetherness.
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Figure 2.6: Page transition matrix; the row values sum up to 100 %
29.96% of the FPA users used at least one app and 50.88 % of all app users used ex-
actly one app. On average, app users use a total number of 2.55 apps and spend 14.97
% of their time on Facebook with running apps. Figure 2.7 shows the distributions of
the number of apps the users from the evaluation set are using as well as the distribu-
tion of the fraction of time they spend. Figure 2.8 shows the popularity distribution of
apps amongst users. However, because of our privacy limitations, we only know the
hash values of app IDs rather than their names. Hence, we only know how popular
apps are but do not know which apps are popular.
2.4 The Facebook Newsfeed
Being the core of Facebook, we dedicate this section to the Timeline. Attracting users
to generate and contribute content to the Timeline, such as pictures, videos status up-
dates and text messages, is crucial for the success of social networking platforms like
Facebook. However, the platform operator needs to solve a chicken-and-egg problem:
content contributors need to be incentivised to contribute content by the existence of
an audience that is interested in their submissions and the crucial incentive for a po-
tential audience to spend their attention to the platform is the existence of interesting
content.
Thus, Facebook’s role is to be an information mediator that manages two scarce
resources: valuable and interesting content as well as attention of the audience. “The
goal of News Feed is to deliver the right content to the right people at the right time so
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Figure 2.7: Box-whisker-plots: distributions of the number of apps FPA users are using
and the time they are spending with apps
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Figure 2.8: Popularity of apps (due to privacy limitations, we do not know the names
of the apps and thus numbered them)
they don’t miss the stories that are important to them. Ideally, we want News Feed to
show all the posts people want to see in the order they want to read them.“ 3
The straightforward way to only leverage friendship connections as communication
channels while respecting restrictions arising from privacy settings is not sufficient to
find an interested audience for content. The matchmaking is a hard task to solve for
two reasons: a minority of users posts a lot of content which is not interesting for all of
their friends and the amount of posts quickly becomes too high to be read by others3.
Facebook thus decides which content to place in which user’s Timeline to provide the
most interesting news to the users during their period of attention.
This matchmaking can be improved by understanding two determinants: the inter-
ests of users in content as well as by understanding the meaning of content. In the
remainder of this section, we first examine user’s content contribution to understand
Facebook’s initial situation for placing content in timelines. We then explain the news-
3 https://www.facebook.com/business/news/News-Feed-FYI-A-Window-Into-News-Feed,
accessed on 2015-10-28
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feed arrangement which reflects Facebook’s assumptions and wishes which content to
view. The consumption of presented content is evaluated thereafter. Finally, we show
the impact of the provided content based on the measured user reactions such as com-
ments and likes. The following Timeline related evaluations are based on the subset of
774 users who viewed at least 100 posts (788,938 in total) to avoid outliers to affect
our results.
2.4.1 Content Generation
The Timeline contains not only user generated content. Facebook itself is creating
a big portion of posts that appear in the Timeline e.g. to inform users about sta-
tus or profile picture updates of their friends. Companies (ad pages) can also post
regular newsfeed messages. However, in the remainder of this section (2.4.1), we fo-
cus on user-generated content rather than content generated from Facebook itself or
commercial pages.
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.10 0.25 0.50 1.00 2.00 5.00 10.00 25.00 50.00 100.00 200.00
Mean number of actions per week
Fr
a
ct
io
n 
of
 u
se
rs
Action  Photo/video upload  Status update  Share
Figure 2.9: Content that was posted at the Facebook Timeline by its type
Users can create different types of content: status updates which only consist of
pure text messages, shared links to internal or external pages as well as media such
as photos or videos. In general, publishing content is not very popular. 36.37% of
the users who viewed at least 100 posts during the observation period did not post
anything. We excluded them from further content generation evaluations.
Figure 2.9 shows the popularity of the three kinds of content uploads. The main
finding is that the average number of posts per week is extremely diverse with respect
to different users. The relative frequency of sharing content can be represented by a
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Figure 2.10: Content posting targets
long tailed distribution. For example, we observed users to share more than 200 links
per week on average.
However, the overwhelming majority only posts very few items. Our FPA users cre-
ated on average 4.36 posts per week. Most frequently, they shared already existing
content amongst others (2.43 times per week). Status updates and photo and video
uploads happen less often. On average, 1.57 Status updates and 0.35 photos were
posted.
Beside the own profile, users can also leverage other channels to post content. Figure
2.10 shows what type of content is posted on the own profile, at a friend’s profile or
on a group’s newsfeed. The overwhelming majority of Links are shared on the own
Timeline and most photos and videos are published there as well. However, elaborating
details regarding status update posts depict different patterns. Facebook invites users
to send birthday congratulations via e-mail notification and provides a dedicated page
for this purpose. The the result is that the majority of status updates was published
on friend’s profiles whereof 36.42% of them were directly posted via the sidebar of
birthday congratulation pages.
2.4.2 Newsfeed Composition
In this section, we evaluate the composition of the newsfeed. We examine who authors
the newsfeed content to depict the nature of the service and we evaluate which fraction
of friends contributes to the newsfeed to scrutinize Facebook’s eligibility as a tool to
keep in touch with friends.
Facebook was initially planned for students to establish and maintain connections
among friends. Figure 2.11 shows the distribution of newsfeed entries with respect to
the authorship. Nowadays, the average fraction of friend-generated content dropped
to 49.5%. While introducing professional pages as a tool for companies to commu-
nicate with their customers, Facebook became an important advertising platform that
now reaches an average fraction of 41.4% of commercial newsfeed entries. Only a
very small fraction of content was initially posted by strangers (9.1%). Content from
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strangers may appear in the personal newsfeed in case that friends interact with it (e.g.
attach likes or comments).
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Figure 2.11: Authors of newsfeed entries
The fraction of friends appearing in the newsfeed is critical for Facebook as a service
that allows users to stay in touch with the whole set of friends. The intuitive assump-
tion is that the fraction of friends that contributes to the newsfeed of users decreases
with an increasing set of friends. This assumption is based on the facts that an increas-
ing set of friends means a bigger set of stories for Facebook to choose for including into
the Timeline while users only spend a limited amount of attention to the newsfeed.
Figure 2.12 shows the linear regression on the size of the set of friends versus the
fraction of friends in the newsfeed. It shows both: that the decreasing assumption
holds as well as that the relation is not very strong (-0.32). Our interpretation is that
Facebook tries to include as many friends as possible into the Timeline.
Some users with the huge set of more than 700 friends still see content of more than
50% of their contacts in their newsfeeds. This leads to a huge amount of newsfeed
entries and suggests that Facebook scales the number of content items in the newsfeed
according to the attention that it receives.
Most newsfeed entries are very fresh until they are shown: 84.79% are not older
than 24 hours and 25.77% are created less than one hour before. However, a small
fraction of entries is very old: 4.02% are older than 7 days 1.73% are older than 30
days. One reason for very old content to appear or reappear in the newsfeed are friends
liking or commenting old content.
2.4.3 Content Consumption
In this section, we provide insights into the content consumption habits of the FPA
users. We first evaluate how long different types of newsfeed entries stay in the view-
port of the browser before being clicked. This gives an idea about how much effort FPA
users invest into the decision which content they view. We then evaluate how many
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Figure 2.12: Relation between the total number of friends and the fraction of friends
appearing in the newsfeed (linear regression)
newsfeed entries were viewed on average per day to estimate the amount of attention
a user pays to the newsfeed. Finally, we examine the types of accessed content to allow
comparing the posted with the viewed content.
Figure 2.13: The time that newsfeed entries stay in the browser viewport with respect
to the authors of entries
Figure 2.13 shows the time a newsfeed entry stays in the browser viewport before
being clicked. This information illustrates the time investments of users to check a
certain entry. Most users invest between one and ten seconds (average 9.5s) to decide
whether to click on an entry or not. This is valid for all types of entries independent
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from the authorship. Very interesting is that posts from commercial pages receive a
similar attention like posts from friends or strangers (9.8s vs. 9.1s). However, posts
from strangers cause a slightly more diverse checking time than others. While there is
a peak at 1.5 seconds, there are is also a higher value at 60 seconds compared with
posts from friends or pages.
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
10 25 50 100 250 500 1000
Average number of read newsfeed−entries / day
Fr
a
ct
io
n 
of
 u
se
rs
Figure 2.14: Distribution (Histogram) of the average number of newsfeed entries that
have been viewed by FPA users during the observation period; each bar
indicates the fraction of users viewing the respective average number of
posts
On average, users view 43 posts per day. A histogram that allows to estimate the dis-
tribution can be found in Figure 2.14. Figure 2.15 shows the composition of newsfeed
entry views. The biggest fraction of viewed posts consists of shared links (41.76%),
photos (27.34%) and status updates (16.77%). Considering the authorship of posts, it
is surprising for us that the clicked shares of commercial posts roughly equal those of
friends or strangers. FPA users seem to accept commercial newsfeed posts equally as
regular news beside user-generated content.
FPA users like on average roughly 4% and comment 1% of all newsfeed posts. Fig-
ure 2.16 shows the long tailed distributions of the number of comments, attached to
newsfeed entries.
2.5 Communication Patterns
In this section, we provide insights into communication patterns of FPA users. We first
separately evaluate the user profile views as such representing the most popular two-
sided communication functionality. In case of viewing user profiles, the profile owners
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Figure 2.15: Number of newsfeed entries that are viewed by FPA users with respect to
entry types
are information sender and the user who is accessing the profile is the information
receiver.
2.5.1 User Profile Access
Profiles in Facebook can be classified into two major categories: profiles of individuals
and profiles of professional pages that represent companies or prominent persons such
as actors or musicians. In Figure 2.17, we further distinguish amongst friend’s, friend-
of-friend’s and stranger’s profiles as well as between liked and unliked professional
pages. FPA users visit on average 33.51% pages of friends, 30.19 % ’unliked’ profes-
sional pages 15.32% pages of friend-of-friends, 11.22 % stranger’s pages and 9.76 %
liked professional pages.
2.5.2 Communication with Friends
Facebook is widely known as a tool to communicate with friends. To understand such
communication, we elaborate the two-sided functionalities. Figure 2.18 shows the per-
centages of friends that have been communicated with during the observation period
by using a certain communication function. Since this analysis is affected by a too
short observation time, we only included data from 714 users who participated for
more than four weeks in our study.
The majority of FPA users communicates with only a minority of friends. By far
the most popular communication between friends is viewing newsfeed entries of each
other, followed by clicking on shared links, viewing profiles and liking content. On the
other side of the spectrum, least popular are poking, timeline posts and commenting.
Excluding the extreme cases of poking and viewing newsfeed entries, the most popular
functions are those which imply the lowest commitment of the acting user.
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Figure 2.16: Number of comments and likes of newsfeed entries
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Figure 2.17: Profile page access with respect to the social graph distance; we distin-
guish between liked and not liked (unliked) professional pages
Both poking and viewing newsfeed entries are exceptional cases for different rea-
sons. The newsfeed is arranged by Facebook’s algorithms and thus no explicit choice
of the users. Poking is exceptional because it is only intensively used by a very small
fraction of users.
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Figure 2.18: Percentage of friends with whom the FPA users communicate with respect
to the communication function
2.6 Dynamics in User Behavior
The social networking idea still disseminates amongst world’s population. The estab-
lishment of best practices as well as the process of users to learn how to use social
networking tools like Facebook is an ongoing process. Furthermore, Facebook is per-
manently working hard to improve the service. Thus, usage patterns evolve over time
and examining user behavior in the field of social networking means to examine a
quickly moving target.
Fortunately, Facebook encloses an activity log into user profiles. It contains all actions
of many categories that users performed, starting from the day when a user registered
her account at Facebook. Our tool, FPA, is able to read this information. To show the
development of usage patterns, we compare the popularity of the seven most popular
activities on Facebook per year in Figure 2.19.
This plot strikingly showcases the maturity of Facebook and its decreased growth
rates. The fraction of friend-adding actions dropped from year to year. This indicates
that the process of new friends joining the network as well as the establishment of
friendship connections converged to the natural social dynamics in the society.
Also noticeable is that the share of actions that require little effort from users in-
creases: Likes and sharing of content recently became much more popular than in
2009. The fraction of sharing actions increased by a factor of 4.62 from 2009 till
2014. Accordingly, the fraction of comment, status update actions and photo uploads
decreased.
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Figure 2.19: Comparison of Facebook usage from 2009 till 2014
2.7 Related Work
A vast amount of related work in the field of user behavior in OSNs has been done by
now. Prior work can be classified by the research discipline (e.g. computer science and
psychology), the data collection method as well as the social network that has been
analyzed (e.g. Twitter, Facebook, Google+).
We aimed to understand the technical core of Facebook’s success. In the remainder
of this section, we thus focus on related work in computer science about Facebook that
evaluates functionality rather than e.g. the social graph. Unlike works in the field of
psychology or sociology [Wilson et al., 2012], we did not aim to contribute in explor-
ing OSN user’s individual properties or any relation between OSNs and societies. We
took the system’s point of view and wanted to know how users use Facebook’s func-
tionality and how to build excellent systems that support user’s needs. Since capturing
functionality usage causes stringent requirements on the data collection process, we
examined related work based on this criteria in this section.
Many works on user behavior are based on crawler-gathered data
[Catanese et al., 2011, Meo et al., 2014, Jiang et al., 2013, Gyarmati and Trinh, 2010].
Datasets that are acquired by employing crawlers contain static elements of user pro-
files. Dynamics can be estimated by frequently crawling the same information to
detect changes. Also activity counters such as page view counters can detect some
types of dynamics [Strufe, 2010]. Page view counters have been also used by Lin et al.
[Lin et al., 2012]. They crawled Renren and Sina which offer pageview counters and
allow to crawl a list of the last nine visitors. This type of information allows insights
into profile visits by building directed and weighted graphs. However, datasets that
are acquired by employing crawlers are not sufficient for our purpose to understand
how users use Facebook since they neither reflect the use of all kinds of functionality
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(such as messaging, likes or the ’Timeline’ usage) or their interplay nor do they allow
to evaluate exact timings.
Schneider et al. [Schneider et al., 2009] analyzed passively monitored click streams
of Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, Hi5, and StudiVZ. They analyzed feature and service
popularity, churn, click sequences and profile usage but do not evaluate information
about the newsfeed and profile page compositions or historical data. We can confirm
the finding that users are trapped when using a specific functionality. If users view
pictures, the likelihood is extremely high that the next action is again to view pic-
tures. However, Schneider et al. did not evaluate content consumption nor content
contribution habits of users.
Benvenuto et al. [Benvenuto et al., 2009] elaborated click stream data from 37,024
users of Orkut, MySpace, Hi5, and LinkedIn in a twelve days period, collected by a
Brazilian social network aggregator. They additionally analyzed crawler data which
was collected at Orkut. The main results of this work are session descriptions con-
taining information such as how long and how often users use which function of the
system. With the help of the crawler data on Orkut, Benvenuto et al. analyzed func-
tion usage with respect to friend relations. In contrast to this work, we focused on
Facebook in 2014. Due to client-side data collection, we know timing issues such as
pre-click times, can distinguish between stranger profiles and professional sites and
are able to do long-term evaluations based on activity log data.
To overcome these dataset implicated downsides in understanding Facebook usage,
Facebook-internal applications and client-side data collection methods have been de-
veloped. Mondal et al. [Mondal et al., 2014] leveraged a Facebook app to examine
Social Access Control Lists and Luarn et al. [Luarn et al., 2014] developed a Face-
book app to test and confirm the hypothesis that people’s network degree is positively
correlated with the the frequency of information dissemination. Client-side data collec-
tion can be found in [Weinreich et al., 2006, Velayathan and Yamada, 2007]. However,
these works did not analyze OSNs but web surfing behavior in general.
The allocation of attention amongst friends has been analyzed by Facebook
[Backstrom et al., 2011]. The main findings are that Facebook users concentrate
their attention on a small fraction of friends while messaging is much more focused
on few individuals than profile page views. Backstrom et al. observed a gender ho-
mophily: “We find that females send 68% of their messages to females, while males
send only 53% of their messages to females. This distinction is consistent with gender
homophily — in which each gender has a bias toward within-gender communication
— modulated by the overall distribution of Facebook messages. On the other hand,
we see much smaller differences in viewing: for typical activity levels, both females
and males direct roughly 60% of their profile viewing activity to female users.” In
contrast to Backstrom et al. [Backstrom et al., 2011], we evaluated user behavior pat-
terns more detailed with respect to timings and content contribution and consumption.
We further evaluated historical and device usage independent data to understand the
development of user behavior over time in the recent past.
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2.8 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a study on user behavior in Facebook with 2,071 partici-
pants. We elaborated the function usage to find out which is the dominating function
in Facebook, we evaluated the newsfeed and depicted what kind and how much infor-
mation is shared amongst which actors. Since Facebook is widely known as a tool to
communicate with friends, we checked this assumption by explicitly elaborating how
often the study participants communicated with their friends using a certain function-
ality. Finally, we elaborated the dynamics in user behavior, since research on user
behavior means to learn about a moving target.
Facebook’s major strength is its efficiency in simplifying communication. First, it
leverages cross channel effects. Facebook users only need to add persons as friends to
stay in touch. Lists of friends act as IDs for many communication channels such as mes-
saging, content sharing or even voice chats. Second, it automatically filters stories in
the newsfeed to allow users to efficiently grasp the most important information about
their social environment. From content producer’s point of view, this filtering leads
to an automatic audience selection. Third, its friend recommender system simplifies
finding social contacts. Fourth, it is time-efficient to send birthday congratulations.
Facebook thus becomes the channel through which people receive attention from their
social contacts.
The evaluation of our dataset yielded several different findings. We summarize them
as follows:
• Sessions in Facebook are shorter and less frequent than assumed in the literature.
In particular, very long sessions are missing.
• The newsfeed is the most intensively used function in Facebook.
• Content contribution is very disparate. A few users contribute a major share of
content.
• FPA users consume many items in a short time per day (average: 43 items in 6:44
minutes).
• Shared content in Facebook is very fresh. 84.79% of all posts are not older than
24 hours until being shown to the recipients.
• The probability of a commercial newsfeed entry to be viewed roughly equals those
of friend’s posts in average.
• User behavior in Facebook is changing at the scale of years. While low effort ac-
tions, such as likes and reshares, recently became more popular, the contribution
of photos, status updates and comments is relatively decreasing.
• Facebook became mature and stable. This is reflected not only by decreasing user
growth rate but also by decreasing establishment of new connections amongst
the existing set of users. Users discover fewer new people to add as friend.
We conclude from our observations that users recently seem to use Face-
book with a higher speed and lower effort than before, preferring quick actions
with low commitment (e.g. likes and reshares). Also, users prefer extremely
fresh content. As a consequence, alternative OSN architectures, such as P2P-
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based OSNs (e.g. [Cutillo et al., 2009c, Narendula et al., 2012, Shahriar et al., 2013,
Buchegger et al., 2009a, Paul et al., 2014a]), could be designed in a lightweight way
without the burden of persistently storing stale content in large user profiles. Be-
cause of their low storage overhead, the large fraction of shared (external) links in the
newsfeeds supports the idea of small user profiles, too. Furthermore, focus of alterna-
tive OSN architectures should be brought on dynamic environments, caused by short
session durations.
This work has also highlighted the dynamics in user behavior at a scale of years.
We assume both technological influences, such as advances in the sector of mobile
computing, as well as the social reasons, e.g. learning curves of users and privacy
discussions, to be drivers of dynamics in user behavior. User behavior in OSNs thus
should be studied while being aware of these dynamics. Stale user behavior models
should be carefully used to evaluate novel systems, since stale models may not reflect
the recent situation in OSNs.
Surprisingly for us, users spend a major share of their attention and time with com-
mercial pages. The probability of commercial newsfeed entries to be viewed roughly
equals those of friend’s posts (does not hold for a small set of close friends). Thus,
Facebook seems to be successful to target the recipients of commercial news and it
seems to insert a compatible amount of commercial content into the newsfeed.
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Chapter3
Privacy Preferences of Facebook
Users
OSNs allow their users to create and maintain a personal user profile and connect this
profile with others by declaring friendship relations. Amongst communication func-
tionalities, sharing content and personal information is the core of OSN sites. Content
sharing serves communication and self-expression needs of OSN users, but raises pri-
vacy concerns at the same time.
There is an ongoing discussion about how to handle those privacy concerns. The
CEOs of Google and Facebook argue that we live in a post-privacy world1,2. We shall
accept the fact that there is no privacy anymore and adapt ourselves to the new situa-
tion. On the other side of the discussion spectrum, privacy advocates fear oversharing
of content [Liu et al., 2011b] to avoid adverse effects such as that employers are ac-
cessing private information to draw undesired conclusions. In spite of this discussion,
the real privacy preferences of the social networking community are still not entirely
known.
Studying the actual privacy settings of Facebook users does also not
tell the whole story about content sharing and privacy preferences (e.g.
[Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2008]), since users are commonly unable to select the
desired audience [Liu et al., 2011b, Madejski et al., 2011]. We thus developed a color-
based interface to simplify the audience selection for user content in Facebook. It
reduces both errors and effort of choosing the audience. Subsequently, we developed
and published an extension for the Firefox and Chrome browsers to help users to meet
their privacy preferences and to study the latter.
In this chapter, we study the privacy preferences of users in Facebook and present
our first approach to mitigate adverse effects in OSNs. To that end, we present our au-
dience selection interface, together with two user studies. The first user study shows
the effectiveness and efficiency of our audience selection interface in a controlled en-
1 http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy, accessed on 2015-
11-01
2 https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/12/google-ceo-eric-schmidt-dismisses-privacy
accessed on 2015-11-01
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vironment. The second study in this chapter is a large-scale user study with 4,182
users from 102 countries that shows the impact of the new interface. We evaluate the
behavior from real users who perform audience selection on their own user profiles for
their own reasons on their own devices.
3.1 Reducing Maloperation Risks in Audience Selection
Previous research concordantly argues that privacy enhancing technologies, includ-
ing distributed and secure data storage are important for OSN [Shakimov et al., 2009,
Tootoonchian et al., 2009]. Yet, it can only improve the situation if the users are ac-
tually able to choose the adequate audience for their postings and properly configure
their privacy settings accordingly. Furthermore, there is consent that this can only be
ensured by increasing intelligibility of current privacy controls [Madejski et al., 2011,
Liu et al., 2011b]. To this end we propose C4PS - Colors for Privacy Settings, a novel
concept for privacy settings and their representation. C4PS aims at minimizing the
cognitive overhead of the audience selection process, based on three foundations:
• color coding of authorization settings with immediate feedback upon change,
• one-click configuration based on proximity of data and respective controls and
• group-based access control through aggregated configuration, and easy group
management based on drag-and-drop.
While we implemented and tested C4PS as a proof of concept for Facebook, the idea
is generally applicable to any OSN, or other web pages with privacy settings.
We started with a C4PS mockup for the Facebook interface early 2011 to evaluate,
if C4PS indeed simplifies the authorization task and performed a lab user study. The
results
• indicate that modifying and inspecting the privacy settings is significantly easier
and more efficient when applying C4PS and
• confirm previous studies showing that even users who consider themselves profi-
cient with the Facebook site are unable to correctly perform precise privacy set-
tings.
Based on the results of the study we provide a Firefox plug-in applying C4PS to the
modified Facebook interface after the introduction of the Timeline for download.
The rest of this section is organized as follows: We present the rationale concept and
design of C4PS in Section 3.1.1 and the color scheme and interface usage in Section
3.1.2. The methodology of our user study is described in Section 3.1.3 and its results
in Section 3.1.3. We conclude the study with a summary and future work in Section
3.1.4.
3.1.1 C4PS: Design Principles
The concept of C4PS is based on four main principles. The first three cover usabil-
ity aspects according to ISO 9241, and the last one defines the applicability of the
interface.
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P1 - Little Effort: To ensure high accuracy when working with the interface, the user
shall be able to check or change his privacy setting with as little effort (easy and fast)
as possible (inspired by ISO 9241-11 – effectiveness and efficiency; and [Krug, 2005]).
P2 - Applying Common Practices: To minimize the learning effort while becoming
accustomed to our interface, commonly accepted and well-known usability patterns
shall be used to support users – like colors, drag and drop, tooltips or graying out
inactive elements (inspired by ISO 9241-10 – conformity with user expectations).
P3 - Direct Success Control: To avoid gaps between intended and actually performed
adjustments (as shown in [Madejski et al., 2011]), results of modifications to the pri-
vacy settings shall be displayed and visible instantly (inspired by ISO 9241-10 – self
descriptiveness).
P4 - Applicability: To cause the least possible cognitive overhead for accustomed
users and to stay independent of Facebook, C4PS needs to allow for direct integration
into the existing web pages.
Based on these four principles, we developed concepts for C4PS, identifying a need
for new functionality for both the main privacy settings as well as the group manage-
ment.
3.1.2 C4PS: Color Scheme and Interface Usage
Regarding the main privacy setting functionality we highlight each attribute in the
profile by a particular color, depending on the group of people who are granted access.
We also enable the user to change the accessibility with just one click, support the
group selection with tooltips, make this privacy settings mode easily accessible, and
provide very brief instructions. In addition, the privacy settings mode provides a button
to check how others see the profile. These concepts are explained in detail in this
subsection.
Color Coding: The colors used are guided by the well-known traffic light colors (P2).
Blue was added to represent custom settings. The corresponding color definitions are:
• Red: Visible to nobody
• Blue: Visible to selected friends
• Yellow: Visible to all friends
• Green: Visible to everyone
All privacy settings are visualized by our color scheme in the C4PS privacy setting
mode (P4), so that an attribute’s visibility can be directly derived from its coloring
(cmp. Fig. 3.1). The concrete choice of colors (e.g. green to represent public visibility)
was subject of both: internal discussions and our user study. We will later present the
preferences of study participants.
Easy To Modify Setting for Single Attributes: The user can change the privacy setting
for a specific attribute by simply clicking the buttons on the edge of the row on the right
side (P1). The color of the buttons shows the visibility that will be set for the entry by
clicking on it (e.g. in Fig. 3.1). The settings are changed immediately (P3), which is
reflected directly by a color change of the attribute’s cell. If the user chooses “selected
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friends” (blue), a window opens in which friends or groups are granted access to the
mentioned attribute.
Tooltip: To further increase the usability, tooltips indicate the setting corresponding
to the color for each button (P2). Tooltips are shown when the mouse courser hovers
over the button (cmp. Fig. 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Color coding for one attribute - birthday
Easy Access to Privacy Settings: C4PS integrates in the mockup a new button under
the profile picture to enter the C4PS privacy settings page. This button is visible on
each Facebook page and thus the C4PS privacy settings page is easy to access (P1).
After switching to the privacy editing mode and editing the privacy settings, the user
can exit this mode by clicking a button labeled “Stop editing privacy settings” at the
same place. In the improved version we enabled the visibility of color coding instantly
without entering any privacy settings mode.
Information on the Top of the Page: According to common practice (P2), general
information about the color visualization and the meaning of each color are provided
on the top of the page in the editing mode.
Check how the own Profile is Shown to other Users: The privacy settings mode provides
a button at the top of the page ‘How others see your profile’, which offers a simple
visualization to check how selected other people - including friends - see the profile
(P1).
Application to Photo Albums: The privacy settings for photo albums can be checked
and modified with the same color mechanism. When visiting the Facebook “photos”
tab, an overview of all photo albums of the user is displayed, as in the original Facebook
interface. However, there is an additional button labeled “Edit Privacy Settings” (cmp.
Fig. 3.2).
This button again activates the C4PS privacy editing mode. Here, the photo album
elements are highlighted with a color indicating the privacy setting (cmp. Fig. 3.3).
Additionally, three colored buttons are shown on every item and allow to change the
privacy setting as described before. Clicking on the colored buttons changes the privacy
setting for the entire album, while individual restrictions, set to single photos, remain
unchanged. To change the privacy settings of a single photo the user can open the
photo album, in which the colored privacy buttons are placed at each photo.
With C4PS, checking and modifying privacy settings in Facebook takes a minimum
of two steps:
1. Accessing the C4PS privacy settings main page by clicking on “Edit Privacy Set-
tings”.
2a To inspect the current settings for the profile entry, the user only needs to properly
interpret the color. In case of custom settings a third step is required.
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Figure 3.2: Photo albums with-
out privacy settings
Figure 3.3: C4PS interface -
photo albums
2b To change the setting of any attribute, the user can simply click on the button
colored accordingly.
3.1.3 User Study
To evaluate C4PS, we conducted an extensive, controlled lab study. We aimed at vali-
dating the following four hypotheses:
H1 C4PS makes it easier and faster to find out to whom a particular attribute is visible.
H2 Using C4PS, testing how the complete profile is presented to another user is easier
and faster.
H3 Setting the visibility of attributes is easier and faster using C4PS.
H4 The group management can be handled easier and faster using C4PS.
These four hypotheses are intended to cover all aspects that may concern users aim-
ing to adjust their privacy settings. In addition, we were interested in the feedback
about the concrete ideas implemented in C4PS to further improve it.
We decided to run a lab study because this enabled us to measure time and clicks
while the participants solved some tasks with both interfaces - the improved one and
the original one. Correspondingly, the participants were asked to use a lab PC and a
Facebook profile that we created, to set a controlled environment without requiring
the participants to disclose their own Facebook profiles.
Course of Action
The study contained the following phases:
1. Answering the OSN questionnaire (provided on paper), containing eleven ques-
tions (see appendix 8.3) regarding the use of OSN in order to estimate the prior
knowledge of the test person
2. First practical part, during which several tasks have to be solved with one of the
interfaces. Note, to prevent a possible learning effect due to the first use of one of
the two interfaces, the order of presentation of the two interfaces was alternated
for each participant. The answers had to be written down (on paper).
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3. Answering the “System Usability Scale” (SUS) questionnaire (provided on paper)
as introduced by Brooke [Brooke, 1996]. It allows measurements concerning ef-
fectiveness, efficiency and user satisfaction, and due to its generality is applicable
to various types of systems.
4. Second practical part for solving the tasks with the second interface.
5. SUS questionnaire was applied to the second interface
6. Answering the usability questionnaire (provided on paper), containing 15 ques-
tions regarding the usability of the new interface and a field for general comments
(comp. appendix).
7. Answering demographic questions (provided on paper) concerning age, gender,
and profession.
Nr. In the practical part of the study, we asked the test persons to:
1. Find out to which users or groups the birthday (Task 1) / hometown (Task 2) /
relationship status (Task 3) / a particular photo album was visible (Task 4)
2. Find out which attributes were visible for a specific friend (Task 5)
3. Create a group “best friends” (Task 6)
4. Add two particular friends and the group “class mates” to the group “best friends”
(Task 7)
5. Adjust the privacy settings of five attributes - mobile phone number to only two
specific friends (Task 8.1) / interests to all (Task 8.2) / hometown to only one
specific group (Task 8.3) / relationship to no one (Task 8.4) / religious and
political views to all friends (Task 8.5)
6. Adjust the privacy settings of one selected photo album, granting access to a
specific group, except a single particular friend, being part of the group (Task 9).
Table 3.1: Tasks for participants to solve during our C4PS study
All tasks (Table 3.1) had to be solved in this particular order while it was not required
to start from the main page after login. This course of action is more realistic, as users
usually want to check or edit the privacy setting for more than a single attribute.
Evaluation Criteria
The following information was deduced from the screencast:
• Time: The time a test person needs to perform a task. This measure is used to
compare the efficiency for users in solving tasks.
• Clicks: Number of clicks a user needs to complete a task
• Success: The task-solving success of a study participant. It is only distinguished
between the values 1 (task solved completely and correctly) and 0 (failure to
precisely solve the task). The success rate per task measures the fraction of users
solving a task with success.
The measurement of time and clicks for a task was performed manually. The first
goal-directed mouse movement was the starting point for the measurement of a task.
The end of the measurement was chosen to be the successful or failed completion of a
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task, or the user canceling the task. We used the time frame without mouse movement
before a new task was started as an indicator for canceling. We did not count clicks
incidentally placed beyond any button or link as well as multiple clicks on a button
or link to start a function (while waiting for the website to respond). This should
preserve the comparability of values. All other clicks to perform a task were counted.
This includes clicks on scroll bars, selecting text or clicking into input forms. The time
and clicks between tasks was stripped.
To evaluate our hypotheses, we measure both the time and clicks it takes to solve a
task to evaluate if a system is easier and faster, and we consider the success of a task
solution. The usability questions from the SUS questionnaire, Attrakdiff® question-
naire, and our final own usability questionnaire additionally are taken into account to
gauge intelligibility and acceptance of C4PS.
Sample Description
In this section, we briefly describe our study sample with respect to demographics as
well as participant’s experience with OSNs. This allows to judge the limitations of our
study.
The study was performed with 40 students, aged between 20 to 32 years. Recruiting
was done in lectures and via email lists. The information provided to the partici-
pants was that a new interface for the privacy settings in Facebook would be tested.
Participants were rewarded with sweets.
All participants were members of at least one OSN, except for three participants.
57.5% access their OSN profile(s) at least once a day and 25% even several times
a day. Nearly two thirds of the study participants are Facebook users. Almost all
probands (90%) have already been in touch with the privacy settings of their OSN
provider. However, many of them consider these settings to be confusing (57.5%).
15% of the participants were very concerned about their privacy settings and stated
that they modify or check them every month. The rest did it less often. 30% did not
change the privacy settings, after they have been set up once. The possibility to create
lists or groups of friends was only used by 27.5% of the participants and the possibility
to set certain rights for groups or for individual friends was used by 37.5%. 62.5% of
the participants stated that they are aware of the visibility of their profile’s attributes
to other network members.
Expectations
While designing the user interface and the user study, we expected the new interface
to help participants to solve the tasks better (less mistakes) and with lower effort (less
clicks). In particular, we expected less OSN savvy probands to gain the largest benefit
from the new interface.
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Figure 3.4: Success rate per task
Results
We first provide the results of the study regarding success rate and efficiency. After-
wards, we discuss the feedback regarding the three usability questionnaires (Subsec-
tions 3.1.3 and 3.1.3). We show that the four hypotheses can all be confirmed in each
category according to the evaluation criteria defined in Subsection 3.1.3. Based on
these results we provide some ideas for further improvements.
Success Rates and Efficiency Analysis
In this subsection, we show that the four hypotheses hold regarding the success rates,
the time needed, and the number of clicks needed to complete the corresponding tasks.
Success Rates: The overall success rate for all tasks and all participants in the new
interface is 91% while it is only 68% for the original Facebook interface. As shown in
Figure 3.4, the success rate for the new interface is higher than the one for the original
interface in almost all tasks. Only for task 3, the original Facebook interface leads to
better results. Here, subjects were asked to list the friends or groups who have access
to the attribute “Relationship Status”. Unfortunately the participants wrote down the
privacy setting “selected friends” while we expected them to read out the actual list of
friends who have access. In most cases, the participant did not click on the blue button
in order to get this information but only wrote down the tooltip text (selected friends)
that was revealed when hovering over the button. Some other participants did not
write down all groups having access to this attribute or the wrong ones. According to
our definition, both cases were interpreted as wrong answers.
The biggest difference was measured at task 2 (visibility of the field “current city and
hometown”). Only 17.5% of the participants solved this task correctly with the original
interface, while all but one participant succeeded using the new interface. One reason
for this is that - using the original Facebook interface - this attribute is placed in the
“Connecting on Facebook” section rather than on the main privacy settings page. In
addition, many participants wrote down the value of the incorrect attribute “Contact
information”, which was displayed on the main privacy settings page on Facebook.
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The difference between both interfaces again is very large for Tasks 8.2 and 8.3, for
a similar reason, and the participants hence changed the wrong attribute. For Task
8.3, participants changed the field “Contact information” instead of “hometown” while
for task 8.3 the incorrect attribute “Interested in” was changed, instead of “Interests”.
The latter in this case represents the gender the user is interested in rather than the
intended interest in his activities like sport, films, music or other.
Efficiency Analysis. The efficiency analysis with respect to time and clicks below
compares only Tasks 5 to 9, since in these tasks the participants actually had to change
settings, rather than interpreting the current configuration.
The minimum number of clicks to properly execute Tasks 1 to 4 using C4PS is one
click on “Edit Privacy Settings” from the main page, then interpreting the privacy set-
tings for the first two requested attributes. In the case of Task 3, a further click was
required, as the displayed privacy level “selected friends” was not the proper answer,
but it was necessary to interpret which selected friends were granted access by clicking
on the blue button. Thus, one click was necessary to open the dialog, and another one
to close it. Similarly, it was required to click on the photo album settings to discover
this information. The minimum number of clicks in C4PS thus amounted to four. The
minimum number of clicks to execute these tasks properly in Facebook amounted to
eight.
Time needed: Most tasks were completed faster when using C4PS, as shown in
Fig. 3.5. Especially when adjusting privacy settings that are in the “Connecting on
Facebook”-category and while creating groups. The test users on average need more
than twice as much time to solve the tasks using the Facebook interface, as compared
to C4PS. Fig. 3.5 also shows that the variance using C4PS is much lower for most tasks,
indicating that all users achieved approximately the same efficiency.
Clicks needed: Considering the number of clicks (Fig. 3.6), the results are very similar
to those from the time measurement. Most tasks can be solved with much fewer clicks
using C4PS, and the variance is very low. The participants generally needed nearly
three times more clicks to complete the task using the original interface. Note, that it
can be assumed that a much greater deviation would have been achieved, if all privacy
setting tasks had to be performed separately starting from the main menu. Using the
Facebook interface, the user would have needed to perform at least three additional
clicks to get to the settings menu, compared to a single click that is necessary using
C4PS.
Comparing users with and without Facebook accounts. The probands who already
use Facebook had an advantage when solving the tasks, because they already knew
the look and feel of the Facebook interface, or even the concerning privacy settings.
However, even those participants achieved better success rates with C4PS, even if they
could be considered Facebook experts for using it every day. In numbers, the success
rate of Facebook experts for the tasks on Facebook was 73% compared to a success rate
of 94% when using C4PS. Participants who were not considered Facebook experts only
reached a success rate of 60% for the task when using the original interface, rising to
a success rate of 86% when using C4PS.
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Figure 3.5: Required time per task
Almost all tasks have been solved better by participants that are Facebook users (in
both interfaces). Solving the task on Facebook, the experts needed 1.65 less clicks
on average. When using C4PS, the disparity between experts and normal users was
smaller. The experts in this case completed the task with 0.89 less clicks. Measuring
the time for completing tasks, the experts performed 1.76 times faster using Facebook.
Using C4PS, however, the experts were only 0.75 times faster. This disparity shows an
additional improvement of the usability of the systems, and the subjects who had not
used Facebook before had a much harder time to cope with the original interface at all.
The results for all three criteria show that even users who consider themselves pro-
ficient with Facebook are unable to correctly perform precise and efficient privacy set-
tings.
SUS - System Usability Scale
The System Usability Scale (SUS) [Brooke, 1996] is a popular one-dimensional psy-
chometric scale (range: 0-100) that allows to measure and compare the usability of
systems. It is determined by a standard questionnaire with ten questions and can be
applied in a vast variety of contexts.
Referring to A. Bangor et al. who analyzed nearly 1000 SUS studies
[Bangor et al., 2009], acceptable products have a SUS-score of over 70. Better
products start at the high 70s and end in the upper 80s range. Only truly excel-
lent products have a score above 90. Products with scores less than 50 should be cause
for significant concern and are judged to be unacceptable. Due to this scale, the usage
of our interface is very good while Facebook itself reaches numbers below those for
acceptable products.
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Figure 3.6: Required number of clicks per task
The average SUS value for our interface (all users) has been evaluated to 82.6. The
maximum possible SUS value of 100 was achieved at maximum, and the worst rating
of the interface was valued at 37.5. Comparing this with Facebook, the users rated
the interface with an average SUS value of 35. The maximum value was 75 and the
minimum was five. That means that our participants rated C4PS to be very good in
terms of usability while the original Facebook audience selection was rated to be poor.
Participant’s Opinions about C4PS
At the end of the study, we asked the study participants what they like and do not like
as well as what they would improve. The results of this questionnaire are discussed in
this subsection. They show that C4PS also performs better regarding these interface
specific usability questions, and that people like the general concepts.
57.5% of the participants rated the original Facebook privacy setting mechanisms as
confusing (the worst level on a scale of four possibilities) and only one stated that it
is very clearly arranged (the best level). 87.5% of the participants stated that C4PS
improved the situation a lot (maximum improvement of a scale of four options). On a
scale with 4 options 50% rated the visualization with colors as very good, 47.5% with
good and the rest with level 3 while no one selected level four. The question whether
the color coding is well-defined was agreed by 31 (77.5%) of the participants.
Only 20% of the participants answered that they cope ‘very well’ or ‘well’ with the
original interfaces for group management while 97.5% of the participants made this
statement for the new interface. The question regarding the usability of the privacy
setting mechanisms was answered with ‘very good’ by 5% of the participants for the
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original Facebook interfaces and by 47.5% for the new interfaces while 22.5% (Face-
book) and 50% (new interface) stated that these mechanisms in the corresponding
interfaces provide a ‘good’ usability.
There were also two fields to provide comments. In the first one we asked the
participants what they liked most about the interface. Almost everyone mentioned
the colors while only a few also mentioned the group management. People stated
for instance that the privacy settings are ‘easy’, ‘clearly arranged’, ‘directly accessible’,
‘easy to find’, ‘easy to use’, ‘everything is on one page’, ‘less clicks’, ‘quick’, ‘applicable
for more attributes’ and ‘clear what to do’. In the second field we asked them to propose
further improvements. Comments mainly addressed the group management and the
profile preview in general and for the case that particular friends have the right to
access this attribute. Some remarks were made regarding the colors - including only
three colors, changing colors, self-defined colors; and also the fact that the order of the
colored buttons in a row should stay the same.
In spite of the subjective nature of the participant’s opinions, presented in this sec-
tion, these details are meaningful. They underline that - in contrast to Facebook’s
original audience selection interface - the study probands had a positive experience
with C4PS. We assume that these positive experiences to encourage users to be en-
gaged in their privacy settings.
3.1.4 C4PS: Mock-up Study Summary
Even though users publish highly personal data on OSN sites, several studies have
shown that they are incapable of configuring their privacy settings correctly. The direct
consequence is unwanted over-sharing of highly personal information by the users,
which allows for various attacks, including information harvesting and various types
of social engineering.
To increase the intelligibility of the authorization controls, we have proposed, eval-
uated, and implemented C4PS – Colors for Privacy Settings. C4PS introduces a new
mental model for the privacy settings, and has been designed as simple and intu-
itive as possible, to minimize the cognitive overhead of the authorization task. It is
based on the foundations of color coding, simple, one-click configuration, and group-
based access control, including a simplified group management interface. We initially
implemented C4PS as a mockup for controlled lab studies.
Evaluating C4PS in an extensive, controlled user study demonstrated two main in-
sights:
1. C4PS greatly aids the authorization steps – it not only enables the user to grant
exactly the desired authorization, but additionally helps the user comprehend
their authorization activities and current settings.
2. Even users who are convinced of their expertise using Facebook are unable to
employ the existing privacy controls correctly and efficiently, and are unable to
precisely configure their profile according to the desired authorization.
Based on the observed success rates, we argue that C4PS enables OSN users to prop-
erly choose the desired audience. We implemented C4PS in Firefox and Chrome
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browser-extensions (plugins), which are available for download from our web site.
This browser extension is called Facebook Privacy Watcher (FPW). The latter enables
us to understand privacy preferences and over-sharing in OSNs by deploying large-
scale user studies.
3.2 Large-Scale User Study on Content Sharing Preferences
The FPW received huge attention from international media, such as newspapers, radio
stations and blogs. As a consequence, it was downloaded more than 44,800 times from
at least 102 countries. We asked the FPW users to join this user study by sending us
anonymized feedback with consent to improve the plug-in and to evaluate the impact
of the plug-in on user’s privacy. We received 9,296 feedback responses originated from
102 countries. These responses included the privacy settings of the user profiles and
the changes that were made with the help of our plug-in. Furthermore, we received
the number of friends, photos, likes, notes and map entries as well as the binary infor-
mation for each user profile data field (denoted profile field in the remainder) whether
it is filled with data or not.
Based on this dataset, we evaluate the real exposure of private user data in Facebook
and the content sharing desiderata of the FPW users. We evaluate the privacy settings
before and after introducing a comprehensible visualization of privacy handle as well
as the changes that have been performed. Since both, the privacy settings as well as
the user profiles profiles (e.g. the number of photos), strongly differ with respect to
different countries, we also performed evaluations that focus on national differences.
Assuming that increasing or decreasing the visibility of parts of the user profiles ex-
presses the desires of users to have more or less privacy, we compared the user profiles
of users who use the FPW to achieve more privacy with those who decided to publish
more private data.
Our results show that users intentionally hide content from being publicly accessed
and do not accept the default privacy settings even before using our plug-in. With the
help of the FPW, users hide critical data fields such as friend lists and family mem-
ber markers but publish birthdays and religious views. The total amount of content
which is visible to Facebook users does not dramatically decrease after introducing
a comprehensible visualization of privacy controls, but the composition of the visible
content changes. The content sharing patterns are strongly depending on their country
of origin.
The contributions of this user study are (i) to provide an understanding of the con-
tent sharing preferences of FPW users both in general and (ii) with respect to different
countries and (iii) to explain and quantify the effect of improved usability of privacy
interfaces on privacy settings. Since we assume user’s privacy preferences to affect
both the content sharing affinity and the privacy settings, we further (iv) depict rela-
tions between these two aspects of Facebook usage by means of cluster analyses. An
important highlight of this study is that we are not limited to public-available data.
Due to the FPW feedback data, we can take the user profile owner’s point of view on
her privacy settings.
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The remainder of this section is organized as follows: We first provide a detailed
data description in Section 3.2.1. In Section 3.2.2, we evaluate the privacy settings of
FPW users and the impact of introducing a comprehensible audience selection without
mentioning country specific differences. Because of vast differences amongst users
from different countries, we provide a deeper analysis of those specifics in Section
3.2.3. The relation between sharing desiderata and quantifiable user profile properties
such as the numbers of friends, likes and photos are evaluated in Section 3.2.4. We
discuss the related work in Section 3.2.5 and summarize our findings and conclude our
work in Section 3.2.6.
3.2.1 Experimental Setup and Dataset Description
In this section, we specify the setup of our study by describing our ethical consid-
erations and the precise data collection methods. To underline the adequacy of our
color-coding audience selection interface to be used in this study, we describe essences
on the feedback from study participants. We further depict which and how much data
we were able to collect in this study and describe basic user profile statistics of the
participants. The bias as a result of a non-random selection of study participants is
also discussed in this section.
Ethical Considerations
We protect the privacy of our study participants! Neither the download logfile which
we used to estimate the dissemination of the FPW, nor the feedback answers that we
collected are linked to individuals. We asked the FPW users to send us feedback with
consent. We explained the reason for collecting the data and allowed users to access
and verify the data before sending it to our server. All feedback responses that we
used in this study are anonymized. We keep the collected data confidential to protect
all study participants from deanonymization attempts and do only publish aggregated
data.
Users’ Acceptance of the FPW
It is essential for the success of the study that participants are willing to integrate the
tool in their normal OSN usage and to use it more than once. The FPW and the realized
user interface hence need to be both: beneficial for the participants and easy to use.
Thus, the first question which we asked our users in the feedback formula was: “How
do you like the idea to use colors to visualize privacy settings?”.
The overwhelming majority rated this idea as “very good” (65.66%) or “good”
(32.2%). Less than one percent rated the idea to be “medium” (0.98%), “bad“ (0.46%)
or ”very bad“ (0.7%). However, the plug-in did not work from 7th of November 2013,
2:30 am, till 8th of November, 3:30 (am, CET), due to Facebook site changes. During
this time, we received most of the negative ratings.
Creating the color scheme, we argued in the team which type of color scheme is more
intuitive to the users: green, inspired by traffic lights meaning “go” - corresponding in
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Rating Percentage
Very good 32.34
Good 61.34
Medium 3.44
Bad 1.83
Very bad 1.05
Table 3.2: How do you like the FPW implementation?
the color scheme to be visible to everybody or green in the meaning of being safe since
the item is not visible to anybody. This question has been asked in the previous user
study with 40 participants. 60% of the participants preferred the green to represent
the setting meaning ’visible to everybody’. It roughly meets the results in this study
(54.83% vs. 45.17%).
The implementation was not rated that good like the idea of using colors for setting
privacy. Evaluating the comments, we can find the following reasons: First, the people
who preferred green to represent the safe setting where nobody has access were not
satisfied that it was not possible to customize the colors in the first three versions.
Second, we suffered from a bug in the first version that caused many negative ratings.
Data Collection
We gathered data about the FPW from two sources. The first is the download log file
at our own server, where the plug-in can be downloaded from. The second source of
data is the set of feedback responses which have been sent to us. While the first source
gives us insights into the spreading process of the plug-in, the second source allows us
to draw a picture of the plug-in usage as well as its impact on privacy settings of the
users’ profiles.
Download Log
Analyzing the download logfile enabled us to understand the time and locality di-
mensions of the FPW dissemination. We discovered strong peaks subsequently to the
moments of publication in different venues as well as that a large user basis is orig-
inated in Germany and Egypt. We further discovered a couple of sites, offering to
download our plug-in3,4,5,6,7. Thus, we only have an incomplete view on the actual
downloads by analyzing our own download log. Some of those alternative download
sites publish the number of downloads. Adding the number of downloads from our
3 http://www.chip.de/downloads/Facebook-Privacy-Watcher-fuer-Firefox\_57997141.html,
accessed on 2014-12-04
4 http://www.computerbild.de/download/Facebook-Privacy-Watcher-7834052.html,
accessed on 2014-12-04
5 http://www.netzwelt.de/download/16629-facebook-privacy-watcher.html,
accessed on 2014-12-04
6 http://www.freeware.de/download/facebook-privacy-watcher\_64364.html,
accessed on 2014-12-04
7 http://www.soft-ware.net/facebook-privacy-watcher, accessed on 2014-12-04
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Country # Feedback responses
Germany 7,581
Egypt 272
Austria 218
United States 150
Switzerland 147
France 94
Spain 72
Netherlands 62
Table 3.3: The number of feedback responses that we received from the top eight
countries
site to those external download counters, we estimate the total number of download
to be higher than 44,800, coming at least from 102 countries. One year after our first
FPW publication, 11,000 users still followed every update that we offered.
User Feedback
The usual life-cycle of an FPW instance starts with the installation process and re-
sumes with a check of the privacy settings of the own profile during a few sessions
(1-5). The plug-in is sparely used afterwards. We asked our users to provide us feed-
back after activating the plug-in three times, which usually happened within the first
days after installation.
We asked for feedback about both the general idea of coloring the profile items to
simplify the privacy settings and the implementation of our plug-in. Furthermore, we
offered two text fields to enter comments and suggestions concerning the idea as well
as the implementation. We explicitly informed our users about the exact (anonymized)
data that we collected. From 2012-10-15 till 2014-07-07, we received 9,296 feedback
responses from 102 countries that included coloring and log file information.
We collected the following information from our users:
• a hash value of the Facebook - ID (Facebook- UIN)
• the counter (including timestamps), indicating how often the plug-in was acti-
vated
• the visibility of each profile field before the first usage of our plug-in happened
• the visibility of each profile field after using our plug-in
• the type and visibility of timeline entries
• the number of friends
• the number of photos and labels
• the number of likes
Furthermore, our server, which gathered the feedback data, ran a script to extract
the countries from which we received the feedback.
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Sample Bias and Basic User Profile Statistics
We recruited our sample (FPW users) via an announcement on our homepage and
by sending press releases to specialized press. We then witnessed a viral spreading
process based on word-of-mouth advertising. The attention of mass media such as
newspapers8, radio stations9 and an Egyptian web portal10 followed afterwards. In
spite of the broad audience of the respective media, the set of participants is by no
means random. We decided not to collect detailed demographic informations about
FPW users, since this would be inappropriate for a tool that has been advertised to
support user’s privacy. Instead, we provide technical information such as statistics
about the user profiles to allow the sample bias to be appraised:
X X = 0 X X˜ σX
Friends 0% 148.75 96 159.53
Photos 3.43% 181.69 32 572.62
Labels on photos 34.45% 20.54 3 64.45
Photo albums 3.49% 10.71 7 20.05
Locations 17.07% 38.68 4 101.65
Likes 10.06% 90.04 36 145.33
Notes 86.94% 1.49 0 19.5
Table 3.4: Basic profile statistics: percentage of profiles without any entry in field X
and the average, median and standard deviation of the number of entries in
field X
Our median user has 96 friends, liked 36 pages and shared 32 pictures. Many users
have just a few friends (Figure 3.7) and a few of them have plenty of friends. The
degree distribution of the friendship graph as well as the median number of friends is
similar to those of the whole Facebook graph [Ugander et al., 2011]. We interpret this
as an evidence that our FPW users are close to the average user with respect to the
number of friends.
3.2.2 Global Privacy Evaluation
In this section, we elaborate which data FPA users upload to Facebook and who is al-
lowed to access it without mentioning cultural differences amongst users from various
countries to provide a holistic view. We further quantify the impact of the FPW on the
privacy settings and compare the standard privacy settings in Facebook with the ac-
tual user decisions to quantify the total demand for modifying the Facebook standard
privacy setting to meet users’ needs.
8 http://www.handelsblatt.com/technologie/it-tk/it-internet/
facebook-privacy-watcher-im-einsatz-gegen-den-daten-kraken-seite-all/7388782-all.
html, accessed on 2014-12-04
9 http://www.ffh.de/news-service/magazin/toController/Topic/toAction/show/toId/3371/
toTopic/die-facebook-ampel-fuer-sichere-postings.html, accessed on 2014-12-04
10 http://www.masrawy.com/news/Technology/General/2012/October/31/5420245.aspx,
accessed on 2014-12-04
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Figure 3.7: Histogram: number of friends
Because of the typical life-cycle of the plug-in instances (Section 3.2.1), three data
views are available: the privacy settings before using the plug-in, after using the plug-
in and the changes that have been made. We avoid the redundancy which would be
caused by presenting the three possible points of view. We instead focus on the settings
after applying our plug-in and the changes which have been made.
Exposure of User Data
A Facebook profile can consist of 28 data fields in total. To estimate the potential
privacy risk, it is crucial to know which parts of the profile are filled with data and thus
potentially exposed to the risk of being accessed by subjects which are not part of the
set of desired recipients. The average filling ratio of the profile fields that allow users
to select the audience is given in Figure 3.8.
The profile fields friend list, Timeline entries, photo albums, map entries and notes
are lists of items that are technically always available. The number of items included
in the users profiles can be found in Tables 3.7 and 3.8. Subscriptions are also not
included in Figure 3.8. They allow users to follow other users’ updates (e.g. news of
famous actors) without befriending with them. It is possible to determine the visibility
of subscriptions without subscribing anything. According to our ethical considerations,
we only store the visibility of data fields but not their content. We thus are not sure
whether a user subscribed to any newsfeed.
The fields gender, e-mail and birthday are obligatory to create a user profile on Face-
book. Hence, every user profile encloses this data (not necessarily honest). None of
the other profile fields are filled by all users. The fields family, current city, relationship
status, hometown, employer and school are filled with data by the majority of users.
Only few FPW users uploaded skills and phone numbers to Facebook. Please note that
we can only check whether data is included or not. We have no means to verify it.
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Figure 3.8: Histogram of the ratio, the user profile fields are filled
Visibility of User Profiles Fields
Figure 3.9 shows the cumulated visibility of the profile fields of FPW users. The most
popular setting is to share content items with all friends. The second most frequently
used setting is to share items with the public. Sharing bits of information with only a
subset of friends (’custom’) or hiding them (’only me’) is not very popular.
More than one third of the users do not restrict access to the fields: current city,
employer, friend list, hometown, languages, school and university. These profile fields
may help attackers to collect sufficient information to deploy social engineering at-
tacks. The friend list is especially dangerous to publish, since sharing the friend list
helps attackers to traverse through the social graph using crawlers. Furthermore,
inference attacks [Lindamood et al., 2009] are fostered by publishing the friend list.
These kinds of attacks are based on the assumption that friends share similarities (e.g.
similar age). An attacker can infer hidden profile attributes in case that friendship
connections are known to the attacker and friends disclose the information of interest.
The custom setting is used for phone numbers in more than 95% of those cases
where this information is included into the user profile. More than a quarter of our
study participants share the birthday, political views and religious views just with a
subset of their friends. The fact that a non-negligible number of users use the setting
’only me’ is remarkable. It makes sense that people disclose information in fields that
are technically necessary (e.g. the friend list) in case that they do not want to share
them with others. However, uploading other fields to Facebook without sharing it with
anybody does not help to socialize with others. We assume fields with this visibility
setting to be a result of increased privacy awareness. Previously visible informations
seems to be hidden.
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Figure 3.9: Visibility of user profile fields
Timeline entries are similar to posts in a newsfeed and can have many different types.
Figure 3.10 shows the visibility of all types of timeline entries. The main findings are
that:
• the setting ’friend’ is even more dominant than in other parts of the profile
• less entries are visible to the public
• posts from external pages (e.g. commercial pages) and cover photo changes are
always public
• the setting ’only me’ is rarely used in general
• the most frequently hidden timeline entries are likes from external pages, posts
from other users and posts from apps
• photos of other users are often shared with only a subset of friends
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Figure 3.10: Privacy settings of timeline entries; Profiles may contain none or many
timeline entries of each type; n refers to the total number of observed
timeline entries per entry type
Privacy Impact of Simplified Audience Selection
Many Facebook users are unable to handle the privacy settings to meet their own
sharing desiderata [Liu et al., 2011b, Madejski et al., 2011]. It is hence not sufficient
to elaborate the actual privacy settings to study the sharing desiderata. Since the
color-coding based privacy setting interface is shown to drastically decrease mistakes
in selecting the audience [Paul et al., 2012c], elaborating the impact of the FPW helps
to understand the gap between sharing interests and actual privacy settings.
With the help of our plug-in, 22.31% of the users change the visibility to a more re-
strictive setting, 19.55% of the users prefer less restrictive settings and 5.44% keep the
average privacy by changing the visibility of different items equally to both directions.
52.14% of the users do not change the profile visibility compared to the settings before
installing our plug-in.
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The group of users who did not change any setting contains many inactive people
with small user profiles as well as those who sent us feedback during the first session
with activated FPW. All users who were not able to change any setting because of facing
technical problems are also part of this group. In spite of not changing the settings,
some users sent us feedback to state that the plug-in is very useful to check the settings
with very little effort.
26.5% 4.4% 1.5%
23.2% 8.8% 4.6%
2.8% 4.8% 1.6%
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Figure 3.11: Heat map of visibility levels reflecting visibility change actions, performed
with the help of the new interface (from, to)
In the remainder of this section, we focus on users who change the visibility of
profile fields using the FPW. Figure 3.11 shows a heat map that illustrates change
actions with respect to the visibility level before and after performing the actions. The
most frequently performed action is to change the visibility from ’public’ to ’friends’.
The opposite change action is the second most frequently performed action.
With the help of the FPW, users hide more information (’only me’) from public or
friends than providing access to content. Remarkable is that the custom visibility set-
ting, which is explicitly supported by our interface, is more likely to be removed than
being newly used. Many users seem not to be happy to distinguish among different
groups of friends. They instead prefer to either publish content without restrictions or
among all friends.
Figure 3.12 depicts the exact percentage of items per profile field where users
changed the visibility with the FPW. We only included those 2,816 users whose pri-
vacy has finally been affected by the FPW. The highest demand for changes can be
seen in the timeline entries. A user profile in Facebook can enfold plenty of timeline
entries but only a single entry in many other fields (e.g. birthday). The visibility of
the employer has been changed by the second largest fraction of users, followed by the
university and the friend list.
The tendency of performed changes towards more or less privacy in different profile
fields is shown in Figure 3.13. Timeline entries, birthdays, about you, quotations,
religious views, instant messagers, political views and e-mail addresses are those fields
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Figure 3.12: Percentage of users who changed the visibility of certain profile fields; only
filled fields are mentioned
where more change actions towards less privacy have been performed. The rest of the
profile fields are more private in average after using the FPW.
Comparison with Facebook Standard Privacy Settings
Advocates of the concept ’privacy by default’ argue that people do not tend to change
the default settings. Following this argumentation, and taking the user’s audience
selection efforts into account, an interesting question is how the defaults should look
like to be in line with the user’s needs. We thus compare the default settings with the
actual privacy settings.
The Facebook default settings consist of two visibility levels: public and friends. The
heat map in Figure 3.14 shows a comparison of the standard settings with the condition
before applying the changes with the new interface: 43.6% of all profile fields, which
are shared with public according to the Facebook standard, are publicly accessible.
39.2% of these public fields have been changed to be accessible only by friends. 49.2%
of the by default friend-visible profile fields are still friend-visible before using the FPW
and 38.4% of profile of the latter are visible to just a subset of friends.
Figure 3.15 illustrates the comparison of standard settings with the situation after
using the FPW. In spite of many users changing profile settings, the cumulated amount
of visible content does not change dramatically. 21.05% of the users used the plug-in
to reduce the visibility of data objects in average by changing the standard settings.
10.44% changed the standard settings to the opposite direction. Our evaluation shows
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Figure 3.13: Fraction of change actions with the help of the FPW towards more or less
privacy per profile field
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Figure 3.14: Comparison of Facebook standard visibility with the profile visibility before
using the new interface
that the visibility of profile fields is still conform with the standard settings in many
cases. 40.56% of the public fields are still unchanged after using the plug-in. That is
also true for 49.13% of the fields which are friend-visible by default.
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Figure 3.15: Heat map that illustrates the privacy setting changes from Facebook
standard (ordinate) to individual settings (abscissa) after using the new
interface
3.2.3 Country-Specific Privacy Evaluations
Since privacy preferences are depending on cultural backgrounds of users
[John Rose and Christine Barton and Robert Souza and James Platt, 2014], we de-
tail the global evaluations by comparing the actual privacy settings as well as the
impact of the FPW with respect to the user’s country of origin. Due to space limi-
tations, we abstain from including every single profile field and concentrate on the
examples showing the strongest variations.
As a result of constraints in our dataset, the cross-country comparisons suffer from
differences in sample sizes. We address this issue in the following evaluations by nor-
malizing all data and comparing only fractions (proportions) and medians which are
rather stable with respect to different sample sizes. Also, we only include samples
which are big enough to be stable against outliers and only apply extremely conserva-
tive statistic testing. Since we used the same method for acquiring study participants
in all countries, we assume a potential bias to equally occur amongst the considered
countries. Hence, we assume the comparability of our samples from various countries
to be valid. Germany is a special case since our university is well known and receives
more attention and trust here.
Exposure and Visibility of Personal Data in Different Countries
FPW users from different countries have different sharing interests. This can be shown
by comparing both the information which is enclosed into the user profiles (filled
fields) as well as privacy settings. Figure 3.16 shows the cumulated differences among
the eight countries with feedback of more than 50 users. We cumulate all profile fields
of all users in the respective country and compare the total proportions of content
according to their visibility.
The most obvious result in our evaluation is that Egyptian users tend to share more
information with the public than others. The latter also tend to hide the highest frac-
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Figure 3.16: Cumulated privacy settings in different countries; sample sizes can be
found in Table 1
Country Country W p-value BH Setting
Egypt Austria 3926 0.00010 0.00131 Friends
Egypt Switzerland 1613 0.00015 0.00131 Public
Egypt Switzerland 2380.5 0.00010 0.00131 Friends
Egypt France 1974.5 0.00080 0.00378 Public
Egypt Netherlands 1800.5 0.00039 0.00221 Public
Egypt Netherlands 484 0.00018 0.00131 Friends
Germany USA 29431 0.00779 0.02726 Only me
France Switzerland 752.5 0.00533 0.02133 Custom
Table 3.5: Subset of significant results of the Pairwise Mann–Whitney U test of cumu-
lated the data in Figure 3.16; W = test statistic; BH = Benjamini & Hochberg
correction for multiple comparisons
tion of information (setting: ’only me’) from anybody. Compared with the other seven
countries, they tend to either publish content or not, rather than sharing with friends.
We thus formulate the hypothesis that people in Egypt tend to use their Facebook pro-
file as a tool to present themselves rather than to share content with their friends.
Users from other Arabic countries seem to show a similar behavior, but the sample size
is too small to provide meaningful results to include them into this study.
French users include the highest fraction of content to their profiles which is vis-
ible for just a subset of their friends. FPW users from Germany and the USA show
significant differences in hiding content from others (setting: ’only me’). Many other
differences can be seen (Figure 3.16), but they are not significant according to our
extremely strict criteria.
We tested the significance of country-specific differences by applying the
Mann–Whitney U-test (with continuity correction) on four distinct datasets. We
compared (country pair-wise on user granularity) the country-specific percentages of
the user profile field visibility to be either ’public’, ’only friends’, ’only me’ or ’custom’.
The Benjamini & Hochberg correction [Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995] has been ap-
plied to adjust p-values for multiple comparisons (28 pairwise comparisons). Table
3.5 provides the results.
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Country Country W p-value BH Field
Egypt Austria 213.5 0.00064 0.01352 Languages
Egypt France 10.5 0.00702 0.01776 Languages
Egypt Germany 4613 0.00324 0.01469 Languages
Egypt Netherl. 10.5 0.00248 0.01469 Languages
Egypt USA 17.5 0.00154 0.0143 Languages
Spain Austria 289 0.00539 0.0151 Languages
Spain USA 53 0.00970 0.0209 Languages
Egypt Netherl. 343.5 0.00097 0.01352 Hometown
Egypt Germany 20119 0.00357 0.01469 Religious V.
France Egypt 399.5 0.00407 0.01469 Family
France Germany 22835 0.00761 0.01776 Family
France Netherl. 495 0.00499 0.01508 Family
France Switzerl. 316.5 0.00420 0.01469 Family
Table 3.6: Subset of significant results of the Pairwise Mann–Whitney U test of non-
cumulated data; W = test statistic; BH = Benjamini & Hochberg correction for
multiple comparisons
Country-specific content sharing differences can be even stronger realized by com-
paring the visibility of certain profile fields in different countries. We thus choose a
sample of seven fields to explain the differences in Figures 3.17 till 3.23.
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Figure 3.17: Privacy settings of the field ’languages’
Evaluating the languages field (Figure 3.17), we realized that Egyptian users do only
rarely include the languages into their profiles. However, in case they do, they share
this information with the public. This is a very different behavior, compared to other
countries. We would thus suspect Egyptians not to speak other languages very often
but in case they do, they seem to be very proud of it. Spanish users do share the
information about their languages significantly more often than users from USA and
Austria. This is less significant but still valid for Swiss users, too.
The profile field ’Mobile phones’ is very special (Figure 3.18). Almost half of our
Egyptian users included a phone number into their own profile. In contrast, Spanish
FPW users show a three times smaller likelihood to add a phone number to the pro-
file. However, the most interesting fact about this is that almost all users limited the
visibility to just a subset of friends. That means that they need to change the default
profile settings of Facebook when uploading this information to Facebook. The concept
of privacy by design builds on the assumption that users do not tend to change default
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Figure 3.18: Privacy settings of the field ’mobile phones’
settings [Gross and Acquisti, 2005]. However, our observation is that nearly all users
who entered a phone number, limited the access to the latter to a subset of friends.
Our study hence does not support the assumption that Facebook users do not change
default settings.
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Figure 3.19: Privacy settings of the field ’hometown’
Another country-specific difference in sharing interest can be observed at the profile
field ’Hometown’ (Figure 3.19). Egyptian FPW users share the name of the hometown
with a significantly higher probability with the public than FPW users from the Nether-
lands. However, the highest fraction of users who added the hometown to the user
profile is from Spain.
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Figure 3.20: Privacy settings of the field ’religious views’
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The religious views (Figure 3.20) are less likely to be included in the Facebook profile
of the FPW users than e.g. the hometown or the family status. Only among Egyptian
users, a majority of people can be observed to add the religious views to the user
profile in Facebook. Furthermore, the Egyptians form the group that publishes this
information with the highest likelihood. This observation can be used to found the
hypothesis that religious views and their public commitments are more important in
Egypt than in the other countries that we consider in this study.
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Figure 3.21: Privacy settings of the field ’family’
Information about the family status (Figure 3.21) is very likely to be included into
the profiles. The overwhelming fraction of users prefer to share this information only
with friends. In comparison to others, French users tend to restrict access to this
profile field. Remarkable is that this is the field which is hidden by the largest fraction
of people.
Austria
Switzerland
Germany
Egypt
Spain
France
Netherlands
United States
Public Friends Only me CustomCondition: Filled Not filled
HometownRelati nship statusRelationship status
Figure 3.22: Privacy settings of the field ’relationship status’
Comparing the visibility of the relationship status of Spanish and Egyptian FPW users
(Figure 3.22) is very interesting. Spanish FPW users are the subset with the lowest
probability of filling and publishing the field ’relationship status’. With the highest
probability compared to others, they share this information with only a selected subset
of friends. In contrast, nearly half of the Egyptians publish their relationship status. At
the same time, they are also the subset of FPW user with the highest likelihood to hide
this bit of information.
The friend list (Figure 3.23) is the sole profile field in this evaluation which exists in
every user profile without being empty. Users do not have the choice to upload a friend
list or not: it is created automatically by adding friends. In case that users prefer not
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to share this information, their only chance is to hide the list by choosing the visibility
setting ’only me’. Accordingly, the latter setting is very popular. This is especially true
for the subset of Egyptian FPW users.
Friendlist
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Figure 3.23: Privacy settings of the field ’friend list’
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Figure 3.24: Fractions of users grouped by change directions of actions with FPW
In Section 3.2.3, we elaborated the privacy settings in different countries and dis-
tinguished between different fields. The main finding was that users from different
countries share different information with their friends or the public. Since all users
are faced with the same default privacy settings while having different sharing de-
sires, the necessity of changing the visibility settings to meet the own sharing desires
thus also differs. In this section, we elaborate the change actions which have been
performed with the help of the FPW with respect to the user’s country of origin.
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Cluster
Friends Likes Photos Map entries Notes
X X˜ X X˜ X X˜ X X˜ X X˜
Only more private 171.48 112 106.03 39 22.34 3 38.69 4 0.48 0
More private 163.64 107 131.69 49 19.16 3 46.95 4 19.87 0
Less private 177.11 88 142.58 49 28.81 2 49.87 7 1.86 0
Only less private 186.49 91 125.69 55 22.69 4 98.32 11 0.71 0
Table 3.7: Profile statistic comparison with respect to change direction clusters; mean
and median
In the remainder of this section, we distinguish among four subsets of users. The first
subset, denoted only less private, consists of users who only changed visibility settings
towards a higher visibility, e.g. from ’friends’ to ’public’ or from ’only me’ to ’friends’.
The second subset consists of users who changed the visibility less private. That means
the users perform changes in both directions but those changes which grant more
access to profile fields prevail the others. Accordingly, we denote the third and the
fourth subset more private and only more private were the third subset consists of users
who mainly changed to a more private setting and the fourth subset of users who only
restricted access to profile fields.
We ignored two subsets which could be built when following the previous logic:
those users who did not change anything and those users who changed the privacy set-
tings equally to both directions. The latter have been ignored since the subset contains
many users who only tried our new interface and changed one field in both direc-
tions. The subset of users who did not change anything can hardly be evaluated since
this subset contains those users who faced technical problems, thus unable to perform
changes.
Figure 3.24 shows the distribution of the four clusters in our top eight countries. The
relative cluster sizes are different amongst the mentioned countries and the majority
of the FPW users change the visibility of profile fields towards one of the two possible
directions. Surprisingly, in spite of advertising the FPW as a tool to increase the privacy,
the fraction of users who only used the FPW to change the privacy settings to less
private settings is relatively high (30.92% of the sum of the four clusters). In Spain,
the latter is even higher than 50%. In total, the FPW caused less information to be
accessible.
Comparing the privacy settings in Figure 3.16 and the change actions in Figure 3.24
draws a homogeneous picture: The two countries with the least conservative settings
are those with the highest fraction of users in the cluster only less private. Switzerland
and the Netherlands are at the opposite of the range in both illustrations.
3.2.4 Change Direction Clusters
The clear distinction of clusters in Figure 3.24 inspired us to evaluate the differences
in the user profiles to examine implications of privacy desiderata on profile properties.
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Cluster
Friends Likes Photos Map entries Notes
X X˜ X X˜ X X˜ X X˜ X X˜
United States 201.41 115 156.47 73 45.64 8 24.68 4 1.93 0
Netherlands 111.63 90 33.50 10 17.70 8 47.73 21 0.03 0
France 267.81 112 129.22 44 47.78 10 82.63 5 30.86 0
Spain 148.78 117 127.97 23 98.37 60 102.05 7 2.94 0
Egypt 331.86 150 455.70 181 61.86 17 25.29 2 7.93 8
Germany 154.54 93 102.22 35 15.38 2 45.61 4 0.52 0
Switzerland 225.52 131 185.41 40 28.30 6 67.48 9 50.58 0
Austria 275.83 193 171.46 96 36.55 16 108.91 5 1.60 0
Table 3.8: Profile statistic comparison with respect to countries
In Tables 3.7 and 3.8, we thus compare the mean and median of the countable profile
properties ’Friends’, ’Likes’, ’Photos’, ’Map Entries’ and ’Notes’ with respect to clusters
and countries.
Users in the cluster only more private have more friends (median) than others but
less likes and less map entries. Users in the cluster more private have still more friends
than those who used the FPW to increase the visibility of profile fields. Also notable is
that users in the cluster only less private do not mind to tell Facebook their location by
having more map entries. Notes are not very popular amongst our set of users. The
mean of 19.87 in the more private cluster is a result of a few freak users having plenty
of notes.
Table 3.8 shows the mean and the median of the same set of countable profile prop-
erties as they can be found in Table 3.7. Obvious differences between country clusters
are that Egyptian FPW users who sent us feedback have more friends and more likes
than all others. The cluster of Dutch FPW users is the opposite extreme, having 18
times less likes (median) than Egyptian cluster. The Spanish users share 60 pictures
while the German users share two (median).
Comparing the differences amongst our four change direction clusters in Table 3.7
exhibits notably smaller differences than comparing user profile differences amongst
users from different countries in Table 3.8. All values in Table 3.7 are very close to the
values in the line ’Germany’ in Table 3.8. The reason is that the majority of the FPW
users in this study are Germans. It underlines the influence factor country of origin to
dominate the change direction.
3.2.5 Related Work
Privacy is a topic that is broadly addressed by plenty of publications in computer sci-
ence. In this section, we discuss works on privacy in OSNs with the focus on user
behavior and interface construction rather than systems or algorithms. Since we dis-
cuss a new privacy settings interface, default privacy settings and privacy awareness in
this section, we particularly focus on publications on privacy by design as well as on
publications, suggesting interfaces for privacy settings in OSNs.
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Works on privacy by design are built on the assumption that people do not tend to
change their privacy settings. Gross and Acquisti state that "We can conclude that
only a vanishingly small number of users change the (permissive) default privacy
preferences" [Gross and Acquisti, 2005]. Based on this logic, the authors suggest to
implement default privacy rules that prevent leakage of data. In contrast to this study,
we evaluate how much a better interface helps the users to meet their needs by avoid-
ing misconfiguration, and compare the sharing desiderata with respect to the user’s
country of origin. Furthermore, our results show that more than 59% of the privacy
settings do not stay untouched in case of using our plug-in.
In 2008, Krishnamurthy and Wills [Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2008] examined pri-
vacy settings in Facebook, Myspace, Bebo and Twitter based on crawler-gathered data.
They discovered that there is some use of privacy settings but there is still a significant
portion of users who allow strangers to access private information. They further exam-
ined the amount of information that is shared within regional networks and discovered
a negative correlation between network size and the amount of shared information. In
comparison to [Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2008], we focus on Facebook, obtain our
data directly from the uses, evaluate the impact of our color-based privacy setting
interface and get different results regarding the users disposition to change privacy
settings.
Stutzman et al. [Stutzman et al., 2013] monitored the public-available data of 5,076
members of the Carnegie Mellon University from 2005 till 2011. They discovered an
increasing privacy awareness over time. Johnson et al. [Johnson et al., 2012] surveyed
260 participants from the United States, recruited via ResearchMatch, by using a Face-
book application. They asked questions with the background knowledge which was
obtained by reading the participant’s Facebook profile via API. Inter alia, they discov-
ered that 94.6% of their participants denied access to their content by people outside
their friend network. Mondal et al. [Mondal et al., 2014] studied the use of social
access control lists (SACLs). The friend list usage of 1,165 users of the tool “Friendlist
Manager”, has been analyzed. They found “that a surprisingly large fraction (17.6%)
of content is shared with SACLs. However, we also find that the SACL membership
shows little correlation with either profile information or social network links; as a
result, it is difficult to predict the subset of a user’s friends likely to appear in a SACL.”
Beside the FPW, other approaches to help users to mitigate the misconfiguration
exist, too. Lipford et al. [Lipford et al., 2008] suggest to allow users to take the
point of view of the expected audience. PViz [Mazzia et al., 2012] is a privacy set-
ting approach based on group visualizations in different granularities. Carminati et
al. [Carminati et al., 2006] suggest rule-based privacy settings that define types of re-
lationships and a set of rules which type of relationship is a precondition to access a
certain data object. Fang et al. [Fang et al., 2010] propose a machine learning based
approach which implements a wizard that suggests a set of access rules. The idea is
to learn implicit rules which are applied by users to set the visibility of objects. In
contrast, our interface allows both to quickly grasp the visibility of content items based
on a color coding and to change those settings with a single click.
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Other related work can be found in studies about Facebook user statis-
tics11, a report12 about the evolution of privacy in Facebook and a survey in
[John Rose and Christine Barton and Robert Souza and James Platt, 2014] where
consumers have been asked which information they consider to be private. How-
ever, the user statistics do not provide information about privacy settings and the
consumer survey does relies on questionnaires without a concrete link to social
networks.
3.2.6 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented the first large-scale study about content sharing and
privacy preferences of Facebook users with special focus on country-specific character-
istics. It is based on 9,292 feedbacks from 4,182 users in 102 countries. Our sample is
neither complete nor a result of a random sampling process (Section 3.2.1). Yet, the
huge media attention from radio stations and daily newspapers, which address ordi-
nary people, shows that the FPW was assumed to be interesting for their recipients.
Furthermore, the fact that a very big fraction of users discloses more information in-
stead of hiding it with the FPW is a strong evidence that it is not used by a fringe group
of privacy savvy people.
In contrast to related work in the field of privacy preferences, we collected our data
on the users’ clients and evaluate the behavior from real users who perform audience
selection on their own user profiles for their own reasons. However, even the evalua-
tion of the actual privacy settings is only a rough estimation of the sharing preferences
that suffers from two imprecisions: (i) Many users are unable to properly choose their
audience with Facebook’s privacy setting interface, and (ii) the sharing preferences
exhibit a vast diversity depending on the user’s country of origin.
To overcome those imprecisions, we evaluated changes that have been made using
color-coding based privacy controls. In a previous study, the latter have been demon-
strated to be usable, intuitive and effective to drastically reduce errors and efforts in
selecting the audience [Paul et al., 2012c].
We further elaborated the country-specific differences in both the privacy settings
as well as the privacy change actions. Additionally, a cluster analysis highlighted the
relation between the impact of the FPW on users’ audience selection decisions and
their countable profile properties.
When creating an account in Facebook, it is obligatory to reveal information about
gender, e-mail and birthday. However, our results indicate that the majority of FPW
users sufficiently trusts Facebook to confide personal information such as family status,
current city, hometown, employer and school. Contrariwise, only a minority of FPW
users includes information on skills, addresses or political views into their profiles.
The most popular audience selection strategy is to allow all friends to access a cer-
tain bit of information, followed by publishing it and disclosing it to only a subset of
11 http://blog.stephenwolfram.com/2013/04/data-science-of-the-facebook-world/,
accessed on 2015-10-25
12 http://mattmckeon.com/facebook-privacy/, accessed on 2015-10-25
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friends. The setting ’only me’ is the least popular setting. Beside unpopular features
such as subscriptions and websites, the current city, the hometown, languages and the
employees are the most frequently published bits. Only very few FPW users publish
their e-mail address, instant messenger ID and their birthday, but the majority shares
these bits with their friends. The friend list is a divisive issue amongst users to decide
about its audience. Being published by more than one third of all FPW users, the friend
list is the profile field that the second largest fraction of users is hiding (setting ’only
me’).
Introducing the comprehensible color-coding interface of the FPW impacts the audi-
ence selection of users. In spite of the FPW being advertised as a privacy tool, users
disclose selected bits of information to the public and to the complete set of friends.
Users mainly change the privacy settings for timeline entries, the friend list and the pro-
file field ’employer’. While the visibility of the timeline entries and the field employer
are roughly equally switched to more and less restrictive privacy settings, the friend
list setting was preferred to be more restrictive by 83% of our participants. The total
amount of content that is visible to Facebook users does not dramatically decrease af-
ter introducing a comprehensible visualization of privacy controls, but the composition
of the visible content changes. This indicates that the usability of Facebook’s privacy
setting interface can be improved by using color codings.
Which information is uploaded to Facebook as well as which information is shared
with whom is strongly depending on the user’s country of origin. A perspicuous ex-
ample is that less than 22% of the German FPW users shared their religious views on
Facebook while the majority of Egyptian FPW users included their religious views into
their user profiles. The visibility is chosen accordingly. Thus, global default privacy
settings cannot meet the sharing interests of all users since the sharing interests show
country-specific as well as person-specific differences.
Authors of alternative OSN architectures argue that fine-grained access control is
an important feature to improve privacy in OSNs [Jahid et al., 2011, Simpson, 2008,
Carminati et al., 2009]. However, our FPW users tend to remove group settings and
individual access rules to achieve a lower complexity of access rules. We construe this
fact to express user’s favor for simplicity and thus encourage privacy interface designers
to focus on simplicity rather than on a rich set of functionality.
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Chapter4
Improving Privacy by
Decentralizing OSNs
Simplifying the audience selection helps to avoid adverse effects which are caused by
over-sharing. However, today’s OSNs are each operated by a commercial provider who
is the explicit authority in the respective OSN. Being the operator of the system, the
latter has omnipotent power to access and monetize user data. Users are at the mercy
of the provider’s goodwill not to misuse their data.
In addition, applying steganography and encryption does not abolish privacy-related
side effects. While using steganography is no feasible solution to hide frequent com-
munication and large items such as photos or videos, the OSN provider can still learn
valuable information about users in case of using cryptography by evaluating mes-
sages (or ciphertext). Some examples for information that may be inferred even when
applying cryptography are:
• Service usage patterns (Churn): How intensive do users use the service? How
do users’ diurnal habits look like?
• Communication partners: Who talks to whom?
• Communication intensity: How frequent do OSN users communicate? At which
time of the day? The nature of a relationship between communication parties can
potentially be guessed.
• Type of content: The technical size of content items allows to identify e.g. pic-
tures or videos with a very high probability.
• Technical equipment: By understanding picture encoding, technical properties
such as picture sizes allow for guessing devices.
Economic pressure to earn money due to provider-side infrastructure and mainte-
nance costs and the provider’s legitimate profit interests lead to strong incentives
for OSN providers to monetize user data far beyond the user’s sharing interests
[Falch et al., 2009]. It is unclear whether content encryption still allows OSN providers
to keep their advertisement-based business models or to find other bearing alterna-
tives.
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The importance of OSNs for the daily inter-person communication puts the OSN
providers in a position of being gate keepers to parts of the social life of their users.
Forced by this dependency, users strongly tend to accept side effects and even disad-
vantageous terms of usage, since the OSN providers may exclude users from the OSNs
and subsequently from parts of their social contacts. One example is that users are
forced to grant usage rights to Facebook: “For content that is covered by intellectual
property rights, like photos and videos (IP content), you specifically give us the fol-
lowing permission, subject to your privacy and application settings: you grant us a
non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any
IP content that you post on or in connection with Facebook (IP License).“1
Authors of decentralized OSN (DOSN) approaches aim to abolish OSN providers
and the side-effects of centralized OSNs by creating decentralized systems, provid-
ing the social networking functionality. Since no single authority controls the whole
network in DOSN, nobody has access to all user data. Many kinds of DOSNs have
been proposed by several authors. Nevertheless, the idea of decentralizing OSNs has
not been widely adopted. Besides Diaspora2, none of the DOSNs has a noteworthy
user basis. In contrast to the authors of many DOSNs, Narayanan et al. doubt in
[Narayanan et al., 2012] that decentralizing OSNs is a feasible way to build social net-
working services. We argue that decentralizing OSNs is a worthwhile idea and aim to
help the DOSN community with this survey by elaborating and evaluating what has
been suggested in the field of DOSN.
In this chapter, we explain the concept of decentralizing OSNs, survey the state of
the art and elaborate the remaining challenges in the field of DOSN.
4.1 Requirements and Adversary Models
In this section, we discuss the requirements that are our benchmark to evaluate DOSNs
and introduce the adversary models that are later used to discuss the security of
DOSNs.
4.1.1 Requirements
In the remainder of this section, we present and discuss different DOSN approaches,
but none of them has a deployment with a reasonable user base and the full set of
functionality compared to today’s most popular OSN, Facebook. We consider the non-
academic approach, Diaspora, with about 400,000 users3 to be the most successful
DOSN. It still comes without a recommender system for friends and content and with-
out a system-wide content and profile discovery mechanism.
Elaborating success determinants of DOSN is out of the scope of this survey, but fol-
lowing [Narayanan et al., 2012], we assume that it is a necessary success-precondition
for DOSN to implement attractive functionality in a usable way. Subsequently, we
1 https://www.facebook.com/terms.php, accessed on 2015-04-09
2 https://joindiaspora.com/, accessed on 2015-04-09
3 https://diasp.eu/stats.html, accessed on 2015-04-09
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assume that users do not completely trust their OSN providers not to misuse private
data [Dwyer et al., 2007], but that they do not want to abdicate benefit of OSN func-
tionality. Hence, DOSNs need to become as usable and as useful as their centralized
counterparts in addition to respect user’s privacy to become successful competitors.
In our discussion we thus use Facebook as a baseline for the Quality of Service (QoS).
Since we do not have access to implementations of all proposed DOSN systems (the
majority of approaches are scientific and thus implementations may even not exist),
we discuss the approaches subsequently represented by the set of functionality and
performance properties of the proposed DOSN. Furthermore, censorship resistance,
security issues and economical issues are discussed in the remainder of this survey. We
thus assume that DOSNs need to provide a comparable level (compared to centralized
OSNs) of service quality while being better in terms of privacy in order to be considered
as an alternative with respect to:
1. System performance
• message transfer and profile update delays
2. Privacy of content and interactions
• confidentiality and integrity of communication
• user authentication and access control
• accountability of user actions within the system
• incidential data evaluation vulnerabilities (e.g. in case of cipher text access)
• resistance to censorship
3. Functionality
• user handle and content search functionality
• recommender systems
• API
4. Economical issues
• network infrastructure costs and storage resource provisioning
• type of payment (e.g. money to rent servers or resource contribution via a
P2P approach)
4.1.2 Adversary Models
The existence of an omnipotent Social Network Provider (SNP) is considered to be a
privacy problem by the authors of DOSN approaches. The underlying assumption is
that the provider can neither be trusted to protect user data from external attackers nor
to withstand misusing the data for monetization purposes. However, the OSN provider
maintains a closed system with little attack surface for external attackers. The question
thus is whether decentralization is the way to go for improving privacy. To discuss this
issue, we define the following set of attackers:
1. An adversary with read and write access to all data, stored in the system (curious
omnipotent SNP).
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2. A traffic observer, having an Internet Service Provider (ISP)-like view at the net-
work traffic.
3. An adversary who can enforce all authorities (organizations and companies like
SNP and ISP) to corporate with her (governmental attacker).
4. The mass data collector, collecting as much data about as many users as possible
(e.g. crawler).
5. The stranger adversary who represents an arbitrary user of the OSN (no direct
friendship connection to the attack target).
6. The friend adversary (defined in [Greschbach and Buchegger, 2012]), exploiting
the friend connection in the OSN.
7. The online reputation attacker, aiming at destroying the reputation of individual
users (cyber bullying).
4.2 DOSN Architecture Model
The following 3-layer DOSN - architecture model (Figure 4.1) introduces an abstrac-
tion of the DOSN design space. Subsequently, it describes its components which are
addressed by approaches, covered in this survey or are core functionalities of today’s
popular OSNs. Existing DOSN approaches individually take just a subset of the optional
extensions into account, but minimally specify the DOSN – core layer.
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Figure 4.1: DOSN architecture model
We derived this model by examining the technological components of DOSNs that
are necessary to implement the intended functionality. Each atomic model component
represents a class of algorithms or software design patterns. The authors of DOSN ar-
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chitectures thus determine the properties of their DOSNs either by combining existing
mechanisms or by developing new mechanisms to implement the respective function-
ality.
The lowest layer represents the communication network which is used for all partic-
ipating entities to communicate. We assume that it reliably transmits messages from
one entity to the other. The middle layer, called "DOSN - core" contains all components
which are necessary to provide the basic DOSN functionality. The upper layer repre-
sents extensions aiming at making the user experience enjoyable. It is divided into two
sublayers where the lower part is hidden from the users and thus provides services for
the elements of the upper part, facing direct user interactions.
The core component contains three main parts:
• the access control component which can be realized via access policies, encryption
schemes or a combination of both,
• the profile storage component which describes how profile data is stored in the
system and
• an overlay or federation component to organize the communication among
nodes. We distinguish among protocols supporting direct user interactions (com-
munication) and those supporting technical information exchange (e.g. profile
update propagation) where the latter is transparent to the user and hence may
raise different time and volume requirements.
The extensions layer consists of two sublayers. Only the components of the upper
layer face direct user interactions while components of the lower sublayer are hid-
den from the user. We define the following hidden modules of the extensions that
implement the extended functionality
• API as an interface for third party applications
• a recommender system which can potentially recommend both: friends relation-
ships to create as well as content items to consume
• a search scheme which supports privacy preserving search for user handles or
content addresses
• a social network connector, connecting the new DOSN to existing OSNs, since
network effects yield the largest OSN the most attractive. The probability of
finding friends is growing with a growing number of users.
The two components with the closest position from user perspective (and hence not
hidden from the users) are the GUI (graphical user interface) and the applications
which can be built by third parties or users. We consider both components to be on the
same layer since applications may realize own GUIs.
4.3 Design Decisions
Decentralizing OSNs seeks to implement OSN functionality without relying on an om-
nipotent service provider for resource provision. DOSNs thus need to implement a
mechanism to satisfy storage resource requirements to support user profiles. For the
sake of satisfying users’ privacy needs, it is necessary to support mechanisms that allow
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users to restrict information access to a chosen audience. Since OSNs are (by defini-
tion) communication systems, the minimal DOSN setting also comprehends some kind
of communication mechanism.
The design decisions, which are necessary to implement this minimal setting, need
to be made in every DOSN approach. They are the foundation for our three main
classification criteria: i) the way of decentralizing the storage of content, ii) the mech-
anisms to decentralize access control and iii) the way how decentralized interaction
and signaling mechanisms are implemented.
4.3.1 Decentralized Storage
Decentralized storage of user-owned data is a very strong concern of the authors of
OSN approaches. The main idea is to put the data owner into a position to hold sway
over her PII by keeping the data storage in her influence zone (sphere wherein the user
or a trusted third party, e.g. a friend, is directly capable to determine storing, erasure
and access operations). In fact, different storage concepts strongly characterize the
different DOSN approaches, since they have a big impact on the nature of the architec-
ture itself. Three different fundamental types of decentralized storage of content have
been proposed: storing on i) peer nodes (P2P-OSN), on ii) external permanent servers
(F-OSN) or on iii) a mixture of both (Hybrid OSN).
In the case of storage on peers (users’ devices), one main challenge is to handle
resource unreliably. To minimize the risk for data loss and data unavailability, redun-
dant service provision is mandatory. Different performance implications of redundancy
procuring approaches yield this design decision crucial for P2P-OSNs. Since replication
of resources is the only type of redundancy leveraged in the literature, one important
storage-related system design decision for P2P-DOSN approaches is to choose the nodes
where to save the copies (i.e. replica placement).
The suggested replica placement strategies are meant to store data:
• at random locations in the network
• on a set of strangers’ devices
• on friends’ nodes
• on a chosen subset of friends
• by leveraging a DTH
To circumvent the availability issue, the replica placement and maintaining effort,
storing on reliable external servers has been suggested. Profile owners in DOSNs have
- in contrast to centralized OSNs - the choice where to store their data. The criteria
for this decision are monetary cost, trust toward the service provider or guaranteed
levels of availability and reliability. We distinguish between flat storage on arbitrary
resources and F-OSN based on specialized servers implementing OSN logic at the same
place.
Hybrid approaches may allow both: storing data on dedicated servers as well as
storing locally on churn-exposed peers.
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4.3.2 Decentralized Access Control
Since one goal of DOSNs is to improve privacy, they should allow users to define exactly
who is part of the set of legitimate content recipients for each single piece of content.
Two general primitives have been suggested: access control (AC) which is performed
by trusted entities as well as encrypting content and distributing keys among legitimate
recipients. Furthermore, mixtures of both primitives are part of some approaches.
Approaches relying on ACLs are based on the principle that users have to prove
they own necessary rights to an authority enforcing policies defined in the ACLs to
access or modify a given piece of content. In our classification, we characterized works
relying on ACLs based on who enforces the policies, which can be peers or external
servers (based on where data are stored). Finally the ACLs can be enforced by external
services in the form of applications or plug-ins, run on the top of the platform, which
allow users to interact with each others.
Data encryption approaches are based on the principle that anybody can retrieve a
piece of content, but only users who have decryption keys can interprete it. Relying on
content encryption for performing AC, implies the definition of a key management
mechanism. In our classification, we thus characterize several works based on the
adopted mechanism.
A motivation for implementing both: an ACL as well as an encryption scheme is
that ACL does not protect from access to encrypted content (ciphertext) and thus still
allows for inferring communication details like e.g. the data size or communication
patterns [Greschbach et al., 2012].
4.3.3 Interaction and Signaling Mechanisms
Interactions among users in terms of sending messages are at the core of any social
platform and may include signaling and notification and establishment of new rela-
tionships etc. In centralized OSNs, the service provider mediates interaction among
users.
In DOSNs, interaction mechanisms can be either i) still centralized, meaning that
they are handled by one single logical entity (in some cases DOSN still rely on classical
centralized counterparts for handling interactions [Liu et al., 2011a]) or ii) decentral-
ized. Decentralized interaction can be realized based on a P2P substrate, relying on
direct interactions among user terminals, on publish-subscribe models or on federa-
tion protocols including inter-server communication (e.g. XMPP). Some DOSNs do not
define how such mechanisms should be implemented, rather addressing lower level
aspects and relying on higher level plug-ins for handling interactions.
In our classification, we thus distinguish between centralized and decentralized han-
dling of interactions and point out the adopted approach.
4.3 Design Decisions 77
Arch. Ref Degree
Storage AC Interact Mech.
Comments
Peers Server ACLs Encr. Centr. Dec.
P2P-OSN
PeerSoN FD Previous
down-
load
- - - PKI - Direct
+ DHT
Support for direct inter-
actions (also with no In-
ternet access)
Safebook FD Trusted
friends
- - PKI - DHT Anonymity of interac-
tions via encryption and
recursive hop-by-hop
routing
LifeSocial.
KOM
FD DHT - - BE - Plugins Interactions based on ex-
ternal applications (plug-
ins)
LotusNet FD DHT - - PKI - DHT Based on Likir
DECENT FD Random
nodes
(DHT)
- - ABE - DHT Social network function-
ality on top of EASIER
Cachet FD Random
nodes
(DHT)
- - ABE - DHT Performance improve-
ment on DECENT
F-OSN
SoNet FD - Active Servers OOB
or
SMP
- XMPP XMPP-like architecture /
social graph obfuscation
Mantle FD - Passive - OOB - Pub/Sub
model
Group encryption on any
storage, pub/sub for in-
teractions
PrPl FD - Active Cloud
but-
tler
Undef. - Plugins Cloud buttler either at
home or in the cloud /
own language: SocialLite
Diaspora FD - Active Hosting
nodes
- - Hosting
nodes
Trusted social hubs, host-
ing several user pods
each
[Anderson] D - Active - PKI - Pub/Sub Multi-layer clients with
sandbox for external ap-
plications
Hybrid
Vis-a-Vis FD - Passive User
pod
- - DHT P2P substrate, data
stored in user pods on
personal devices / cloud
services
[Kryczka] D Social
graph,
locality
Active Hosting
node
- Central
Index
- Centralized OSN ex-
tended with P2P content
storage
[Raji] D - Active - BE - Pub/Sub Private data on personal
storage, rest at OSN
provider
Polaris FD - Passive User
Home
- - Ext.
apps +
direct
Storage on phones or
servers, NAT traversal
necessary
Confidant D Trusted
friends
- - OOB Extern.
Plat-
form
- Storage on trusted
servers, existing OSN
is used for signaling
(notification)
Vegas FD - Passive - PKI - direct P2P/reliable storage
Table 4.1: DOSN approaches; (D = distributed, FD = fully distributed, BE = broadcast
encryption, OOB = out of band, ABE = attribute based encryption)
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4.4 Resulting Effects of Design Decisions
In this section, we discuss the properties and implications of the respected classes
entailed by the basic design decision elaborated in Section 4.3.
4.4.1 Decentralized Storage
The answer to the question of where to store data in DOSNs naturally commemo-
rates the impacts of the issues of data availability, storage costs as well as trust. Data
availability is an important issue in case of using unreliable resources (P2P). Storage
costs become important in case of applying replication schemes that maintain multiple
copies in the network or in case of using dedicated resources. In either case, the stor-
age devices have to be trusted to reliably serve legitimate requests and not to leak or
misuse accidental data or even the content itself if it is not encrypted.
In P2P-OSNs [Buchegger et al., 2009b, Cutillo et al., 2009b, Graffi et al., 2008,
Aiello and Ruffo, 2012, Jahid et al., 2012, Nilizadeh et al., 2012] data availability
is bound to the on-line time of the different principals and can be enhanced thanks
to the discussed replication mechanisms. In [Cha et al., 2007] several replication
mechanisms are discussed, which show how availability increases with replication
granularity.
No matter how the replication nodes are chosen, storage on peers costs stor-
age as well as bandwidth resources which are not for free. Sophisticated ap-
proaches [Koll et al., 2013, Shahriar et al., 2013] aim at minimizing resource con-
sumption while maximizing profile availability. We briefly describe them in Section
4.7, since these approaches are just replication schemes rather then complete DOSN
approaches according to our definition and hence not part of our classification.
However, data replication may affect data consistency, since the latter is significantly
harder to achieve as the number of copies of a single piece of content, distributed
on several nodes, increases. From the user’s point of view, all replication schemes,
suggested by the authors of DOSNs, come with serious disadvantages:
1. Storing replicas at friends’ nodes
• Bootstrapping: it is difficult when entering the network while having no
friends.
• Correlated failure: the profile cannot be found by unconnected friends and
strangers if all friends are offline at a given point in time.
• Load balancing is not scalable to popularity peaks if the set of replica nodes
is fixed and limited to the friend’s devices, assuming that profile data items
can be requested publicly (e.g. requests caused by a newspaper article about
a person).
2. Random replication without management requires a to high number of replicas
to be feasible under realistic churn assumptions. [Paul et al., 2012a]
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3. Passive replication in which offering access to previously downloaded profiles is
granted, does not support unpopular profiles to stay available since they are not
frequently accessed.
Assuring data availability and integrity is not an issue in F-OSNs, since users may
store a single copy of their data only on a reliable professional storage which they
trust for not altering or removing their data. Social network architectures relying
on flat storage [Famulari and Hecker, 2012] with no OSN-specific logic implemented,
allow flexible choice of storage resources, since different types of storage resources (e.g.
upload and download services, e-mail boxes or personal web space services) exist.
Users may choose external servers for data storage based on criteria such as technical
specifications (storage size and bandwidth), trust, monetary costs or reliability. The
drawback is that there must be a place to process the OSN logic and if it is not the
storage offering server, an additional party, which has to be trusted, is necessary.
In contrast, approaches relying on special OSN servers for storing user
data [Schwittmann et al., 2013, Seong et al., 2010, Schulz and Strufe, 2013,
Anderson et al., 2009] abolish the need for external OSN logic deployment but
limit the users in choosing a storage location to the OSN servers instead of any
arbitrary storage resource.
Hybrid approaches, allowing both to store on dedicated servers as well as to store
on own hardware (e.g. diaspora), relieve users from the need for external services.
4.4.2 Decentralized Access Control
Limiting access to content to a desired set of recipients is at the core of each privacy
concept. Three general concepts can be found: ACLs (Access Control Lists), encryption
schemes and a combination of both. All those concepts can be realized on the granu-
larity of individuals, role-based access control as well as access control on the basis of
a group management system.
Restricting access via ACLs can be realized straightforward via granting access to
legitimate users after authentication (before accessing content, the knowledge of the
secret needs to be proven) or identities (users being part of a content owner-defined
set of legitimate identities are allowed to access).
Since ACLs do not provide any kind of protection against attackers which are able
to listen to the communication at the underlaying network and access policy enforcing
parties need to be trusted, several authors of DOSNs suggest to implement encryption
schemes in spite of their need for key distribution. In our classification, we thus charac-
terize the approaches based on the trusted parties enforcing the ACLs and the adopted
key management mechanism in case of content encryption.
Most encryption-based DOSNs [Wilson et al., 2011, Famulari and Hecker, 2012,
Baden et al., 2009, Anderson et al., 2009] rely on Out-Of-Band (OOB) mechanisms for
exchanging the whole keys (or fingerprints of the key that can be used for retrieving
the associated key, for example relying on cryptoIDs [Perrin, 2003], as suggested in
[Anderson et al., 2009]). This of course implies the disadvantage of the need for a
secure and trustworthy OOB channel.
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As an alternative to OOB mechanisms, Safebook [Cutillo et al., 2009a], PeerSoN
[Buchegger et al., 2009b] and [Sun et al., 2010] rely on trusted nodes playing the role
of Credential Authorities/PKI. In those cases, the Credential Authorities (CA) are only
used to cryptographically initiate the OSN, while they do not mediate communications
and cannot trace interactions.
Finally, Graffi et al. in [Graffi et al., 2008] propose to rely on a DHT substrate also
for distributing keys, which allows to avoid any necessity for a central node in the
network. As a consequence, there is no need for OOB communication nor Credential
Authority, but it comes without any kind of identification.
Cryptographic methods which allow malicious parties to access cipher code still do
not prevent from inference attacks. Attackers may infer the type of a message (e.g.
video vs. chat) from the size. Furthermore, access to cipher code allows attackers
to notice actions (depending on the encryption mechanism) like revocation of access
rights or access patterns [Greschbach et al., 2012]. A combination of limiting access
via ACLs and encryption or obfuscating methods like chunking and salting can mitigate
this issue.
4.4.3 Interaction and Signaling Mechanisms
Different types of interaction handling mechanisms with contrary implications have
been proposed by the authors of the approaches which are covered by this survey.
Interaction includes messaging as well as sharing pieces of content. Sharing operations
consist of making pieces of content available for being downloaded by other users. We
distinguish between centralized and decentralized interaction mechanisms.
Centralized Handling of Signaling
Centralized interaction handling can be achieved by purpose-built specialized ser-
vices or via utilizing existing OSNs (e.g. Facebook) for signaling.
The centralized interaction mediation and handling of metadata is suggested in
[Kryczka et al., 2010]. In contrast to centralized OSNs where resources of a central
authority takes care of different functionalities (e.g. storage, authentication and inter-
action management), a (single) central node is responsible just for the interaction and
metadata handling. The aim is that interaction handling can be done via reliable and
powerful units for achieving good quality of service without having a central authority
which is able to access user data. The underlaying assumption is that user data access
(like in centralized OSNs) is a crucial part of the service provider’s omnipotence and
needs to be abolished. Lockr [Tootoonchian et al., 2009], Polaris [Wilson et al., 2011]
and Confidant [Liu et al., 2011a] rely on existing platforms performing signaling mech-
anism.
However, centralized interaction and metadata handling approaches still give the
OSN provider access to metadata and content access information. This means that
the central authority is still able to learn e.g. the interests, social connections and
popularity of users and their profiles. Hence these approaches require the users to
trust the authority to a certain level.
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Decentralized Handling of Interactions
P2P systems often rely on a DHT as a signaling mechanism thus mediat-
ing interactions. For example, in Safebook [Cutillo et al., 2009a], PeerSoN
[Buchegger et al., 2009b] and Vis-a-Vis [Shakimov et al., 2009] the DHT system
can be used as an asynchronous messaging mechanism, which may include sig-
naling of new (inter)actions. Users can query the DHT with the ID of a user or a
specific piece of content.
A unique feature of P2P-OSNs is the possibility of direct interactions among users,
also with no Internet access, as suggested in PeerSoN [Buchegger et al., 2009b] and
in Polaris [Wilson et al., 2011]. While PeerSoN relies on direct data exchange among
user devices, in Polaris data may be stored/replicated on external servers and user
smart phones only play the role of entry point to user data.
The decentralized interaction handling comes with the main advantages not to re-
quire trust into a single entity for that (interaction) purpose. Drawbacks are that de-
centralized systems may leak metadata by cipher evaluation [Greschbach et al., 2012].
They may also suffer from churn-caused node unavailabilities and - like approaches
with purpose-built centralized interaction mechanisms - from missing connectivity to
popular centralized OSNs like Facebook.
4.5 DOSN Approaches
This section supplements the Table 4.1 with a short paragraph of text for each ap-
proach. The rationale behind this section is that a classification cannot capture all
unique details of all approaches. The aspects which are already covered in the clas-
sification are not mentioned again, except when they are part of the unique clue of
the approach. Advantages and disadvantages are not discussed in this section for each
approach, since similarity of approaches causes redundancy in the evaluation. Section
6.2 encloses an evaluation based on classes instead.
Furthermore, we explain the publication time line aiming at making it easy to grasp
when an approach was published and which approaches can be assumed to be known
by which authors of newer approaches.
4.5.1 P2P-OSNs
PeerSoN
The authors of PeerSon [Buchegger et al., 2009b] propose a two-tier architecture in
which the first tier is a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) and the second tier consists
of the nodes representing users. The idea is to use the DHT to find the necessary
information for users connecting directly to the target nodes. This approach comes
without a replication scheme and stores offline messages at the DHT (OpenDHT in the
prototype implementation). All user contents are encrypted.
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Figure 4.2: Publication date timeline of the surveyed approaches
Safebook
The main objective of Safebook [Cutillo et al., 2009a] is to protect privacy of users
in a DOSN setting. The architecture consists of three main components, namely: Ma-
tryoshkas (a ring-like ego graph reflecting friendship relations), a P2P lookup service
and a Trusted Identity Service (TIS).
Each node is surrounded by its friends (first shell) and friends-of-friends (second)
shell in its Matroyschka. User profiles are replicated for better profile availability at
friend’s nodes in the innermost shell. Nodes at the outermost shell are entry points for
routing requests to the center of the Matryoshka and can be found via querying the
lookup service. This overlay structure hides the friendship relations from strangers by
multihop routing. TIS verifies user identities.
LotusNet
LotusNet [Aiello and Ruffo, 2012] is a modular P2P-OSN platform, realizing social
network functionality in widgets. The communication infrastructure as well as the
encryption scheme and the identity management is realized by using the DHT mod-
ification Likir [Aiello et al., 2008]. Access control is realized by signed grants for
proofing social relations. The data owner hence specifies the type of social relation
which is necessary to access the data item.
LifeSocial.KOM
Graffi et al. [Graffi et al., 2008] present an approach where the entire OSN function-
ality is realized by plug-ins. Storing and exchanging data items is realized with the help
of FreePastry [Rowstron and Druschel, 2001]. PAST [Druschel and Rowstron, 2001] is
used for data replication. Cryptographic public keys are leveraged to be user IDs in the
network thus uniquely identify users in addition to encrypt content and messages.
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DECENT
Decent [Jahid et al., 2012] is a modular and object-oriented DOSN architecture. It
leverages a DHT to store user data and uses cryptography to protect confidentiality
and integrity of user-owned content. The focus of the authors is a blog-like wall rather
than chat messages. The architecture is modular, i.e. the data objects, cryptography
and DHT are separate components interacting with each others based on an inter-
face. This modularity causes freedom to use any kind of cryptography (ABE-based on
[Jahid et al., 2011] is suggested in DECENT) and any type of DHT.
Cachet
Cachet [Nilizadeh et al., 2012] is an improvement of DECENT. Thus it is also a de-
centralized architecture for social networks that provides strong security and privacy.
The main difference is that Cachet introduces social caches to improve the performance
of the system by avoiding the pull-based grasping of many single data items from dif-
ferent sources. Therefore nodes leverage social trust relationships to “maintain con-
tinuous secure (SSL) connections with online contacts to receive updates directly as
soon as they are produced”. In case of overlapping online times, this type of presence
protocol can effectively reduce communication delays.
4.5.2 F-OSNs
SoNet
SoNet [Schwittmann et al., 2013] circumvents the implications of P2P mechanisms
(like profile availability and free-riding attempts in resource provision) by suggesting
an XMPP-like architecture. Every node is attached to one server, implying the address
scheme to be user@host (RFC 822). Profile data is encrypted and replication is still
part of the architecture to mitigate server failures. The clue of this approach is to
obfuscate the social graph by introducing single-direction pseudonyms.
Mantle
Mantle [Famulari and Hecker, 2012] is a DOSN approach, settled around the idea of
leveraging arbitrary storage in the web (cloud services as well as mailboxes, etc.), to
store user data. Since the arbitrary storage concept disallows storage entities to deploy
any logic, the service-related logic is implemented in user-owned clients. Interaction is
managed by employing a publish/subscribe model and is handled locally without any
help of a centralized server.
PrPl
PrPl [Seong et al., 2010] stands for Private Public. The main goals are to allow users
to store data in their own influence zone by choosing trusted storage resources, and
to run social applications across different domains while sharing data without privacy
concern. The idea of the architecture is to have “Personal Cloud Butlers” to store
personal digital assets to support access control mechanisms. A “Pocket Butler” handles
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all authentication and communication with personal cloud butler along with the facility
to allow sharing of resources across multiple applications.
PrPl uses SociaLite: a language based on a data log which allows developers to
access the data by just querying on the data served by butlers. OpenID is used for
authentication.
Diaspora
The main aim of Diaspora4 is to build a reliable and usable decentralized online so-
cial network. The architecture is based (similar to PrPl) on a client-server model where
every user has her own server instance (pod) which is used for storage, communication
and access control. Since there is no data or service replication, pods must always be
online for reliable service provision. A pod can be hosted either on own hardware or
by a service provider (cloud service). Data is stored unencrypted on the pod, protected
by an access control mechanism.
[Anderson]
The authors of [Anderson et al., 2009] define a privacy preserving architecture for
decentralized social networking that takes advantage of the simplicity and performance
of the centralized client-server model. The main goals are to protect personal data from
unauthorized access, to hide the social graph (like friendship links) as well as assuring
content integrity.
The ideas described in this approach are closely related to the field of software en-
gineering rather than network architecture. The authors suggest the client software
to consist of the following layers: the application layer, the data structures layer, the
cryptographic layer and the network layer. The layered architecture render the soft-
ware components on each layer exchangeable. All applications are supposed to run in
a sandbox, allowing the applications to access just a predefined subset of the private
data.
4.5.3 Hybrid DOSNs
Vis-à-Vis
A VIS (virtual individual server) [Shakimov et al., 2009] is a reliable personal server,
assigned to every user to store her data. The main idea is to build overlay networks
(with VISs as members) that correspond to social groups. Members of groups are sup-
posed to have the intention to share their location. The focus of Vis-à-Vis is to support
location-based OSNs while preserving privacy of location information by supporting
flexible degrees of location sharing in different groups.
[Kryczka]
In this approach, a User Assisted OSN (uaOSN) [Kryczka et al., 2010] is proposed
where users can contribute resources to reduce the costs of the OSN provider and to
4 https://joindiaspora.com, accessed on 2015-11-01
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increase scalability. In uaOSN, queries are sent to the provider that informs the user
about storage placement for large content items like photos or videos. The uaOSN
provider stores the user profiles and metadata of the outsourced content. Data in
uaOSN can be either stored on user’s desktop or set top-box/residential router which
can have a hard disk or on paid storages like Amazon cloud services. To achieve a
better profile availability, data is replicated. An encryption scheme is not part of this
approach.
[Raji]
Similar to the uaOSN, Raji et al. propose in [Raji et al., 2011] to store private data
(encrypted) beside the OSN on personal storage servers which are assumed to be hon-
est but curious. A BE scheme enforces the access control as well as the confidentiality
of the data.
Polaris
Polaris [Wilson et al., 2011] is an “architecture for OSNs that preserves monetary
incentives for OSN providers to store and manage user data, while also mitigating the
systemic privacy concerns associated with monolithic OSNs.” To realize this, a user
can choose a different provider for each functionality (e.g. photo storing or micro
blogging). Highly sensitive data is stored at a mobile phone which is assumed to be
able for keeping small pieces of content available. The authors argue that (as a result)
every provider that is involved in service provisioning can just access a subset of the
whole personal data.
Confidant
Confidant [Liu et al., 2011a] fosters decentralized data-processing being scalable
and affordable by storing data without encryption. It relies on social trust relation-
ships among friends to replicate the data on secure devices. The challenges addressed
in this paper are access control and data consistency among the distinct replicas.
Vegas
Vegas [Durr et al., 2012] is a DOSN architecture proposing to use reliable data stor-
ages for increasing the availability of user data in a P2P setting. The encryption scheme
is based on mutual public keys for exchanging symmetric keys. IT is used to ensure the
confidentiality of user data.
4.6 Evaluative Discussion
In this section, we discuss the present situation in the field of DOSNs on the way to
become an alternative to their centralized counterparts. We thus elaborate the degree
of achievement with respect to our requirements. We focus on the fitness of the DOSN
approaches to help to improve privacy as well as on the quality of user experience.
We discuss the latter by looking at performance issues, resource provision, technical
knowledge which is necessary to use the DOSN and finally the offered functionality.
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4.6.1 Privacy and Security
The major reason for authors to suggest a distributed approach for social networking
is to increase privacy and security. Hence, the enthralling question is: Are the sug-
gested approaches appropriate to achieve better privacy and security? We discuss this
question with respect to our adversary models (Section 4.1.2, Figure 4.3).
  
Trust
User
Network Underlay
OSN Infrastructure
Governmental Attacker
Traffic Observer
Curious OSN Provider
Friend Attacker
Mass Data 
Collector
StrangerOnline reputation
 Attacker
Figure 4.3: Layered OSN model that illustrates the attackers: user, OSN infrastructure,
network underlay
SNP Attacker
The overwhelming majority of approaches abolishes the SNP completely and hence
it does not exist as attacker anymore.
uaOSN uses user devices for data storage. Even though the users may be able to
exactly specify which data is sensitive5 and store this data on private storages, the OSN
provider is still able to learn sensitive facts about the users by evaluating incidental
data. The SNP may learn habits like diurnal usage patterns (e.g. conclude that the
user works at night) and the social graph. That issue applies for Polaris in the same
way, since every provider of a particular functionality can learn usage patterns and two-
sided actions like messaging (sender and receiver) potentially leak knowledge about
5 we doubt that, since sensitivity is depending on the knowledge of the attacker
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social relationships. We argue that it is necessary to hide metadata and communication
habits as well as social graph information from the SNP to protect user’s privacy.
Traffic Observer
P2P-based approaches implement some kind of encryption. Assuming that the at-
tacker is not able to decrypt ciphers, she is still able to infer who communicated with
whom and how often. Furthermore, the data item sizes can be inferred by observing
the traffic. This allows for guessing what kind of data is exchanged (chat messages,
photos or videos). If replication schemes rely on social graph metrics (e.g. friendships
or trust), those can potentially be observed as well. Only one approach, covered by this
survey (Safebook), tackles these issues by redirection schemes or traffic obfuscation.
Safebook introduces the concept of Matryoshkas where friends form ring-like struc-
tures in egocentric networks. Traffic is redirected from outer to inner circles. Never-
theless, Matryoshkas are still vulnerable to timing and traffic observation attacks since
there is no traffic obfuscation or message throttling included.
Inferring facts by observing traffic in F-OSN can be challenging if more than one user
is using one server and if the servers are re-encoding the data items, since the traffic
observing attacker can then only observe that a set of users is connected to the server
but not who exactly communicates with whom. The success of the attacker depends
on how much information can be learned from communication intensity (traffic, data
size) and timing attacks.
Considering hybrid solutions, the situation strongly depends on the concrete archi-
tecture. They are as vulnerable to traffic observing attacks as P2P solutions are if direct
communication happens among peers or if it can be inferred from the storage place to
which the latter is assigned. Approaches like Polaris [Wilson et al., 2011] may mitigate
the success of traffic observers by combining different centralized services for commu-
nication and storage. uaOSN [Kryczka et al., 2010] cannot be evaluated by now, since
it is highly dependent on what exactly is stored at the peers and how it is accessed. A
caching mechanism in the centralized part of the uaOSN can be a game changer for
traffic observing.
Governmental Attacker
Non-democratic governments tend to try to censor or even disable social networks
as soon as riots start in their country. The Arab spring is a prominent example for that
phenomenon. Governmental type of attacker can (simplified) be considered being a
unification of the SNP attacker as well as the traffic observer. The questions is: Is there
an approach which can resist the governmental attacker?
Even though assuming that the government does not want to disable the whole com-
munication infrastructure of a country to disable social networking, we argue that
none of the approaches is bullet proof. P2P approaches (without traffic obfuscation)
are vulnerable to traffic observing attacks: Governments could find out who commu-
nicates with whom and who is important for organizing demonstrations. Server-based
architectures can easily be deactivated if the servers are well known and run within the
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influence zone of the government. From our point of view, research in making DOSN
more resilient against governments is eligible.
Stranger
Stranger attacks with the goal to learn private facts about a particular user are very
weak if people would use the access control mechanisms properly and if they would
be aware of inference attacks (assuming facts to be valid also for friends). The success
of stranger attacks is in general less depending on the architecture of DOSN but rather
on efficient access control. Perfect usage assumed, none of the presented DOSNs open
an attack surface for stranger attacks.
Mass Data Collector
State of the art for mass data collection is building crawlers. That could be possible if
data items are publicly-accessible and if user handles are available to address profiles.
The straightforward approach for crawling a social network is to first create a user
account then initially connect to arbitrary users and try to crawl their friend lists.
Iterating over friend lists can theoretically lead to a discovery of the whole connected
region if every user allows to access a list of her friends. Hence, no matter at which
type of architecture, it is very important to disallow strangers accessing friend list
in general. DOSN architectures thus do not help to mitigate attacks from mass data
collectors in case that access to profiles is restricted in centralized OSNs.
Friend Attackers
Friends, being attackers aiming at accessing more information than authorized by the
data owner, can be successful either when access control is not performed properly or if
replication schemes in P2P-OSN rely on social trust. A node where friend’s (encrypted)
content is stored can still learn incidental data.
Cyber Bullying
The social phenomena to attack the reputation of an individual can be observed in an
environment like OSN as well. In a centralized setting without content encryption, the
omni-potent provider can delete content as well as user accounts if the well-behavior
rules are not respected by users. No author of a DOSN considered misbehavior of
users by now. To tackle that issue, accountability of actions (e.g. posting content or
messages) needs to become a focus of DOSN. Accountability, however, may affect the
achievement of anonymity goals.
Conclusion for the privacy and security evaluation: The main advantage in privacy
protection, which can be achieved with the approaches in this survey, can be seen in
protecting against the central OSN provider. Authors tend to protect communication
content rather than hiding communication. From our point of view, no approach can
protect against the governmental attacker being interested in building communication
graphs.
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Censorship is not an issue in most DOSNs (in Polaris and uaOSNs it still is) because of
the usage of cryptography. This implies that it is hard to prevent illegal actions. Illegal
content can be shared with only a minimal risk and attacks on the reputation of users
are abetted. The answer to the general question whether DOSNs improve privacy and
security of users strongly depends on the point of view: DOSN can effectively protect
the content which is shared but they may foster misusage.
4.6.2 User Experience
Measuring user experience by conducting a user study in DOSNs is hard to perform
since no DOSN (except Diaspora) has a user basis rather than public-available and
usable prototypes. Having no better alternative, we discuss performance issues, the
skills being necessary for using DOSN, and the functionality instead.
Performance
P2P approaches replace the database queries in centralized OSNs by vast inter-node
messaging for accessing data. The authors of Safebook [Cutillo et al., 2009a] con-
sider 11 seconds to be a realistic time for requests if no performance optimizations
are employed. Cachet introduces a caching strategy for improving the performance
by maintaining encrypted channels to friends. Receiving unpredictable data requests
from strangers (e.g. friend-of-friend) still causes time consuming operations.
F-OSN and Hybrid approaches do not suffer from these P2P-specific performance lim-
itations, but still cause federation overhead. In general, we would see a performance
advantage for centralized OSNs since a single authority is able to globally optimize its
databases and to build caches.
Usability
If DOSNs leverage cryptography for privacy, basic knowledge about cryptography
may be necessary to use the DOSN. For example, users need to understand that they
need to exchange public keys. Furthermore, the presented approaches (except Po-
laris) require users to install a client software instead of being only a web application.
Installing software on local machines may cause a need for actions which require ad-
ministrative rights on the local system. Moreover, the necessity of local software instal-
lations could cause interoperability issues and is an additional procedure which might
be an obstacle for users. We thus argue that any kind of DOSN should be running at
every web-connected device without installation obstacles to achieve a usability which
is comparable with centralized OSNs.
Functionality
No DOSN provides the same functionality like Facebook. One reason of is that the
approaches are academic and concentrate on a particular idea to present rather than
being intended to be a social network which can be used by the users.
Another reason is more wholesale in nature: popular functionality like recommender
systems, search functionality and some online games leverage the social graph and
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user attributes. Having only local knowledge, the complete social graph is not known
to any single entity. Only local (egocentric) structures can be learned via exchanging
messages. Functionality based on global knowledge remains too expensive in any case.
Acquiring the graph knowledge beyond the own graph neighbors (friends) via mes-
saging may effect the user privacy. Even paramount functions like a sophisticated
search mechanism for user handles is not available in a privacy preserving manner.
Conclusion of the User Experience Evaluations
Considering our metrics for the user experience, the presented approaches (except
uaOSN) will suffer disadvantages in comparison with centralized OSNs. This holds for
performance as well as for the required user skills and the functionality. We consider
F-OSN and Hybrid DOSNs to have the biggest potential to present a good trade-off:
they can be web-based as OSN are nowadays, do not suffer the performance limita-
tions caused by maintaining P2P structures, and in case that the majority of friends is
assigned to one server, they allow efficient local operations instead of grasping data
items from a high number of different sources.
4.7 Related Approaches
We discuss some approaches in this section which address DOSN related issues or
approaches only aiming at improving specific sub-aspects of DOSNs to highlight cur-
rent challenges. We include approaches addressing the profile availability issue in
P2P-DOSNs, encryption schemes for DOSNs as well as for centralized OSN being one
alternative to distributing OSN and finally we include social network integrators.
Social network integrators are also included, since they offer potential ways of ex-
tending the initially limited user basis of DOSN to temporarily increase their attrac-
tiveness until sufficient adoption. We thus think that a social network connector is a
crucial success component for new upcoming social networks.
4.7.1 Profile Availability in P2P-based OSNs
The load and requirements for storage in P2P-OSNs differs strongly from distributed
storage as well as from file sharing. OSNs environments require the storage layer to
reliably store many unpopular content items which are frequently updated. This is
in stark contrast to file sharing applications, which usually provide a comparatively
low number of large and popular files to a high number of users. A stark contrast
exists even to conventional P2P backup and storage scenarios, which are character-
ized by rather infrequent I/O access to the stored data. Furthermore, contrary to file
sharing and P2P backup and storage, in which all participants are treated somewhat
equally, OSNs contain information about friendship and trust relationships that can
be exploited. Many techniques that are deployed in P2P storage environments - like
erasure codes - are not convenient in this dynamic environment. Thus, none of the
P2P-OSN approaches is based on a file sharing nor P2P storage scheme. The following
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subsection explains the solutions for profile availability in P2P-OSNs that are discussed
in the literature.
As we have shown in [Paul et al., 2012a], choosing replication nodes randomly leads
to a high number of replicas if a convenient availability of user profile data should be
achieved. Friend storage approaches suffer from localization effects: if all friends live
in the same time zone (e.g. same city), it is very likely that they have the same off-line
times in the night. Furthermore, if a new node has no connections to friends, it does
not benefit from replication. Choosing the best subset of friends for profile replication
is an NP-hard problem [Sharma et al., 2011].
Finding a systematic solution for having a good availability with minimum cost
and overhead is the goal of the authors of MY3 [Narendula et al., 2012], SuperNova
[Sharma and Datta, 2012], Gemstone [Tegeler et al., 2011], SOUP [Koll et al., 2013]
and S-Data [Shahriar et al., 2013]. These approaches aim to improve the effectiveness
and efficiency of replication mechanisms to increase the performance of P2P-DOSNs.
SuperNova introduces super nodes for bootstrapping and circumventing the disad-
vantages of utilizing friends’ nodes for storage. Gemstone has a metric-based approach
to select some friends which are a good choice for achieving a high availability with low
costs and SOUP proposes to select replica nodes by calculating an online experience
among friends. S-Data is a group-based approach where groups are generated on the
basis of diurnal online patterns to reduce the number of replicas. The authors of MY3
[Narendula et al., 2012] propose users to choose a subset of friends (trusted proxy set)
for performing profile replication and access control. Arguing that trusting the friends
which are performing the access control can replace the encryption of content and
hence abolishing key distribution. This assumption simplifies the approach.
Common ground of the mentioned P2P-DOSN availability improvement approaches
is that the authors assume at least a small subset of nodes to have very long session
durations and to be stable in terms of churn. However, the churn behavior that we
observed in our user studies (Section 2.2) does not support this assumption. We hence
suspect these approaches to provide a lower availability of user profile data in case of
assuming the session durations that we have observed.
4.7.2 Encryption Schemes for OSNs
Abolishing the omnipotent and trusted social network provider as a mediator of com-
munication between social network users, combined with the introduction of replica-
tion schemes in P2P-OSN, leads to the need for encryption of content and communi-
cation (in case of leveraging untrusted resources). F-OSNs or hybrid solutions often
aim at mitigating the need for trusting server entities and rely on cryptography for this
purpose. Only a minority of DOSN approaches comes without encryption and relies on
trust in friends (e.g. My3 [Narendula et al., 2012]).
Thus, the efficiency, performance and usability of encryption and key distribution
schemes are crucial factors for DOSNs for being widely adopted. For this reason, some
authors work on building new cryptographic mechanisms for that specific issue. Men-
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tioning their relevance, we present a brief sketch of the ideas and a brief overview of
this field.
Brief OSN Encryption Background
Using mutual public keys is the straight forward way of realizing an encryption scheme.
For every recipient of a message, one encryption procedure has to be performed. Asym-
metric cryptography, however, is comparatively expensive compared with symmetric
cryptographic algorithms. Group key management mechanisms based on symmetric
keys tackle that issue by distributing one symmetric key among a group of recipients
(e.g. via mutual public key schemes). Hence, one (symmetric) encryption process is
sufficient to share content with a group of recipients. As long as the group setting does
not change, a new key distribution is not necessary.
Broadcast encryption (BE) schemes can rely either on symmetric or asymmetric en-
cryption and are used by senders to share confidential data with a dynamic set of
recipients in a cost-effective way. BE requires each recipient to have an individual
key. In BE schemes, the encryptor uses an encryption mechanism that allows to pro-
duce ciphertext that can be decrypted by plenty of keys which are defined during the
encryption process. If a private key generator, which is leveraging identities to de-
cide about legitimation, is part the system, the broadcast encryption scheme is called
identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) [Delerablée, 2007, Boneh et al., 2005].
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [Sahai and Waters, 2005, Goyal et al., 2006]
schemes adopt that idea. An encryptor decides who is able to decrypt the cipher-
text by labeling the latter with a set of descriptive attributes. Private keys are
associated with ACL structures to decide, based on those attributes, which ciphertexts
can be decrypted. The encryptor thus does not decide about decryption by taking sin-
gle keys or identities into account but defines attributes or combinations of attributes
which a decryptor needs to meet to be able to decrypt a message.
(D)OSN Encryption Contributions
The main goal of Persona [Baden et al., 2009] is to disallow third parties from access-
ing personal information by deploying attribute-based encryption (ABE) in an OSN
context. Each user generates an ABE public key (APK) and an ABE master secret key
(AMSK). For each friend, the user can generate an ABE secret key (ASK) corresponding
to the set of attributes that defines the groups that friend should be part of.
The main contribution of the model from Sun et al. [Sun et al., 2010] compared
with Persona is to have a very efficient revocation of content access rights. It uses
broadcast encryption that enables the data owner to exercise desired access control.
The authors of Noyb [Guha et al., 2008] (“none of your business“) suggest to im-
prove privacy by encrypting content and to modify it in a way that it looks like legiti-
mate content. Hence, it allows users to use existing OSN while disallowing provider to
access the content. Applying this approach is not an obstacle for the provider to learn
usage patterns as well as friendship relationships.
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Günther et. al. [Günther et al., 2012] provide a building block for privacy pre-
serving treatment (including encryption) of user profiles in OSNs. The authors
of [Bodriagov and Buchegger, 2012] compared different encryption mechanisms and
evaluated them for their applicability in the DOSN context and concluded that broad-
cast encryption would be the best choice for this use-case.
EASIER[Jahid et al., 2011] is an ABE architecture for DOSN, supporting dynamic
group memberships and revocation of rights without re-encrypting data items or is-
suing new keys. The main idea is to introduce a proxy which needs to be contacted
before decryption. A user sends a part of the cipher text (CT) to the proxy where a
transformation takes place. The transformed CT can only be decrypted if the right was
not revoked.
Lockr [Tootoonchian et al., 2009] is an identity-management tool for OSNs that al-
lows users to codify their relationships through social attestations. The primary goal
is to provide privacy as well as to simplify site management and accelerating content
delivery. Lockr’s decoupling eliminates the burden on users of maintaining several up-
to-date copies of social networks, performing user-ID reconciliation across sites, and
familiarizing themselves with the varied access control mechanisms provided by each
site. A social attestation is a piece of data that certifies a social relationship. By issuing
an attestation, the issuer tells a recipient that they have formed a relationship.
The presented encryption approaches show that retaining confidentiality of content
in OSNs is possible. In case of suggesting a new DOSN approach, authors may rely on
existing encryption mechanisms.
4.7.3 Private Discovery of Common Social Contacts
Discovering common social contacts is a common feature in today’s OSNs like Face-
book. In privacy preserving distributed systems, it may not be desired to exchange
contact lists. De Cristofaro et al. [De Cristofaro et al., 2013] introduces a scheme
which allows for finding common friends without disclosing non-common friends. To
the best of our knowledge, there is no discovery mechanism which neither disclose the
search index nor the search queries. As a result, there is a trade-off between imple-
menting (or using) a discovery mechanism or preserving privacy with respect to search
index and queries.
4.7.4 Social Network Integrators
OneSocialweb6 is a project aiming at building an XMPP-based connector which poten-
tially integrates all OSNs into one large social network. Other social network integra-
tors, connecting a subset of popular services are:
1. Meople (http://meople.net/, accessed on 2014-01-20) aggregated SNSs: Face-
book, LinkedIn, Google+, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Flickr, Groupon, Tumblr,
Foursquare, VK, Odnoklassniki
6 http://onesocialweb.org/, accessed on 2014-01-20
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2. Jyst (http://jyst.us/, accessed on 2014-01-20) aggregated SNSs: Facebook, Twit-
ter
3. Alternion (http://www.alternion.com/, accessed on 2014-01-20) aggregated
SNSs: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Flickr, Foursquare, Pi-
casa and the mail accounts: Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo!, AOL
4. Yoono (http://www.yoono.com/, accessed on 2014-01-20) aggregated SNSs:
Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr, Foursquare, MySpace, Yahoo!,
Google Talk, AIM, FriendFeed
5. TweetDeck (http://www.tweetdeck.com/, accessed on 2014-01-20) aggregated
SNSs: Twitter, Facebook, Myspace, Linkedln, FourSquare, GoogleBuzz
6. Hootsuite (http://hootsuite.com/, accessed on 2014-01-20) aggregated SNSs:
Facebook, Linkedln, Foursquare, MySpace, PingFm, Wordpress
7. SpredFast (http://spredfast.com/, accessed on 2014-01-20) aggregated SNSs:
Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Google+, YouTube
The aforementioned social network connectors could potentially been leveraged to
bootstrap a new (D)OSN since the attractiveness of OSNs is strongly bound to the user
basis.
4.8 Decentralization Impact on Stakeholders of OSNs
In this section, we discuss the impact of decentralizing OSNs on today’s OSN stake-
holders. This includes benefits, drawbacks and challenges.
The stakeholders in the context of OSN, considered in this work, are: the OSN users,
the OSN provider, the advertising companies which benefit from utilizing the adver-
tising opportunities offered by the OSN provider, the governmental state and media
consumers which are not necessarily part of an OSN. Effects on extenders (e.g. ap-
plication sellers) like Zynga7 are not discussed since the effects on them is strongly
depending on the particular architecture.
Since we consider the user to be the most important affiliate, we start our discussion
with the following benefits of OSN decentralization for the users:
• Ownership: Facebook and other OSN providers ask the users to transfer the
copyrights of any content from the user to the OSN owner. In contrast, decentral-
ization holds user data in the influence zone of the users. The copyright transfer
can be avoided.
• Privacy: In centralized OSNs, users need to trust the omnipotent provider not to
misuse the data and to be able to protect the data from attackers.
• Flexible choice of resources: Building, running and maintaining OSN platforms
cause expenditures. In centralized OSNs, platform-related resources are provided
by the service provider itself. In most cases, they present no monetary costs to
the final users [Falch et al., 2009], which pay by agreeing for such platforms to
exploit their data with a commercial purpose.
7 http://zynga.com/, accessed on 2014-07-06
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One of the benefits a decentralized approach should bring to users, is that they
should have the possibility to choose what resources to rely on. For example, a
user can choose whether adding the own device’s resources (e.g. P2P approaches)
or relying on dedicated servers (e.g. Diaspora). Using dedicated resources for
building a DOSN does not cause an exploitable dependency like using the re-
sources of centralized OSN provider, since the OSN membership does not require
an affiliation with one specific authority. Hence, the resource provider is replace-
able. This opens to several business models which strongly differ from exploiting
user data for commercial purposes.
• No censorship: Several centralized OSNs perform active censorship8,9 - called de-
cency or content control - on user behavior and content. This imposes significant
limitations on what a user can or cannot do within the platform, based on rules
which may strongly vary from one platform to another and are in general very
subjective. Such rules can also be very country-specific, since OSNs have already
accepted to be compliant to local laws imposed by several governments.
• Openness: DOSNs abolish the central authority, causing that no single authority is
able to exclude a user from the platform by suspending his account (e.g. because
of not accepting copyright transfer rules).
While decentralizing OSNs does not come without drawbacks, the following aspects
may become an issue for users:
• Resource provision: Centralized as well as decentralized OSNs need technical re-
sources (e.g. storage, bandwidth) to operate. In centralized OSNs, the provider
is responsible for making them available. The most popular approach to com-
pensate these efforts is to sell opportunities for personalized advertising. In the
decentralized case, other mechanisms need to tackle the resource issue.
• Profile availability: Availability of user profiles is strongly linked to the OSN ar-
chitecture. In the centralized case, the provider takes care of storing and keeping
user profiles available. Federated DOSNs rely on independent professional and
reliable resources while P2P OSNs utilize the unreliable resources of the users
devices.
• Cyber bullying: Since decentralized OSNs hide or encrypt the communication,
no central authority can enforce rules. In the real world, no administrator can
switch off the voice of people which are bullying others as well, but everybody
is responsible for what he or she is doing. We argue that DOSNs should support
accountability to protect users.
• Metadata privacy and the concealment of communication partners: Depending on
the particular architecture, decentralizing OSNs may raise security issues that do
not exist in centralized OSNs [Greschbach et al., 2012]. An attacker which is able
to observe traffic in the underlying communication network (e.g. IP) can track
who communicates with whom if OSN devices are assigned to a single user and
can send messages to other devices without obfuscation. In contrast, a centralized
8 http://www.facebookcensorship.com/, accessed on 2014-01-20
9 http://www.dailytech.com/Google+Plays+Name+Police+Conducts+Baffling+Censorship+
Crusade/article22238.htm, accessed on 2014-01-20
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OSN has a mixing functionality. Assuming frequent usage, the mixing functional-
ity implies that the observer could only find out that users communicate with the
provider but not track single communication paths among users.
• Functionality: OSNs allow to build social applications which are based on in-
teractions among users who share social links or special interests. Examples for
these applications are recommender systems, interest matching algorithms for
mediating between users as well as games. Due to the nature of decentralized
systems, the complete social graph as well as the complete set of interests of all
users is unknown to anybody. Each node has only local knowledge. Hence, the
graph knowledge needs to be grasped using federation protocols, if it is necessary
for an application.
Other affiliates become more affected by economical issues. Abolishing the cen-
tral OSN provider naturally destroys their business model and hence other companies
cannot benefit anymore from utilizing the advertising opportunities.
4.9 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, we discussed the impact of decentralizing OSNs on different OSN affili-
ates of today’s popular OSNs, explained the design space by introducing an architecture
model, presented and discussed a classification of DOSN approaches and introduced
some DOSN-related approaches. Finally, we presented the unique ideas of each dis-
cussed approach.
Decentralization of OSNs can tackle two important issues: First, it is a possibility to
circumvent the need to trust the SNP for not learning facts which cannot be hidden by
encryption. An omnipotent provider could still learn who communicated with whom
and how often. Second, users do not need to accept copyright transfers to the SNP and
terms of usage which are disadvantageous for them.
The result from security perspective is that DOSNs mainly aim at protecting content
from curious provider and assuring confidentiality of user communication. DOSNs
potentially abolish content censorship by leveraging encryption schemes. Beside
Safebook, none of the presented approaches introduces mechanisms to protect against
traffic observer or governmental attackers building communication graphs.
The result of our functionality discussion is that the discussed ideas do not solve
the issue of providing attractive social-graph based functionality like a comprehen-
sive privacy preserving search and a recommender system like in the centralized OSN
counterparts. Hence, we argue that the field of DOSNs could benefit from research
in building privacy preserving graph-based functionality, combined with performance
optimizations.
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Chapter5
Finding User Handles with Privacy
Decentralization removes any single entity with complete knowledge about OSN users
as well as about the social graph connecting them. However, several appealing func-
tions in today’s OSN, like Facebook, require knowledge about user data and the social
graph. These functions include not only advanced inference or recommendation fea-
tures, but even paramount functions like discovering other users. Even the most popu-
lar DOSN, Diaspora, consequently relies on out-of-band communication for exchanging
user handles, which are required to connect to other users [Schulz and Strufe, 2013].
This lack of competitive features in DOSNs has severely hindered their success. Exist-
ing technologies do not seem to offer appropriate solutions to the privacy preserving
user discovery problem. In particular:
1. Creating a central index requires a trusted party, or leak information about the
participants. Beyond privacy concerns, economical reasons prevent its setup in a
decentralized system, as it would cause costs that are unlikely to be paid for by
the users, in the current Internet ecosystem.
2. Classical P2P search assumes a public, distributed search index, which at
least partially is stored on and forwarded by presumably untrusted nodes
[Raiciu et al., 2009], and commonly even spreads information by replicating its
content.
3. Public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) [Boneh et al., 2004] requires
possession of the cipher, and hence a centralized, encrypted index, which is unvi-
able as mentioned above. Applying PEKS to a DHT does not seem viable since the
cipher isn’t known to the requesting party and hence can not easily be addressed
and discovered.
4. Secret database querying approaches do not solve the problem of avoiding to
build a database that contains user-linkable information.
In this work, we propose a mechanism that adds the functionality of user handle
discovery in RFC 8221 based systems, to make a step towards providing usable DOSNs
with a competitive feature set, while maintaining the privacy of their users. This im-
plies that no information that can be linked to any participating individual may be
1 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0822.txt, accessed on 2014-02-18
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leaked by the scheme. Because of potential abuse of profile discovery, the scheme
must also prevent mass collection of profiles and their identifiers to avoid SPAM or
other types of illegitimate messaging.
To tackle this issue, we propose a solution that divides the service into three separate
parts:
• The collection of distributed information about servers that host profiles which
potentially include a specific user, identified by separate user attributes.
• A privacy preserving negotiation protocol to prove knowledge about the sought
user.
• The provision of ephemeral handles with limited validity, which allow for a single
message within limited time.
The scheme is applicable to arbitrary hybrid DOSN architectures. These con-
sist of decentralized servers that are equal by design and operated by diverse par-
ties, and are selected by participants to host their profiles. Hybrid DOSN archi-
tectures circumvent the implications of leveraging unreliable resources (P2P) while
still operating without a central authority. Examples for this type of approaches
are Diaspora, Vis-a-Vis [Shakimov et al., 2011], Vegas [Durr et al., 2012] and SoNet
[Schwittmann et al., 2013]. Without global knowledge about other servers, a com-
mon choice of identifying users and their profiles is to use addresses of the form
[user]@[host], following RFC 822. The host part uniquely identifies the server (usu-
ally using its DNS name), and the user part the respective participant registered on the
server.
The first step towards building our search scheme is to map all atomic user properties
on their registering servers. A DHT spanning all participating servers then is used to
register the user properties under their server address. Hence, there is no link between
the attributes that describe an individual and the user herself, but only a link to her
server. Her server consequently can be discovered, when searching for the user, and
contacted for further negotiation.
The contacted server then can verify the validity of the discovery request. Demon-
strated with knowledge about the target subject (in a privacy preserving manner), the
server can decide whether to create a valid temporary handle (Search_ID) for contact-
ing the subject once, or to create an invalid one, pointing nowhere. The participants
hence have the liberty to define a selected set (or subset) of knowledge that is needed
to discover a valid temporary handle for their profile.
The contribution, presented in this chapter, is to adapt well-known techniques like
DHTs, indirection schemes and secret sharing in an innovative and beneficial way to
allow finding user handles in decentralized communication systems without facilitating
SPAM. In contrast to previous solutions that leverage lookup services, we avoid to build
a search index that can be maliciously exploited.
The rest of the chapter defines the requirements and the protocol in Section 5.1,
explains our system design in Section 5.2, gives a detailed evaluation in Section 5.4
and finally summarizes the main contributions in Section 5.6.
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5.1 Requirements
The central objective is to enable users in a distributed client-server environment to
find user handles of communication partners without knowledge about the partner’s
responsible server. State of the art services are not widely adopted (e.g. public e-mail
address catalogs) because of their potential facilitation of copious undesired messag-
ing. Our scheme hence needs to meet the following requirements:
1. The service must not jeopardize the privacy of any participant, and hence no
linkable data may be published.
2. The discovery scheme has to be scalable to handle large numbers of users (com-
parable with popular OSN) and servers.
3. The search protocol must be resistant to illegitimate user discovery. Permanent
addresses, or user handles, may be retrieved through the system only upon ex-
plicit approval by the related individual.
4. The search protocol must be resistant to unsolicited mass communication. It
specifically has to prevent uninformed mass address retrieval.
5. Supporting requirements 3 and 4, the scheme shall merely provide ephemeral
alias addresses for single use only.
5.2 System Overview
This section describes the system design and illustrates the solution space. We explain
the mechanism to discover the server that is responsible for a targeted identifier, while
meeting requirements 1 and 2 and subsequently specifying the registration process of
profile attributes. To address requirement 3, we introduce an access control mecha-
nism. Requirement 4 is fulfilled by restricting the served identifiers to be valid within
a short term (minute scale). Requirement 5 is met by introducing an ephemeral user
handle.
5.2.1 Discovery Mechanism
As a consequence of requirement 1 as well as the absence of a central authority in our
system environment, we can neither build a central index to locate user handles, nor
use a distributed lookup service which publishes or replicates data to discover them.
Since the servers in our scenario are equal in functionality, a potential search request
sender does not have a specific location to start the search procedure. Furthermore,
privacy preserving negotiation for demonstrating knowledge about the search target
to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate requests is an expensive procedure
(with respect to communication overhead).
Thus, the basic idea is to first locate servers which potentially host the sought user
handle and subsequently perform the negotiation with a small set of servers. We
use an efficient discovery mechanism which allows us to register tuples of attributes
and server addresses for that purpose. Promising candidates are DHTs (e.g. CHORD
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[Stoica et al., 2001], CAN [Ratnasamy et al., 2001]), since they are scalable and churn
resistant.
Our approach implies the need to register a tuple of every field (just once per at-
tribute value no matter how often it is occurring on the server) of the user profile (e.g.
name, city) and the server address at the lookup service by its own.
Thus, a request to the DHT returns a list of servers, matching the field content. The
servers which are part of every single list are candidates which may be the server
hosting the desired contact. We will call this list the candidate list for the rest of the
chapter. This list can then be condensed by intersecting candidate lists for several
search requests while increasing the detail of the search. But it terminally may yield
more than a single server.
To mitigate the issue of index poisoning, the tuple of server address and the piece
of search content can be signed by the server. Registering this signature together with
the tuple allows us to validate whether the registration of an item is originated by the
legitimate server or not.
5.2.2 Access Control
Each user defines a set or range of knowledge that is necessary to discover herself. A
requesting individual then has to demonstrate at least this minimum knowledge about
the sought subject in order to get a valid Search_ID. We define a privacy preserving
negotiation protocol that allows the search request sender to prove knowledge about
the search target without disclosing the query to anybody but the servers, sharing the
same knowledge. This prevents the untrusted nodes in the lookup service from being
able to learn valid attribute combinations from search requests.
5.2.3 Ephemeral User Handles
Each provided valid Search_ID can only be used for a single message and just for a
short period of time. We decided to not provide the long term valid addresses (IDs) of
the subject to fulfill the misuse and access control requirements. Being contacted via
short term identifier, the sought user handle owner may decide whether to reply or not
on the message for disclosing the permanent user handle.
5.3 Protocol
This section gives a detailed description of our protocol, which consists of the two parts
of user registration and discovery. It relies on a lookup service (DHT), which is adopted
by the communication servers (Diaspora, SMTP, XMPP, etc.) of all participating users.
5.3.1 Definitions
This subsection defines terms for later use in the formal protocol description: Servers
are nodes, participating in the DHT as well as providing the underlying communica-
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tion service (eg. e-mail). Search Fields are tuples of properties comprising of a field
name and its content, which describe a detectable individual (field “First Name” con-
taining “Bob”, for instance). Search fields are filled by participants in order to describe
themselves. The Client is a part of the software installation. It is installed on the
user’s machine and is responsible for communicating with the assigned server. The
Ephemeral User Handle is a string, which is a valid address for just one message in a
short predefined period. It consists of a random string which is not guessable.
5.3.2 User Registration
An individual user A¯, registered at the responsible server A, fills m of n search fields
f1, f2... fm, describing its profile with strings a1, a2...am. A¯’s client then sends the data to
the server A, which in turn registers itself for each of the descriptors (cmp. Algorithm
1).
Algorithm 1: Registering Search Fields
Data: m of n search fields f1, f2... fm of a user profile with strings a1, a2...am as
their values
Result: m in the lookup service registered search fields
foreach ( fi, ai) do
a˜i = concatenation( fi, ai);
h1 = hash(a˜i) ;
register h1 at the DHT
end
5.3.3 User Discovery
A requesting user A¯ describes the target subject by providing as many specified search
fields
{(a1, f1), (a2, f2), . . . , (a j, f j)} as possible. A¯’s client subsequently submits the
entered information to its responsible server A, which in turn retrieves a list of can-
didate servers, which are responsible for users matching any of the specified Search
Fields (cmp. Algorithm 2).
Having a list of servers with potential matches (the length is depending on the pop-
ularity and distribution of the search items), the user can submit requests for receiving
short term IDs to servers from the candidate list. These requests contain all available
knowledge about the target individual. Servers receiving this request check if a match-
ing individual is registered and if this individual’s access control policy is met by the
request, i.o.w. whether the presented knowledge is sufficient to generate a Search_ID.
The search protocol is depicted in Fig. 5.1, with the following variables:
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alt
ā:Ā a:A s:S c:Chord x:X0,…,Xj y:Y
[ j > 0 ]
startSearch(j) searchservers/get(j)
findsuccessor/get
findsuccessor/result[ i < j ]
searchhost/get
searchhost/result(k)
buildIntersectionList([searchhost/result(k)]0, 
…, [searchhost/result(k)]j-1)
lsearchservers/result(l)presentServerLIst(l)
startSearchOnServer(m)
presentResult(n, p)
searchonserver/get(m)
searchonserver/result(n, p)
searchonserver/get(m)
searchonserver/result(n, p)
startSearchOnServer(m)
error
startSearch(j)
error
[ default ]
[ i < j ]
alt
[ m ≧ j ]
[ default ]
loop
loop
Figure 5.1: Sequence diagram of the message flow during the search phase. A repre-
sents the user’s Client and S the user-assigned server. CHORD illustrates the
lookup service. Xn...Xn−1 are the servers, selected during the findSuccessor
operation. j, k, l, m, n and p are the numbers of the variable parts of each
message.
j number of filled out search fields in the search form at the first step
k number of hosts having at least one user matching one search field
l number of hosts having at least one user matching all search fields
m number of filled out search fields in the search form for a specific host (second step)
n number of matching users on the specific server
p sum of all public profile fields
Algorithm 2: Search algorithm, conducted by the searcher’s hosting server
Data: search fields f1, f2... f j with contents a1, a2...a j
Result: List of servers which potentially host the target subject
foreach ( fi, ai) do
a˜i = concatenation( fi, ai);
h1 = hash(a˜i) ;
request h1 at the DHT ;
receiv e l ist ali o f serv ers, assi gned to ai;
end
candidate_List =
⋂n
i=1 a
l
i ;
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5.3.4 Privacy Preserving Negotiation Algorithm
In case an adversary runs a server and registers popular data items (e.g. popular
names) for advertising herself to become part of the candidate list of a user’s request,
she could misuse the negotiation process for learning more attributes about users. We
counter this potential data leakage by suggesting the following negotiation protocol,
consisting of two algorithms: one on the server side and one on the searcher’s client
side.
In this protocol, we propose to define a set of obligatory base attributes: name,
first name and city. Our experiments (Section 6.2) show that this combination is a
good choice for a real world user identifier. Furthermore, the entropy of a single
attribute is small and an attacker could guess the existence of combinations of popular
attributes. Our attribute concatenation (Algorithm 3) increases the number of possible
combinations per server to the total number of first names multiplied by the number
of last names and the number of cities. Hashing the concatenated strings keeps them
secret but still allows conducting pattern matching operations on the server.
Please note that if a user realizes attackers guessing the combinations due to the fact
of a popular name and a big city etc., she can easily define the minimum knowledge to
contain more attributes (e.g. interests, employer) and thus make guessing harder.
Algorithm 3: Client-side negotiation algorithm
Data: m of n search fields f1, f2... fm of a user profile with strings a1, a2...am as
their values and the Server_ID of the request recipient
Result: Request message content for a temporal user handle
base = concatenation(a1...a3,Serv er_ID);
P(ai) = powerset(ai), i > 3;
foreach (x in P(ai)) do
concx = concatenation(base, x);
knowled geproo fx = hash(concx);
add knowled geproo fx to the knowled geproo f l ist;
end
add hash(base) to the knowled geproo f l ist;
Request message = knowled geproo f l ist;
We expect the server to have a table of user handles and the corresponding hashes,
related to those users which are registered at this location. The hashes are computed
according to the user defined minimum knowledge. Subsequently, the server algorithm
runs a local lookup for the hashes in the “knowledgeprooflist” (the hashed represen-
tation of the requester’s knowledge and a result of Algorithm 3) from the negotiation
request. If a match happens, the request is replied with a valid temporal user handle,
otherwise with an invalid one.
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5.4 Evaluation
With respect to our requirements, we evaluate the functionality, the mentioned pri-
vacy properties and the scalability of our search protocol in this section. Regarding
functionality, we answer the following questions: Is it possible to find persons with
three to five attributes (e.g. name, first name, city, employer) in the real world? Is the
approach feasible to achieve this? Our privacy discussion answers those questions i.e.
whether the protocol leaks private data. Regarding scalability we discuss: How many
servers need to be contacted for negotiating with them? How much data is exchanged
by applying the protocol?
5.4.1 Functionality
The only real world data collections we are aware of and which are suitable for esti-
mating the search success of a public user handle search algorithm are phone number
search engines2,3, social networks and web search engines (like Google). Thus, we
used them for estimating the amount of data which is necessary to identify a person.
Our experiments with the authors of this chapter’s conference publication as an ex-
ample, showed that the first name and the last name as search strings reduce the result
list to the length of two (Thorsten Strufe, supervisor) and seven (Marius Hornung, stu-
dent). Thomas Paul is a common name, leading to the necessity of taking the city
information into account.
Further real world experiments in existing user handle lookup services (see above)
with about two dozens of popular German names showed that the combination of first
name, last name and city usually is sufficient to find the subject. We argue that this
sample size is big enough, since drawing two dozen strangers is unlikely and a search
service is still useful even if a negligible minority of subjects could not be uniquely
identified, just using commonly available knowledge (e.g. city, name, employer). The
answer to the evaluation question whether our profile description is applicable hence
is true.
To show the feasibility of our scheme, we introduce an example scenario: We assume
the server landscape to have a similar structure like the e-mail system or the XMPP
system because of both a lack of reliable user and usage quantifications from DOSN
and the similarity of the architectures. That means for our scenario to assume some big
hubs with plenty of users, providing publicly-available services (e.g. Google) as well
as a significant number of smaller servers4,5 maintained by companies or non-profit
organizations like universities. Algorithm 2 builds on the assumption that not every
server has registered every search string (e.g. name) which occurs in the system. We
assume that the server candidate list usually contains the big hubs, but just a small
fraction of small servers.
2 http://www.dastelefonbuch.de/, accessed on 2014-02-18
3 http://www.teleauskunft.de/, accessed on 2014-02-18
4 http://www.mailradar.com/mailstat/, accessed on 2014-02-18
5 http://www.zdnet.com/jabber-numbers-overtake-icq-3039117160/, accessed on 2014-02-18
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We make the following assumptions for our scenario:
• The lookup service (e.g. DHT) works well in low-churn environments like ours,
since this concept is well known, evaluated in previous work and tested within
our prototype in a small scale.
• The server popularity has the following properties which reflect the situation in
the e-mail provider landscape:
– 10 big hubs (like Google or Microsoft in the e-mail environment) concentrate
the majority of users on them,
– 10,000 smaller (about 100 users in average) servers exist, maintained by
companies, organizations and communities,
– 10,000 different values of each: the first names, last names and cities are
known in the system.
The worst case assumption, is to assume that every first name, last name and city
name occurs in each of the big hubs. Subsequently, applying our algorithms in our
scenario would mean to have a candidate list, consisting of less than 110 servers (out
of 10,010) before starting the negotiating process.
The affordability of the negotiation process is shown in Section 5.4.3. Contacting
those (less than) 110 servers results in a list of ephemeral user handles where the
overwhelming majority is pointing nowhere. Sending a contact request with a short
reasoning for the contact request may motivate the desired search target to answer the
request and hence disclose the permanent user handle. Please note, as shown before,
the combination of first name, last name and city describes a person very well. Thus
it is not likely to receive a plenty of contact requests, addressed to the wrong subject.
Nevertheless, in case of receiving too many requests, caused by e.g. a popular name in
a big city, the burden of proving knowledge can be raised by adding more fields to the
knowledge proof.
The presented search algorithm mitigates the problem that the peers, responsible for
the most popular keys, become a bottleneck (Zipf distribution of the request popular-
ity [Gummadi et al., 2003], [Breslau et al., 1999]), by saving only the server’s address
once per popular attribute instance (e.g. popular name on one server) instead of saving
each instance of the user attribute separately. Furthermore, our approach circumvents
the need to store replicas of fully qualified user descriptions at other peers in the net-
work, as proposed in [Cutillo et al., 2009c] or [Rzadca et al., 2010].
5.4.2 Privacy and Security
This section contains privacy and security contemplations of the proposed protocol as
well as further improvements which address security concerns beyond the scope of
the system design to mitigate service availability attacks. The scope of this part of
the evaluation is to answer the question whether the use of the search scheme can
be harmful for the user or server authority. Leaking data could affect user’s privacy,
coming with negative side effects far beyond the search functionality.
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Attacking additional functionality just brings back the actual status before the search
protocol was available. Hence, we consider attacks on the search functionality not to
be an obstacle for adding this search protocol to a communication system. We thus
assume an attacker that aims to leverage the search scheme to illegitimately access
private information. Since we trust friends not to publish user handles, arbitrary nodes
in the network, except the own server or trusted friends, can be attacker.
The proposed search protocol does not include actions, sending any personal related
information to anybody but the server, the user is assigned to. Other nodes, like the
nodes in the DHT, just learn that a user named “Bob” is assigned to server A. The link
between the public string “Bob” and the ID of the subject, which was sought after, has
to be made by the server A. Hence we meet the requirement 1.
Even blind testing of attribute combinations does not give reliable information about
single users, since knowing that both a user with a first name “Bob” and a user with a
last name “Brown” exist, does not yield concluding that “Bob Brown” exists. The first
name item and the last name item may belong to different subjects, using the same
server. Armknecht et al. [Armknecht et al., 2014] show that the entropy of the user
attributes is high enough to make guessing (dictionary attacks) unfeasible as soon as a
combination of attributes is used as a key.
Requirements 3 and 4 are met by introducing the short term valid ID, since a re-
questing node needs to negotiate for receiving this ID, which is invalidated after a
short time.
Since the design of our protocol is based on the assumption that attackers have less
knowledge about the search target than legitimate request senders, this mechanism
is not able to prevent well informed attackers from getting a short term valid ID. We
argue that this is not an issue, since popular OSNs like Facebook allow strangers to
send friend requests as well. To mitigate that issue, we suggest to allow just one short
term valid ID per requester ID. Please note that the well informed attacker still does
not have access to the permanent user handle (e.g. email address) until she gets a
reply message.
Two types of index poisoning are possible. An attacker could register plenty of entries
for another server to increase its load caused by being involved in unsuccessful search
requests. Furthermore, an attacker could create fake (sybil) IDs to register plenty of
fake targets aiming at hiding the real search target. The first poisoning attack can
easily be tackled by signing the DHT entries, the latter can be mitigated by reputation
schemes and tackled by abolishing the zero cost environment.
Further security limitations are the following:
• Attackers can learn users not to be part of the system if one of her attributes is
not popular by sending a request to the DHT. If the server list is empty, the search
target is most probably not registered.
• The number of participating servers can be estimated by requesting popular at-
tributes and calculating the super set of all server list items.
• The popularity of servers can be estimated by evaluating the relative frequency
of servers being part of the candidate list resulting from arbitrary requests to the
DHT.
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To summarize: Users can register to the search infrastructure without fearing to pub-
lish their user handles or any other private information. However, the functionality of
the search scheme can be attacked like in other distributed search schemes as well. We
argue that the presented limitations are not an obstacle for this scheme to be adopted
in DOSN or XMPP systems.
5.4.3 Communication and Computational Costs
Compared with centralized approaches for finding user handles, decentralized solu-
tions require more communication. One reason is that the searcher does not know
both the user handle itself as well as the particular server to query. Hence, the
distributed search procedure contains an additional step for finding the responsible
server. Despite this overhead, any useful search scheme must not become prohibitively
expensive in terms of network and system load (requirement 2). In the latter of this
section, we show that the network load is not a prohibitive issue. The formulas can be
found in the appendix.
Having a given search field distribution (e.g. names and city inhabitants) and user-
server affiliation frequency distribution, the final network load per search request thus
depends on the efficiency of the chosen lookup service, the complexity of the search
request, the number of participating servers and the number of system users (and
hence are registering attributes).
The load increases less than linear with a growing number of users, since duplicate
attribute instances per server do not have an impact. A growing number of servers has
a linear impact as well as the length of the search field content. Nonlinear growth of
load is caused by the privacy preserving negotiation algorithm while calculating the
power set of the atomic parts of the search request. This is given by 2n−2 (minus two,
because of the concatenation of three fields) where n is the number of search fields.
We argue that this is not an issue (Figure 5.2), since we expect the number of search
fields to be usually small (less than six).
Giving a second example scenario, we assume the profile attribute length, the profile
field name length, the sender address length, the host name length and the key length
to be 255 bytes (=255 characters) each, which represents the worst case. Based on
our prototype, we assume a CHORD DHT to be the lookup service. Furthermore, we
assume users to fill three search fields, a fraction of 30% of the servers having at least
one user with one matching attribute field and a fraction of 5% of these servers having
at least one user hosting a matching user profile. Subsequently, we assume that two
users on each server in the candidate list are matching all search fields, and each of
these users filled out five profile fields.
Since we assume the maximum field lengths (URL restrictions) in our example and
do not expect users to use more than three to five attributes per average search oper-
ation in reality, we assume our scenario to be a rather worse case. As a consequence
of this scenario evaluation, we argue that the resource consumption is not an obstacle
for deploying this protocol and thus the privacy is preserved at an affordable amount
of costs. Hence we meet our requirement 2.
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3 – 7 search fields
16 – 20 search fields
Figure 5.2: Impact of growing number of search fields on our example scenario (1,000
servers)
To prove the functionality of our scheme in a testbed, we implemented a proof-of-
concept prototype by adding components to the XMPP server Tigase6. The choice was
driven by the openness of the latter as well as by the fact that motivating existing
XMPP users to help us testing is easier than motivating people to join Diaspora* for
that purpose. Creating enough load to the system for exploring its performance limits,
was done by a small script for sending random requests.
Beside the result that the idea works well, we learned that the performance is suf-
ficient not to be prohibitive even though we did no performance optimizations in our
code and used comparably slow machines (2.2 GHZ AMD cores). Assuming that users
may want to find in average a dozen friends in a month, this server setup can handle
more than 50,000 users at one core without further code optimizations.
5.5 Related Work
The authors of Vis-a-Vis [Shakimov et al., 2011] suggested a DOSN approach based
on virtual individual servers. Every user runs her own virtual server for profile data
availability and interaction handling. A hierarchical scheme for finding user handles
and group management is proposed, realized by spanning a DHT across the individual
servers. Data which is used to characterize users in the search scheme is defined as
“searchable” which means to be public. We consider this search scheme to be the
closest to our proposed solution but it does does not meet our privacy requirements.
6 https://projects.tigase.org/, accessed on 2015-04-17
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To the best of our knowledge, no current work exploits the properties of decentral-
ized server architectures for finding user handles with privacy. Several approaches
implement client-server based DOSNs like e.g. Diaspora* and Jabbix7, but they do not
provide any integrated comprehensive user discovery. XMPP addresses can globally
be found by using central user directories, based on XEP-0055 (Jabber Search), but
there are “no security features or concerns related to this proposal”8. Server-local JID
(Jabber Identifier) search is possible with the “Net::XMPP::JID - XMPP JID Module” 9
but again comes without tackling privacy and SPAM concerns.
The situation for finding e-mail addresses is even worse. Attempts to provide system-
wide search functionalities did not succeed. For example, the leading German telecom-
munication company took the e-mail directory10 (public, without privacy protection)
offline. Hence, finding e-mail addresses causes the need for side channel communica-
tion via e.g. web pages or social networking sites.
Since finding user handles is a subproblem of finding arbitrary re-
sources, general purpose search approaches are feasible for finding user
handles as well. Common ground of these approaches (e.g. key-
word search [Reynolds and Vahdat, 2003], XPath [Bonifati et al., 2004], ROAR
[Raiciu et al., 2009], SplitQuest [Lopes and Ferreira, 2010] or Bubblestorm
[Leng, 2012]) is the public-accessibility of the search strings. Thus, these solu-
tions do not meet our requirements 1, 3 and 4. Our solution, in contrast, allows for
the privacy preserving publication and discovery of users, which we achieve by two
cascaded indirection schemes.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented the first approach that allows to find user handles in
systems of decentralized client-server architectures, without disclosing any data that
is linked to the permanent user handle (ID or address). The novelty is to avoid build-
ing a user-linkable search index. This is realized by cutting the search strings into
atomic parts, which are linked to the server handle instead of the user handle and
separately registered at the lookup service. The reunification of the search results is
done locally and the subsequent access to a temporal user handle is limited to requests,
which demonstrate a minimum knowledge about the search target. The permanent ID
(e.g. email address) is not published by this mechanisms until the user is manually
responding to the request and thus confirming the contact to be desired.
It hence renders offline or other side channel communication for the purpose of
discovering users unnecessary and thus increases the usability of email, or Jabber-like
IM services. It additionally represents a step towards creating a usable distributed
social networking service, based on decentralized servers since finding friends is a core
functionality in today’s OSNs.
7 https://jabbix.com/, accessed on 2014-02-18
8 http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0055.html, accessed on 2014-02-18
9 http://search.cpan.org/dist/Net-XMPP/lib/Net/XMPP/JID.pm, accessed on 2014-02-18
10 http://www.email-verzeichnis.de/, accessed on 2014-02-18
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Our extensive evaluation includes the functionality, the privacy and security as well
as the communication costs, coming with the usage of our approach. A prototype im-
plementation based on XMPP, extending the popular Jabber server Tigase, underlines
feasibility and scalability of the system.
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Chapter6
Increasing Profile Availability in
P2P-based OSNs
Doing away with a centralized service provider, and realizing social network-
ing features over a decentralized user-contributed (P2P) infrastructure is a
promising approach, that has been proposed and explored for over half of a
decade [Buchegger et al., 2009b, Cutillo et al., 2009b, Sharma and Datta, 2012,
Durr et al., 2012, Nilizadeh et al., 2012, Aiello and Ruffo, 2012, Jahid et al., 2012].
Most existing works aim to emulate full-fledged features of popular commercial social
networking services like Facebook and Twitter. Despite many academic as well as
open-source community initiatives, P2P OSNs are still not sufficiently mature to pro-
vide an easy to use and reliable service. A major challenge that is still not adequately
solved is to efficiently replicate user profiles in case of assuming short session durations
(Section 2.2).
To that end, we argue that bulk data storage as a result of sharing e.g. large photo
albums should be distinguished from realizing other features in developing a P2P-OSN.
This keeps user profiles small and hence easier to replicate. The rationale behind this
design choice is that social updates are the glue that binds a social network by keeping
it interesting for its users. It is thus important to provide fast dissemination and high
availability of such information. In contrast, stale bulk data provides less benefit per
data volume and may be abdicable. We thus envision a lightweight P2P online social
network, aiming to securely store and disseminate social updates (this includes all
types of 1:1 and 1:n communications) over a P2P back-end, but without the burden of
permanently storing bulk data such as huge photo albums or videos.
The total volume of such user profiles can be reasonably small (e.g. 1-10MB), and
hence can be more easily maintained over a P2P infrastructure. Furthermore, free
riding incentives are mitigated by decreasing the size of objects to be replicated despite
the fact that members in the network may be individually unreliable.
In case that users still want to keep bulk data, e.g., videos and large photo albums,
it could either be stored at third party services, or by peers dedicating more resources,
or by realizing a hybrid infrastructure. Thus, a more privacy-concerned user may use
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Figure 6.1: Lilliput is a storage module to achieve high availability and consistency for
small volume of aggregate storage, comprising of small data items. The
latter however can be inserted and updated at high rate in the system.
Lilliput’s purpose is to store and share the ‘social glue’ of online social net-
works such as status updates, profile, messages and text posts on walls, etc.,
disentangling the storage of (relatively static) bulk data - photo albums and
multimedia.
a peers only storage functionality, and pay for it by dedicating more resources herself
(e.g., by running a more reliable server, similar to a Pod of Diaspora, to store and serve
the bulk of her data), while, a less discerning user may be satisfied with using a cloud
service like Dropbox, Flickr or Youtube for media storage. Multi-cloud storage mod-
ules such as Depsky [Bessani et al., 2011] or InterCloudRAIDer [Ling and Datta, 2014]
could provide an intermediate amount of privacy, by further dividing the bulk data over
several cloud services instead of storing them at a single one.
The bottom-line of disentangling the bulk data storage and dissemination from the
essential social updates is that the quality of service for the latter is not sacrificed
due to the burden of bulk data, while different users can then append diverse kinds
of solutions according to their privacy needs and concerns, on top of this lightweight
P2P online social networking service. For the rest of this chapter, we will thus focus
only on the design of a lightweight, reliable and secure P2P storage substrate aimed at
supporting a lightweight online social network. Figure 6.1 showcases how we envision
a full-fledged system may look like, and how the other components would be related
to the storage service we have designed.
We next enumerate the requirements that we believe that a lightweight online social
network should ideally meet. We distinguish between functional and non-functional
requirements.
The functional requirements are inspired by current popular OSN functionalities:
1. 1:1 as well as 1:n communication mechanisms for users to communicate (mes-
sages, wall, ...)
2. Content sharing functionalities along with flexible access control mechanisms
3. A content and user handle search mechanism
4. Event notifications
The underlying system needs to achieve the following non-functional requirements
in order to realize high quality of service while fulfilling the above functional require-
ments:
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1. 24/7 availability of each user’s profile data: This includes an inbox for messages,
technical information (header data) as well as posts and thumbnails of photos
and videos.
2. Consistency guarantees for the profile data: Users need to be sure that the re-
ceived data is correct and not stale.
3. Fast access to every profile, with propagation delays comparable to similar web-
based systems.
4. Feasible resource consumption w.r.t. what is available from peers in terms of
storage, bandwidth and computational power.
5. Cryptographic access control and authorization mechanisms providing confiden-
tiality guarantees.
In this chapter, we present a design of a storage service which uses peer resources
instead of any dedicated infrastructure, advocating a redundancy management scheme
which tries to identify a sweet-spot in the trade-offs between high profile availability
and low resource consumption. To that end, we present Lilliput, a set of protocols to re-
alize a storage service for lightweight P2P online social networks, specifically achieving
the following:
• Up to 99.64% of user profile availability even under churn levels where the ses-
sion durations exhibit a median of 50 minutes and online peer population per-
centages are between 7.9% and 15.5% of all nodes.
• This very high level of availability is achieved without overstretching (scarce)
network resources, e.g., the average transfer rate of the highest contributors (10%
fraction) is 68 kbit/s and respectively 44 kbit/s for the lowest contributors (90%
fraction).
• Despite providing high availability, Lilliput, based on a very small but aggressively
maintained set of replicas, avoids running into the consistency gap typically oc-
curring in replication systems.
One can notice the conflicting system requirements - high availability of user profile
data has to be achieved despite using (extremely) unreliable user devices. Placing
many replicas of each piece of content in the network could arguably achieve this, but
that would be detrimental to the network resource utilization, particularly given the
high rate of updates under which consistency needs to be maintained.
Lilliput handles these conflicting requirements by leveraging small data overlays with
dynamic participation of nodes. These data overlays can be created by any user who
will be regarded as the data owner for that data overlay. Subsequently, other nodes
are invited to her data overlay with the help of the members of the overlay. Once a
sufficient number of nodes have been invited to the overlay, it typically becomes self-
supporting. At this point the data owner can disconnect and the other participants
in the overlay will continue to invite nodes upon necessity. Nodes in the overlays
maintain knowledge about the current replica status. Each node is aware of the status
of every other participant in the overlay. Based on this knowledge, the set of nodes
which replicate one profile can react to critical situations by inviting new nodes.
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In our packet based simulation driven evaluation, we show that even small replica
sets can successfully keep a user profile online using an aggressive maintenance of a
small set of live nodes in the overlay, and can do so by utilizing a small amount of
network resources. That is true even under very adversarial churn patterns. It is worth
stressing that Lilliput’s design allows nodes with short online durations to contribute,
avoiding unavailabilities of user profiles without overloading relatively highly available
peers.
The contributions of this chapter are:
• We present a new architecture in the field of P2P OSNs with the focus on user
profile availability. Motivated by Schneider et al. [Schneider et al., 2009], who
discovered that OSN session durations are short (mean time: 40 minutes), it
allows every node in the network that is online for at least a couple of minutes
to be able to contribute in keeping data items available by applying our dynamic
replication scheme.
• Caused by plenty of data copy processes while applying our protocols, replication
of big data items becomes too expensive. We thus propose to reduce the profile
size by avoiding bulk content data to be permanently part of the user profile.
• In contrast to existing literature in the field of DOSN, we run packet level simu-
lations to evaluate our system under high churn which exhibits a median session
duration of 50 minutes.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 contains a system
design description that details the system environment and specifies data structures
and protocols. We evaluate Lilliput in Section 6.2. Furthermore, we discuss related
work in Section 6.3 where we point out the void that Lilliput fills, and how this work
contributes to the progress of DOSNs. We conclude this chapter in Section 6.4.
6.1 System Design
This section first gives a brief overview of Lilliput and describes the assumed system en-
vironment. It further explains Lilliput’s architecture in detail, including its components
and protocols.
6.1.1 System Environment and Brief System Overview
The system environment is determined by the user behavior that can be observed in
OSNs as well as by today’s technical preconditions with respect to network bandwidth
and user’s devices.
The user behavior has been investigated in Chapter 2. The main findings are that
both - the session durations and total online times of users - are short. Finding a small
and static subset of nodes to replicate user profiles hence seems unfeasible. Moreover,
users view very fresh contents that very often consist of shared (often external) links,
likes and comments. The popularity of profiles is assumed to be disparate. Users may
have just a couple or even plenty of friends.
116 6 Increasing Profile Availability in P2P-based OSNs
Based on today’s technical preconditions for accessing OSNs, we assume Lilliput to
be run on a vast variety of different devices. This includes desktop machines, laptops,
tablets as well as smart phones. From the resource’s point of view, it implies that
the potential to contribute storage, computational and bandwidth resources to the
OSN is heterogeneous. Our strategy to handle this situation is to keep the resource
requirements low enough to allow all nodes to participate equally to achieve fairness.
The user devices that contribute to the OSN are assumed not be accessible all the time.
Instead, we assume users to connect their devices to the network at the moment when
they gain a benefit from its web applications.
We handle this challenging situation by introducing an agile replication scheme while
strictly limiting the size of user profiles. We further minimize the data replication
overhead by leveraging nodes that rejoin overlays which they have been part before,
still storing a recent copy.
Participants who join the social networking service for the first time create their
profiles and establish one Lilliput overlay for its management. The Lilliput overlays
are small, fully connected, and are uniquely identified by IDs that are derived from
the handles of the users who created them. They consist of nodes that replicate the
respective user profile to keep it available and accessible. The limited size of only three
to nine nodes helps achieving scalability, as it allows for flooding the status of profile
and updates internally at affordable cost. The exact size is adapted according to system
settings and environment, below.
Each Lilliput overlay is registered and can subsequently be found using a discovery
service. The discovery is not part of this approach and can be implemented using
any of the well known approaches (DHT, DNS, central registries, etc). This choice is
orthogonal to Lilliput, and the impact with respect to our study is negligible.
6.1.2 Definition of Data Structures
This subsection details data structures that are established and maintained for the
operation of Lilliput.
User Profile
A user profile is assumed to be a container, enclosing all data items owned by one
user. It is consisting of a header for meta information (size, IDs, ...), a payload section
containing data to be downloaded upon interest as well as an inbox to leave messages
addressed to the profile owner. Integrating all data items of one user into one container
reduces the effort to check the integrity and simplifies replica maintenance.
We suggest to apply the PMS-SK scheme in [Günther et al., 2012] to protect the
confidentiality of user data. This profile management scheme provably protects user
data from unintended access as well as perfect unlinkability. Only legitimate users
themselves know whether they are allowed to access a certain piece of information. We
also use the suggested key handling and the provided operations on the user profiles.
As it is proposed by Günther et al. in [Günther et al., 2012], we define all data items
to be stored in key-value pairs: “A profile P is modeled as a set of pairs (a, d¯) ∈ I ×
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{0,1}∗ where I ⊆ {0,1}∗ is the set of possible attribute indices a and d corresponding
values stored in P. We assume that within a profile P attribute indices are unique.
Furthermore, we assume that each profile P is publicly accessible but is distributed in
an authentic manner by its owner UP ∈ U . Also, every user U owns at most one profile
and the profile owned by U is denoted PU .”
PMS does not offer an easy way to implement messaging. To solve this issue, we
suggest to allow everyone to include one encrypted link into a message receiver’s pub-
lic section of the profile. This link points to the message (or a set of messages) which
is stored at the sender’s profile to mitigate the chances to overwhelm the receiver’s
abilities to receive messages. Every link is signed by the message sender and the pro-
file replication node which accepted to include the link into the public section of the
profile.
Since only one link, which can point to a set of messages, is allowed per sender,
thousands of senders can drop message notification links in a single profile. In the
unlikely case that a storage limitation is reached, we suggest to proceed like it is done
in the current e-mail ecosystem and refuse to add new links. The profile owner needs
to make sure to empty the space after noticing the messages. To avoid SPAM, a proof
of work mechanism might be used in future to legitimate nodes to add the notification
link to other user’s profiles.
Candidate List
The candidate list is a list of IDs of nodes which are considered to be invited to Lil-
liput overlays in case of insufficient overlay size. The candidate list contains nodes
encountered during normal operation. This includes nodes which have been encoun-
tered in any of the joined Lilliput overlays, during profile requests, or which have been
obtained from the discovery service. The candidate lists are shared among all partic-
ipants in all Lilliput overlays. To reduce the number of stale entries in the candidate
list, each node removes candidates from its list when the candidate has denied an
invitation request or in case of timeout.
6.1.3 Bootstrapping and Maintenance Protocols
This section contains all protocols that are necessary to establish and maintain data
overlays in Lilliput. We assume the existence of a P2P overlay with basic services like
DHT lookup and peer-sampling.
Bootstrapping
Each participant first chooses an identifier, which is used for identifying both the
node in overlay operations and the profile within the social networking service. These
IDs are either generated by hashing a unique string, like an e-mail address, or chosen
at random. The further bootstrapping process is twofold: First, the node joins and
registers within the discovery service. It then creates a profile and the corresponding
Lilliput overlay, establishes an initial candidate list, and resumes normal operation.
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Creation of Data Overlays
In order to maintain profiles in Lilliput, a data owner has to establish her own data
overlay in the system. First, the application locally creates an initial data structure
containing the overlay ID and initial application defined data. The ID of the created
data overlay equals the node’s own ID. It then leverages the lookup service to randomly
select the allowed minimum number of nodes (r_min) to invite. When nodes accept the
invitation, the owner establishes a TCP connection to send the initial data structure.
This procedure is repeated until r_min nodes have accepted and received the initial
data structure. The owner will then become the initial leader of the overlay until her
node goes offline.
Invitation Procedure
At every point in time at least one node of each data overlay has to be available. As-
suming high churn rates, it becomes unlikely that the initial set of nodes selected by the
data owner is able to achieve 24/7 availability. Therefore, the nodes in the data overlay
will select and invite other nodes whenever too many nodes become unavailable.
The invitation process for each data overlay is led by the data overlay leader. The
data owner will always be the leader of her own data overlay as long as her node is
online. In the absence of the data owner, the node whose ID is closest to the overlay
ID is elected using a form of the Bully algorithm. Since every node in the data overlay
knows the overlay IDs of all other nodes, the first node to detect a failure will calculate
the distance between the overlay ID and its own ID as well as the distance between the
IDs of other overlay members and the overlay ID. Heartbeat messages are then sent
to elect the invitation leader. Please note that since the owner has the same ID as her
overlay, once she is online, she always wins the leader election.
If necessary (number of nodes in the overlay drops below r_min), the leader of an
overlay selects a node from the list of candidate nodes taking a combination of metrics
into account. The leader will then send an invitation message to the candidate node.
The invitation message contains the overlay ID, the leader node ID as well as optionally
the ID and IP of another node in the data overlay with which to perform the initial data
transfer.
The invited node can either respond with an invitation refusal or with an invitation
acknowledgement. Invitation refusal, e.g. due to exceeding the maximum storage on
a node, will result in the node being removed from the leader’s candidate set and the
next candidate will be invited. However, if the node accepts the invitation, it will then
open a TCP connection either to the leader or to the designated download node, if
available, and request the overlay’s data.
After a successful initial transfer, the invited node sends a data acknowledgement to
the leader as well as the first heartbeat messages to all other nodes. After that, the
node is considered an established participant in the data overlay.
Monitoring the Overlay Status Information
The idea of dynamically inviting nodes to join the overlays upon demand causes
the need to monitor the number of available replicas (the current size of the overlay).
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Figure 6.2: Sequence diagram of the invitation process
Thus, heartbeat messages are periodically exchanged UDP messages among nodes in
same data overlay. They have two main purposes: First, they are used to detect failed
or disconnected nodes in order to achieve a constant awareness of the number of
nodes in the data overlay. Second, they are used to disseminate and measure other
information about nodes, such as current utilization of resources or average round trip
time (RTT) between nodes.
Reconnection of Nodes to the Overlay
To reduce bandwidth consumption, nodes that come back online after a downtime
will first try to reconnect to the data overlays which it was previously participating. In
case the reconnect fails, the node will - depending on the local storage limitations -
eventually discard the data to free storage for other data overlays. This is not the case
for the data owner’s node in case of reconnecting to her own data overlay. Instead, she
will re-instantiate her data overlay in case her node can not reconnect.
6.1.4 Application Protocols
The category of application protocols encompasses protocols used for read and write
access of the data, which is stored in overlays. The receiver in these protocols is always
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a node that currently participates in the overlay while the initiator is the application
that is using the system for its service.
Access to Data Overlays
Three operations are supported by the data overlays. Read operations incorporate
data requests either for the whole data, for parts of the data (e.g. delta updates) or sec-
tions of the data structure. Update operations performed on the private section require
owner’s rights (cryptographically enforced). Write operations targeted to the public in-
box are strongly limited in size and frequency per client and are non-revocable. Public
inbox write operations are facilitating asynchronous message exchange among users
as well as push notifications to inform users about profile updates.
Data Dissemination
Write operations (see Access to Data Overlays) are always performed between the
client node and only one node from the data overlay. The contacted node will have to
take care of disseminating the data to the other nodes, which is done in an iterative
way. Once all nodes in the data overlay have acknowledged the write request, the first
contacted node sends an acknowledgment back to the client. Updates by the owner
are handled in a different way, since the owner’s node will always participate in her
own data overlay for the duration of the node’s online time (see below). The owner
node will simply take the application request and perform the iterative updates itself.
6.1.5 Node Selection Strategies
The invitation leader has to choose one node from the candidate list to perform the
invitation process. However, the candidate list contains more than one node during
normal operation. The strategy to choose the candidate to invite has an impact on the
performance of the system. We suggest the following strategies:
• random: nodes are selected from the candidate list at random
• equalizeConnections: A node could be in replica overlays where all sets of replica
nodes are disjunct. Taking the maintenance effort perspective, this is the worse
case since nodes sharing more then one overlay still only have to ping each other
once in each interval to check if the other is still available. However, the opposite
case where exactly the same group of nodes hosts multiple overlays is the worst
case from the stability point of view since one failing node causes invitations in
each affected overlay.
To strike a balance between both extremes, we propose to modify the node selec-
tion in such a way that each node tries to equalize the number of shared overlays
among the nodes which it is currently sharing overlays with. A candidate that is
in only one other overlay together with the inviting node should therefore be pre-
ferred over a node that is already in many shared overlays. To do that, the node
selection algorithm calculates a score for each candidate that is inversely propor-
tional to the number of shared replica overlays s. The node with the highest score
is then selected for invitation.
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A special case (s = 0) is necessary because otherwise candidates that are not
yet in any shared overlay would simultaneously get the highest score in every
candidate list in which the node is part of. To avoid this case, new nodes’ score is
a random value between 0 and the maximum achievable score (smax). The small
random factor (rand([−0.01,0.01])) ensures nodes with the same score to be
chosen randomly:
score =
(
smax · rand([0,1]) if s = 0
(smax − s) + rand([−0.01,0.01]) if s ≥ 0
• filterShortTimeThenEqualizeConnections: Using this node selection strategy,
nodes are scored according to equalizeConnections while omitting nodes that
have been online for less then two minutes. The background is twofold: First,
nodes coming online for shorter than two minutes cannot contribute much to
increase profile availability but cause synchronization traffic. Second, users may
want to keep their own network link utilization low in the first seconds to retrieve
updates of own interests first.
6.2 Evaluation
To assess both the efficiency of our system as well as the availability it can provide, we
performed an extensive simulation study. Addressing the requirements to a lightweight
DOSN, we focused on the following questions:
1. At what fraction of time a profile and its respective overlay are available, and how
many profiles are offline at any given point of time during the study?
2. How much data in total is being transferred during the entire simulation and
what fraction of the bandwidth per node is used?
3. How many overlays does each node have to join such that Lilliput can achieve an
acceptable level of profile availability?
We now briefly describe the assumptions, the simulation environment and the results
of our simulations.
6.2.1 Churn Assumption
Churn describes how peers arrive at and depart from the system over time and reflects
the unreliability of nodes in P2P-based systems. Measuring the performance of P2P-
based systems is always related to the churn model, since the churn model determines
the availability of resources in the network.
In the simplest case, churn can be generated from a single probability distribution.
To generate churn for n nodes, a delay time is drawn for each node from a population
(following a certain distribution), after which the node is brought online. Subsequently
after determining the time a node is appearing, a session duration is defined.
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However, studies of churn and user behavior [Benevenuto et al., 2009,
Steiner et al., 2009] as well as our own study in Chapter 2 show that the simplest
methods to generate churn do not reflect the situation in reality. Just drawing both the
online duration and the inter session time does not create diurnal patterns and time
zone distributions of nodes in the world as well as week day related patterns.
Figure 6.3: Diurnal patterns of churn with respect to weekdays; Monday till Wednesday
equal Thursday and have thus been omitted in favor of lucidity
While our own user behavior study (FPA) focuses on the orchestration of functional-
ity and is up-to-date, it is not ideal to build churn models. The reasons are that:
• our participants are originated from 46 countries but only the German subset has
a reasonable size,
• a subset of our participants does not share the country / timezone information
with us.
Thus, we rely on existing churn models from the literature that are in-line with
our results to evaluate Lilliput. The KAD trace by Steiner et al. [Steiner et al., 2009,
Steiner et al., 2007] and the Skype super-node trace [Guha et al., 2006] are available
online1. For the following evaluations, we use the KAD trace, since the Skype super-
peer trace just contains the most stable nodes in the system. It hence is too optimistic
to evaluate a P2P-OSN. We derived arrival rates for single timezones that exhibit a
clear diurnal pattern. Our trace generator, based on these traces, generates synthetic
trace files for arbitrary numbers of nodes, simulation durations as well as timezone
distributions of nodes.
1 http://www.cs.illinois.edu/~pbg/availability/, accessed on 2015-11-01
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Please note that the KAD trace is more challenging than all traces or churn models
which have been used to evaluate P2P OSNs before. We assume in average about 11%
of nodes to be online and have situations with just 7.9% of nodes in the system.
To be able to simulate different network sizes as well as to avoid to use a part of
the trace recorded during an uncommon situation in the observed system, we build
a churn generator that generates trace files with the desired properties from the KAD
trace. This churn generator is available online2.
6.2.2 Simulation Environment and Experiment Setup
In this section, we name the simulation environment and describe the modifications
on it that were necessary to run our simulations. Thereafter, we specify the setup of
our experiments.
Simulation Environment
We used the general purpose OMNeT++ network simulator [Varga and Hornig, 2008]
in conjunction with the OverSim overlay network simulation framework
[Baumgart et al., 2007]. OverSim supports simulations driven by trace files. However,
we needed to make modifications to OverSim in order to allow nodes to leave the sys-
tem and return later with their state preserved. Furthermore, we modified OverSim’s
SimpleUnderlay network topology so that we could control the latency between nodes
based on their assigned timezone. For this purpose, nodes are placed into an euclidean
coordinate system according to their timezone.
Setup and Parameters
We simulated the system using several simulations sizes and scenarios using 1000,
5000, 10,000 and 15,000 nodes as well as four different timezone distributions for
these nodes. We simulated the nodes being located in one country, one continent, two
continents or around the world using a distribution taken from the data collected by
Pingdom3. Each trace spans five days of simulation time.
Nodes in the simulation are considered homogeneous having a reliable Internet con-
nection (1MBit uplink, 10MBit downlink) as well as 500MB of available storage space.
Latency between two nodes is calculated by the SimpleUnderlay topology from Over-
Sim, which uses a fixed value of 20ms and adds a fraction of the euclidean distance
between the position of two nodes as well as some random jitter, the maximum latency
is approximately 600ms.
The system parameters that are elaborated in our evaluation influence the size of the
overlays, the maximum profile size as well as the time until a node starts reconnecting
to the overlays:
2 https://www.p2p.tu-darmstadt.de/research/p2p-churn-generator/, accessed on 2015-11-01
3 http://royal.pingdom.com/2013/02/12/internet-users-time-zone/, accessed on 2015-11-01
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r_min
This value defines the lowest number of nodes which is acceptable to have in one
overlay and must be set to a value ≥ 2 to ensure that each profile is replicated. We
evaluated values between 2 and 4 since values bigger than 4 did not help to improve
availability but caused resource consumption.
r_max
The valid value range for this upper bound for the profile size is between r_min+ 1
and ∞. If r_max is set to ∞, returning nodes are never rejected to rejoin the over-
lay when reappearing online. In all other cases, nodes are rejected when the replica
count of the overlay grows up to r_max . We decided to evaluate all combinations
with r_max ≤ 9 since a growing overlay size makes flooding of heartbeat messages
expensive.
profileSize
The size of profiles is limited to 10 MiB. We decided to use this profile size for two
reasons: downloading our own profiles in Facebook resulted in a data package of less
than 10 MB and Lilliput is not designed for long term storage of bulk data. We thus
argue that this profile size is appropriate.
maxStorageSize
The device owner may want to limit the storage which is used by the system to host
other users’ profiles. We evaluated the effect of this limit on profile availability and
network load for the values 500 MiB, 1000 MiB and∞.
Measurements
From the 14 days of simulation time, the first five days are used as warmup period
while we observe the key metrics of the system during the remaining days of simulation
time. We measure the consumed storage space, the bandwidth utilization, the number
of connections as well as the number of overlays each node participates in. For the
data overlays, we observe the overall availability over time, the number of concurrent
active nodes and the total number of nodes invited during the course of the simulation.
Finally we measure the ratio of data overlays available with regards to the total number
of created overlays over time.
6.2.3 Results
We provide the results of our experiments in the following section. As a first step we
justify the size of the experiment and show that increasing the number of nodes by
factor 15 does not change the results in general. The main focus of the numerical
results in this section covers the achieved profile availability, the communication costs
as well as the storage utilization on the nodes.
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Figure 6.4: Example churn model: The numbers of online nodes in 5k, 10k and 15k
churn models are (proportionally) identical.
Figure 6.5: Scaling up the experiment: influence of the total network size on the avail-
ability of profiles
Profile Availability
Not considering the bootstrapping phase, we discovered parameter combinations
which led to an availability of more than 99.07%. That is especially true for
(r_min/r_max) 3/6, 4/5 and 3/7. In case of 3/7, 96.37% of the profiles have
never been offline during the whole simulation time. The profiles which have been
offline at least once during simulation time still have a median availability of 84.28%.
The main factors that influence the availability in our simulations are the minimum
fraction of online nodes during the observation period as well as the time it takes to
invite a new node to the overlay. Since we assumed a churn model that results in
having a minimum of 7.9% of nodes online (and a maximum of 15.5%, Figure 6.4),
we make rather pessimistic assumptions. Please note that the total number of profiles
equals 100% of the nodes in the experiments. We do not fulfill our non-functional
requirement 1 since we achieve 99.64% instead of 100% availability but consider the
availability criteria not to be an obstacle in applying Lilliput.
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Figure 6.6: Fraction of overlays that have been oﬄine at least once during simulation
time under storage limitations with respect to different parameter combi-
nations (r_min, r_max)
6.2 Evaluation 127
# Nodes # Overlays available 24/7 Total Availability (Time)
1k 97.6 0.9964
10k 96.4 0.9918
15k 96.37 0.9907
Table 6.1: Availability of profile overlays
# Nodes Mean Median
1k 0.8515 0.9012
10k 0.7726 0.8627
15k 0.7438 0.8428
Table 6.2: Mean and median availability of nodes that have not been online all the time
Communication Overhead
The communication overhead is a strong concern of users in mobile environments
but matters to a certain extent in every case. Users may not want an OSN application
to utilize the complete available bandwidth. We hence measured the amount of data
which is sent and received by each node. The results show that applying our protocols
causes average traffic of about 40 times the profile size per node in a 14 days period.
The bandwidth utilization is driven by the assumed churn, the replication parameters
(r_min/r_max), the maximum storage allowance on the nodes and the size of the
stored objects. The churn influence on bandwidth utilization can be translated into the
probability of nodes to rejoin overlays in relation to those needing a whole new copy.
Figure 6.7 illustrates both the amount of traffic that is necessary to keep 10 MB online
for 14 days as well as the influence of the parameters r_min, r_max and the maxi-
mum storage capacity. The influence of the parameters r_min and r_max is twofold
(Figure 6.7): First, increasing r_min strongly increases the bandwidth and storage
utilization. Second, increasing r_max decreases network traffic. The increasing effect
(on bandwidth and storage utilization) is caused by a higher number of nodes in the
overlays (and thus more invitation processes). A higher r_max increases the probabil-
ity for nodes to rejoin an overlay and updating a stale copy of a profile is cheaper than
submitting a new copy.
Storage Consumption
The storage used by Lilliput strongly depends on the chosen parameters for r_min
and r_max. We used three different settings with 500 MB, 1000 MB and unlimited
storage capacity. While unlimited storage resources cause unlimited growth of storage
usage, 500 MB is a good choice for all cases where r_max is smaller than 9 (Figure
6.6).
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Figure 6.7: Impact of different parameter combinations (r_min, r_max) on the total
amount of data transferred in the experiment with 1000 nodes in a 14 days
period
Figure 6.8: Amount of data sent and received per node in the case of limited storage;
star-markers indicate the averages; differences between received and sent
data amounts are caused by churn-indicated transmission abortions; out-
liers indicate early / late adopters during bootstrapping phase
Figure 6.9: Number of overlays each node is part of at the end of simulation time with
respect to the minimal overlay size r_min
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Data Consistency
Content freshness is not an issue for Lilliput, since the content is replicated in a
single, fully connected overlay and the participating nodes share identical copies of
the profile. Assuming that the owner of a profile updates the profile, she necessarily
is online. If the owner of the profile is online, she serves access requests from the
original copy. Before going offline, the owner makes sure that the replica are up to date
by uploading her profile to the replicating nodes. The replicating nodes subsequently
again serve the latest copy in case the profile owner is not available.
Two cases in which the consistency is challenged remain: First, if a breakdown occurs
during the process to update the profile (from profile owner to replicating nodes, or
between the replicating nodes). Second, if a breakdown occurs after a message has
been left for, but before it has been delivered to the profile owner. We do not see any
chance to evaluate or tackle the first issue. Regarding the second one, the only chance
for the message sender to make sure that the message arrives is to check back later.
6.2.4 Fulfilling Functional Requirements
Our functional requirement 1 can be met by implementing a push / pull communi-
cation strategy. Each user profile contains two sections: a larger one where only the
owner has write access as well as an inbox where other users can drop messages and
notifications. Text message exchange can be realized by dropping a message directly
at the recipient’s inbox. In case of sharing content (requirement 2), thumbnails or
smaller items can be stored at the sender’s profile. To avoid the necessity to check a
vast amount of profiles for new content items, an update notification (requirement 4)
will be dropped at the inbox of the desired receiver.
In case of synchronous communication where both parties are online, a direct data
exchange is realized. The presence information of nodes in the network is implicitly
available since profile owners are always part of the overlay and are first responder of
any requests.
Finding user handles can be realized straightforward via lookup service (requirement
3). This comes with the disadvantage of disclosing information which is necessary to
identify the search target.
6.2.5 Comparison to S-Data
S-Data [Shahriar et al., 2013] is the prior approach that in its features and properties
is probably most closely related to Lilliput. S-Data groups all participants, with each
node of a group hosting all profiles of all group members. It has been evaluated un-
der a much more conservative churn model, and still achieves a notably lower profile
availability. The authors indeed state that “For a mean peer uptime of 8 hours it is
possible to have more than 93% of the groups online even under 50% failure rate”.
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6.3 Related Work
There is a vast amount of related work, with a multitude of focus: general purpose P2P
storage systems design as well as P2P-OSN specific works. P2P storage approaches like
Oceanstore [Kubiatowicz et al., 2000] or UniStore [Karnstedt et al., 2007] are con-
structed to provide a persistent storage for predominantly static data. They are not
optimized to store social data since consistency of small data objects undergoing fre-
quent updates is expensive to achieve.
Most P2P OSN works take a holistic view on the system in general, and profile
availability and dissemination receives peripheral attention [Buchegger et al., 2009b,
Cutillo et al., 2009a, Aiello and Ruffo, 2012, Graffi et al., 2008, Jahid et al., 2012,
Nilizadeh et al., 2012]. The focus is instead on the system design, the communication
protocols and the encryption schemes. In most cases, friends are supposed to replicate
profile data or a standard underlying storage service such as a DHT is assumed.
Specialized availability schemes for P2P-OSNs have been suggested in Su-
perNova [Sharma and Datta, 2012], GemStone [Tegeler et al., 2011], My3
[Narendula et al., 2012] and S-DATA [Shahriar et al., 2013], while profile information
dissemination using friend networks has been studied in [Mega et al., 2011]. Super-
Nova focuses on bootstrapping and incentives, while the focus of [Mega et al., 2011]
is purely on dissemination and not on persistent storage, and hence they are not
comparable. GemStone, My3 and S-Data are direct competitors from the perspective
of a storage service.
The main idea of My3 is to select a subset of friends who are fully trusted to replicate
one’s profile data and to perform access control. For availability, the scheme relies on
the assumption that each user has a small subset of friends whose online time patterns
cover the online times of all other friends. This is a patently wrong assumption, and can
lead to extremely poor data availability [Sharma et al., 2011]. It also requires users to
trust these friends to have complete access to all profile data items and enforce the
access control benevolently, and not abuse these meta-information.
In Gemstone, a profile owner chooses a set of nodes based on criteria like “online
experience” and “social relation” to determine replica peers. This decision is static in
nature during the time when the profile owner herself is unavailable. This leads to
two effects: First, the owner’s online experience establishes a tendency to prefer nodes
with similar churn patterns like the owner. Second, the choice is based on experiences
from the past and hence assumes constant and predictable future patterns, and lacks
dynamic adaptivity.
S-DATA addresses the latter issue by introducing an external and centralized service
with global knowledge to find nodes with complementary churn patterns. Based on
this knowledge, groups where each node hosts every profile of all group members are
formed. Changes in churn behavior of any single participating node necessitate the
creation of new group assignments. Furthermore, users need to trust this centralized
service not to misuse the knowledge of churn patterns.
In contrast, Lilliput creates small profile overlays based on the current status of the
network without depending on assumptions regarding churn patterns. Thus Lilliput
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does not prefer or burden stable nodes for profile replication. Each node can contribute
to replica profiles even if the session duration is just a few minutes. Thus, there is no
need for nodes to explicitly disclose information about churn patterns and nor is the set
of replica nodes limited to the set of friends. The result is a rather agile storage service
which nevertheless requires low network resources, while providing highly available
yet consistent storage even in the presence of frequent updates in the data, making
Lilliput ideal as the storage primitive for lightweight P2P OSNs.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter addressed the issue of profile availability in P2P-OSNs. The straightfor-
ward solution of replicating profile data in a DHT takes the control where to store the
own data away from the user profile owner and raises trust and incentive issues. These
issues have been addressed by a couple of related works [Sharma and Datta, 2012,
Tegeler et al., 2011, Narendula et al., 2012, Shahriar et al., 2013] which suggested
group-based replication mechanisms. However, these approaches assume online ses-
sion lengths which are much longer than those measured in real systems e.g. by Schnei-
der et al. [Schneider et al., 2009]. The owner chooses (based on different criteria) a
static set of nodes for replication. This choice is fixed until a new decision is made.
In contrast to the related work, we proposed a dynamic replication scheme that still
allows the owner to take influence where to store data. Lilliput preserves the advantage
of group-based replication schemes to allow nodes to re-join the replication overlay
after a period of offline time. Using packet level simulations, we demonstrate that
Lilliput can be deployed even under heavy churn and still maintains data redundancy
to achieve an outstandingly high profile availability of more than 99%.
The main flaw of dynamic replication is the higher bandwidth utilization. We thus
propose the split design to guarantee small user profile sizes to reduce bandwidth uti-
lization as well as storage overhead. We argued that the main ‘social aspects’ of an
online social network can be achieved in a lightweight manner, disentangled from
the storage of bulk data. Accordingly, we designed ‘Lilliput’, which provides high
availability of small amount of data, which can however be frequently updated: es-
sentially corresponding to the profile and notification information in social networking
applications.
A lookup service is necessary to locate the data objects in the network. This can be
achieved by using a DHT for this purpose. However, resource locators are magnitudes
smaller and thus easier to replicate than even lightweight user profiles. The reduced
resource requirements caused by small user profiles help to mitigate free riding incen-
tives. Furthermore, our list of candidates for later node invitation consists of nodes
that have been met during normal operation. Profile owners can thus prefer to store
replicas at nodes with a cooperation history.
Lilliput solves an important challenge of P2P-OSNs to provide profile availability
in the presence of high churn. It is thus an approach to avoid implications of today’s
centralized OSNs since Lilliput contributes to make P2P-OSNs becoming an alternative.
However, Lilliput does not support sharing of bulk data such as videos or large photo
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albums by design. This is an important flaw that needs to be solved by leveraging
alternative services depending on the privacy implication. For example, traditional
file sharing could be used to share popular e.g. viral videos and 1:1 file transmissions
(supported by presence protocols) for sensitive data. Also, cloud-like services may help
to share data.
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Chapter7
Leveraging Locally-available Data
to Apply Video Prefetching
The decentralized storage of user data is a consequence of the design goal of
DOSNs to store and process data in the user’s influence zone (Chapter 4). How-
ever, even core functionality of OSNs, such as pull-based newsfeeds [Jahid et al., 2012,
Nilizadeh et al., 2012] and finding user handles (Chapter 5), requires gathering of in-
formation from different (potentially unreliable) sources. It causes communication
overhead amongst nodes and thus delays to collect the relevant data upon request.
Hence, DOSNs tend to suffer performance disadvantages compared with today’s OSNs.
These performance disadvantages are determined by the type of decentralization (e.g.
F-OSNs or P2P-OSNs), the data storage granularity, the communication delays and the
network bandwidth. P2P-DOSN are the most affected type of DOSN.
We suspect this situation to be caused by DOSNs to focus on privacy and security
rather than performance and functionality. However, beside enriching the functionality
in DOSNs, more work needs to be invested in improving the performance and user
experience to help DOSNs to become a serious alternative. To this end, we examine
the user behavior in Facebook with the goal in mind to discover stable usage patterns
that allow to predict data requests in future. These predictions can be used to avoid
and to reduce request delays.
In addition, these predictions can likely be derived from additional information
which is linked to the video. Facebook offers a rich set of metadata such as likes,
comments and social graph information for content which is uploaded to the social net-
work. In this chapter, we analyse this metadata and evaluate its feasibility to forecast
future media consumption. We set up two user studies to observe video consumption
habits of 34 users for 14 days in a mobile setting and 774 users for 34 days in average
in a stationary setting. As data gathering for prefetching is a computationally intensive
task which can be less attractive on mobile devices, our study is based firstly on sta-
tionary devices, using a browser plug-in, and secondly on 34 selected participants who
allowed us to track their Facebook usage. We analysed the newsfeeds with respect to
the type of entries (text, pictures, videos, links), the pre-click delays, the relation to
the author (friend or not) as well as the number of likes and comments.
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Nodes in DOSNs technically only have local view on content consumption. We thus
relate - in contrast to the previous works - the video consumption of users only with
locally-available contextual metadata, associated with the content, to find patterns that
can be leveraged to predict future content retrieval. We consider approaches that rely
on exchanging content access patterns amongst nodes (users) to be disadvantageous
in the field of DOSNs. They potentially harm user’s privacy.
Elaborating our measurements indicates that the social closeness of content producer
and recipient helps in predicting media consumption for close friends and the family
members, which are explicit subsets (groups) of what is called ’friend’ in Facebook. We
had hoped that prefetching based on affective expressions such as likes or comments
can be effective. However, we did not find a strong correlation between the number
of likes and comments and the probability of a video for being watched. As a further
result, we argue that the time a user spends to evaluate a post before clicking on it can
help to decrease startup delays. Our study participants tend to spend much more time
to evaluate a wallpost before clicking on it as it would be the case without the intention
to click on it. We thus suggest to start downloading videos before a click happens.
This chapter contributes to create a better understanding of predictions for prefetch-
ing videos based on likes, events, authorship and timings in OSNs. Applying our strate-
gies can help to reduce network traffic in cellular networks for the mobile and to
decrease startup times.
7.1 Background and Related Work
Efficient prefetching strategies are desirable for two reasons: First, they allow to shift
network traffic to the most cost and energy effective network interfaces of mobile
devices. Second, they allow to reduce video startup delays.
Several studies focus on the impact of startup delays on the perceived QoE. In Krish-
nan and Sitaraman’s work [Krishnan and Sitaraman, 2012] the effect of different video
startup times are evaluated. They demonstrate for short video clips such as those on
YouTube that an increase of startup time increases the probability that a user can-
cels the streaming session. Prefetching may solve this issue as content is downloaded
before the user requests it, resulting in a significantly reduced startup time.
With the work of Gautam et al. [Gautam et al., 2013], a mobile application is de-
veloped that allows to prefetch whole video clips based on arbitrary sources such as
social networks or news feeds. The paper focuses on energy cost savings realized when
applying prefetching on mobile devices. Zhao et al. [Zhao et al., 2013] demonstrate
a custom mobile Facebook application that integrates social network based algorithms
for prefetching. It allows the conclusion that social prefetching is beneficial, but hard
to conduct.
For scenarios in which video sharing sites are in focus, Khemmarat et al.
[Khemmarat et al., 2011] propose prefetching strategies considering related videos,
and search query results. In contrast, Cheng et al. [Cheng et al., 2009] present the P2P
streaming network NetTube which is customized for the video sharing site YouTube. In
a long-term measurement, they show that 99.6% of all videos uploaded to YouTube
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have a playback time of less than 12 minutes. They give helpful insights on the struc-
ture of a video sharing site and how YouTube’s infrastructure could be supported by the
P2P paradigm. They propose to prefetch the first part of a video with a fixed length of
ten seconds. Both approaches achieve high prediction rates but investigate YouTube, a
site which focuses on videos and neglects social ties. Their findings are closely related
to caching experiments and recommender systems for video sharing sites.
Online Social Networks are increasingly leveraged by networking and caching re-
searchers to predict media consumption. In [Kaafar et al., 2013], a recommendation-
aware content placement strategy for Content Delivery Networks (CDN) is investi-
gated. This work focuses on storing content at different places within the network,
whereas prefetching concentrates on downloading content to a device. Additionally
Bai et al. [Bai et al., 2013] show social network related caching mechanisms for Face-
book as well as in Yahoo News. Caching is powerful, but of course focuses on a large
set of users, whereas prefetching through the downloading of content to an individual
device can be tailored to each user individually. Prefetching, in contrast to caching in
large-scale CDNs, has only a limited view on the OSN data - the view of the user. Thus,
future video requests are potentially harder to predict.
An overview on video dissemination in OSNs is given by Li et al. [Li et al., 2013].
They show that popularity of videos has a significant impact on their consumption via
social networks. Unpopular video content disappears quickly from OSNs. This work
concentrates on shared links of videos on a Chinese OSN that is claimed to be similar
to Facebook. In contrast, Li et al. focus on the popularity distribution of videos in
general and thus neglect that unpopular videos still can be very interesting for a small
subset of users e.g. because they are acquainted with people in the video.
Wang et al. [Wang et al., 2011] investigate the most popular social network in
China, called RenRen. They design a P2P-based prefetching algorithm that aims to
reduce the video start-up time. The SocialTube [Li et al., 2012] system demonstrates
the efficiency of a peer-to-peer-based social network. The purpose of the system is
to reduce the playback startup time. The authors show that most of the video views
are driven by social relationships and less by interests. We can confirm and refine the
results.
However, the related work does not focus on locally-available information to avoid
both the necessity of content consumption to be shared with others (for privacy rea-
sons) and the need for trust in other nodes to honestly serve requests. We add new
insights on the average pre-click viewing time of each post and its relation to the prob-
ability of a video to be watched in near future. The community additionally benefits
from practical recommendations to identify the close friends in being a predominant
factor of a video being watched.
7.2 Data Description
In this section, we describe the data collecting methods and the data gathered both in
the stationary as well as in the mobile setting.
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7.2.1 Stationary Setting
Our approach in the stationary setting is to use browser plug-ins for Firefox and
Chrome to collect data about user behavior in Facebook. We approached volunteers
via newspaper articles to convince them to help us with our research. As a supportive
incentive, we built statistic pages that help people to understand their own Facebook
usage patterns.
The plug-ins read the Facebook wall of a user while the page was being rendered.
Additionally, it collects usage patterns such as clicks. We saved and collected the meta
information about which type of content was included in the walls (video, picture,
link), the timing information (age of the entry, the time span between displaying and
clicking / removing from the screen) as well as whether the author of a content item
was part of the friendlist or not. The Facebook user ID, which was collected to distin-
guish the participants, was anonymized using hash functions to protect the privacy of
users.
During our observation period of 123 days, the plug-ins (both versions for Firefox
and Chrome together) have been installed by 2071 Facebook users. Since most people
did not install the plug-in on the first day of our observation period and since some
participants left earlier, the average observation time was 34 days. We observed the
phenomenon that many users were extremely passive and clicked only on very few
content items. To ensure that we only use valid data, we excluded all cases where less
than 100 wall entries were clicked. As a result, our analysis is based on 618,165 wall
entries from 774 users.
7.2.2 Mobile Setting
To ensure that our findings from the stationary setting are also valid in mobile environ-
ments, we validated our findings by a small, prototypical evaluation on mobile devices.
Data of 34 users over a time span of two weeks has been gathered and analyzed. Volun-
teering participants agreed on anonymously sharing their newsfeed’s metadata (likes,
comments, etc.), information about their interactions with media posts as well as social
graph information with us. We created an app for this purpose. In total, 8370 posts
including 742 (8.9%) video posts and 3608 (43.1%) pictures have been analyzed.
7.3 Analysis of the Collected Data
We analyzed our datasets to answer the following questions:
• What type of content can be found in the newsfeed?
• What type of content is consumed?
• Which fraction of the offered videos are watched?
• Does the number of its likes and comments change the probability of videos to be
consumed?
138 7 Leveraging Locally-available Data to Apply Video Prefetching
Photo Video Link Total
Total 231,582 46,055 340,528 618,165
Clicked 13,342 5,259 21,636 40,237
% Clicked 5.76 11.42 6.35 6.51
Table 7.1: Summary of the newsfeed entries gathered in our study
Figure 7.1: Comparison of the number of comments and likes received by newsfeed
entries
• Does it depend on the author whether a video is being watched or not? - If yes,
to which extent does the type of friendship or the membership in a global group
play a role?
7.3.1 Stationary Setting
Our participants viewed an average number of 43 newsfeed entries per day (only days
with activity are mentioned). Table 7.1 summarizes the newsfeed compositions with
respect to the content type. It also shows what type of content was clicked by our
participants.
Interactions with the content are rare in general. Our participants clicked on 7%,
liked 4% and commented less than 1% of the displayed content items. Figure 7.1
illustrates the distribution of clicks and likes. Newsfeed items usually have more likes
than comments and items with multiple comments are very rare.
We are also interested in the relationship between the author and the user. This can
be determined by looking at the friendlist. In average 49.5% of all newsfeed entries are
authored by friends. The remaining posts are created by ’pages’, (profiles maintained
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Figure 7.2: Box-Whisker-Plot showing the distribution of clicked content items with re-
spect to authorship; the red dots mark the averages
by companies to spread information) (41.4%) and content from strangers in case that
friends liked or commented on these items (9.1%).
Nearly half of the clicked newsfeed entries are those of friends (Figure 7.2). Pages
are slightly less popular compared with their fraction in the newsfeed (41%). Nine
percent of the viewed content was posted by strangers. Very interesting at this point is
that the fractions (with respect to authorship) of watched videos equals the fraction of
displayed videos (videos shown on the wall). As a result, authorship cannot be used as
a predictor for prefetching content if it is considered at this granularity. We later show
in the mobile setting, that authorships of subsets of friends (close friends and family)
can be used as predictors.
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 show the distribution of the number of likes and comments,
which clicked and non-clicked videos have received before our study participants dis-
covered the vidoes in their newsfeed. In both figures, the distributions are very similar.
They cover each other more than 90%, which means that the fraction of watched
videos is nearly uncorrelated with the number of likes or comments. If the number of
videos with a certain number of comments or likes increases, the number of watched
videos with this certain number of comments or likes increases equally and the frac-
tion of watched videos stays the same. That indicates that the number of likes and
comments, attached to videos in Facebook, are no feasible prediction basis.
In Figures 7.3 and 7.4, we distinguished between professional pages, maintained by
companies, and users since Facebook seems to use different algorithms for choosing
newsfeed entries to display them on the user’s wall. Our data indicates that content
from professional pages needs to have far more likes and comments than items from
users to be included into the newsfeeds of users.
However, the timing patterns (Figure 7.5) show a very clear indication that newsfeed
entries that will be clicked, are watched for a longer time than those which will be
removed without a click. This effect can be used to decrease the startup delay by
starting to prefetch the item before it has been clicked.
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Figure 7.3: Distribution of clicked and unclicked videos with respect to the number of
likes; stacked plots indicate discrete numbers
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Figure 7.4: Distribution of clicked and unclicked videos with respect to the number of
comments; stacked plots indicate discrete numbers
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Figure 7.5: Duration of newsfeed entries to stay in the browser viewport either before
being clicked or removed
7.3.2 Mobile Setting
Our prototypical evaluation on mobile devices shows that the results obtained in the
large-scale, stationary setting can be mapped to mobile devices. Figure 7.7 illustrates
the influence of likes and comments on videos. Both categories, the one of clicked
videos and the one of non-clicked videos, are normalized to one. A large proportion of
the videos is neither commented nor liked at all.
It highlights two phenomena observable in social networks: 1) Many of the video
posts, clicked as well as non-clicked, have no likes or comments, and 2) a low number
of likes and comments does not mean that the videos are not watched. It shows that
many videos are consumed shortly after publishing, or that they are distributed to
only small groups of friends. This result is supported by Table 7.2 which investigates
friendlists.
The distance to a given user is approximated by her membership in a friendlist. We
show in Table 7.2 only the subset of posts that has been shared by users within a
friendlist. Despite the anonymization of traced data, standard Facebook groups such
as ’family’ and ’close friends’ can still be identified. For both videos and photos, posts
by close friends and family are preferred. The information on the social distance to a
posting user can thus easily be identified and leveraged for prefetching mechanisms.
The videos shared by close friends or family are predominantly those with low numbers
of likes or comments. None of these videos in our dataset, reshared by close friends,
has one thousand or more likes. It demonstrates that videos are either consumed
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Photos Videos
Close Friends 70.1% 85.7%
Family 82.6% 50%
Other lists 9.2% 8.3%
Table 7.2: Friendlists and their impact on consuming video and photos. The table
shows percentage of media shared by members of a friendlist that was
clicked
Figure 7.6: Impact of photos and videos shared by friends versus global Facebook
groups or pages
quickly after being shared with close friends or they don’t have to be very popular in
the social network to be watched by close friends of the videos’ authors.
In total the proportion of unwatched videos is, as shown for stationary evaluation,
nearly two times higher than those being watched. A significant outlier is located
between 100 and 1000 likes. In this range, the percentage of clicked videos is nearly
as high as for videos without likes.
Comparing content shared by friends with content posted by a Facebook group, it
can be seen that video consumption patterns are very similar. This is true for both
videos and photos. Figure 7.6 illustrates that for both videos as well as photos the
consumption behavior is the same as if the origin is a friend or a group.
7.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, a large-scale analysis on the impact of comments, likes and friends as
originators on video consumption is presented. We discovered that short-time prefetch-
ing is an option to reduce the start-up delay of videos. The reason is that clicked posts
remain longer in the browser viewport (before being clicked) than those that will not
be clicked. This initial time can efficiently be leveraged to initiate download connec-
tions and stream the first chunks of a video. Since the exact time strongly depends on
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Figure 7.7: Influence of the number of comments and likes on the consumption of
videos on mobile devices
the user, we suggest to initiate download connections after two seconds as a rule of
thumb.
Furthermore, we did not observe videos to have a high likelihood of being watched in
case they count a high number of likes and comments. That indicates that prefetching
mechanisms should not solely be based on the pure number of likes and comments. It
is necessary to integrate measures such as closeness of a friend as originator.
We have also shown that being a friend with the video resharing person is no suffi-
cient indicator for watching the latter. The type of friendship is important. 85.7% of
the videos, shared by users that are part of the group ’close friends’, and 50% of the
videos from family members are watched. This is independent from the number of
likes, comments and the freshness of the videos (in case that they are still displayed
in the feed). Since only 8.3% of the other friends’ videos are watched, we suggest to
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prefetch the videos of authors which are labeled to be ’close friend’ or family mem-
ber. Relying on those both first major insights of this chapter, a next step is to design
prefetching mechanisms for mobile devices that take the individual user characteristics
into account.
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Chapter8
Summary, Conclusion and Future
Work
In this chapter, we summarize the content of this thesis, draw and discuss conclusions
from our work and depict future work in this research area. Unlike summaries of
previous chapters on the individual contributions, this section provides a holistic view
on the thesis.
8.1 Summary
The topic of this thesis is to avoid and mitigate adversarial side-effects of using OSNs.
The spectrum of side-effects spans from having too many party guests1, cyber bullying,
facilitating social engineering attacks, undesired effects in job interviews (human re-
source managers may use OSNs to investigate the personality of applicants), losing the
job due to improper public comments and even imprisoning in autocratic countries.
Also being forced of granting content use licenses to OSN providers and censorship
can be assumed not to be in line with OSN user’s interests.
We identified two important causes for side-effects: First, sharing bits of information
with too many recipients (e.g. the public) or with a wrong set of recipients (e.g. mis-
takenly chosen subset of friends). Second, most popular OSNs are run by omnipotent
profit-oriented providers that monetize user data far beyond user’s content sharing in-
terests [Falch et al., 2009]. We argue that only a mixture of various user actions and
novel approaches can effectively change this situation. In this thesis, we contributed
to four main fields.
In the field of user behavior in OSNs, we contribute two large-scale user studies. In
contrast to related work, we evaluate the behavior from real users who use Facebook
on their own user profiles for their own reasons on their own devices.
User behavior in Facebook is changing at the scale of years. While low effort actions,
such as likes and reshares, recently became more popular, the contribution of photos,
1 http://www.stern.de/digital/online/facebook-fans-stuermen-geburtstagsparty-im-vorgarten-von-
thessa-1692209.html, accessed on 2015-11-01
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status updates and comments is relatively decreasing. Facebook also became mature
and stable. This is not only indicated by a decreasing user growth rate but also by a
decreasing establishment of new connections amongst the existing set of users. Users
discover fewer new people to add as friend. Based on those observations, we argue
that stale user behavior models may not reflect the recent situation in OSNs.
Sessions in Facebook are shorter and less frequent than assumed in the literature.
In particular, very long sessions are missing. This is important for P2P-DOSNs since
the session durations and session frequencies determine the churn model. The latter
is a basic assumption on the amount of resources that are available in the network.
Furthermore, shared content in Facebook is very fresh. 84.79% of all posts are not
older than 24 hours until being viewed by the recipients. Only a negligible amount of
content, accessed by Facebook users is older than one week. We thus advocate that
alternative OSNs can be designed in a lightweight way, only storing the most recent
data. This also allows to use the systems in environments with high churn and low
resource contribution.
We also found that introducing the comprehensible color-coding interface of the FPW
impacts the audience selection of users. However, the total amount of content which
is visible to Facebook users does not dramatically decrease after introducing a compre-
hensible visualization of privacy controls, but the composition of the visible content
changes. Which information is uploaded to Facebook as well as which information is
shared with whom is strongly depending on the user’s country of origin. Thus, global
default privacy settings cannot meet the sharing interests of all users since the sharing
interests show country-specific as well as person-specific differences.
In spite of the impact of C4PS on the visibility of content, users still need to trust
the OSN provider not to misuse user’s data and to protect it against external and in-
ternal (e.g. provider’s employees) attackers. Since decentralizing OSNs abolishes both
the explicit authority that needs to be trusted and ownership implications of OSNs be-
ing owned by commercial companies, we surveyed the state-of-the-art in the field of
DOSNs. We found that DOSNs - except Diaspora - are academic approaches that only
introduce concepts rather than being full-fledged OSNs. Also, there is a big gap in
performance and functionality between today’s OSNs and DOSN.
To that end, we proposed several improvements on DOSNs:
• a search scheme that allows to find user handles without disclosing information
that is linked to a user handle,
• a lightweight storage concept for P2P-OSNs, applicable in very dynamic environ-
ments and
• a video prefetching approach to avoid delays in DOSNs, based on locally available
information.
8.2 Conclusions
Privacy desires are diverse amongst users, strongly influenced by their country of ori-
gin. Thus, users need to be able to make qualified decisions and to be aware of possible
consequences of user actions in OSNs. This should be learned and taught. Technical
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solutions cannot take the responsibility of content publishers to choose their audience
in OSNs without limiting the power of the communication system. The audience selec-
tion decisions can only be supported and simplified by technical means (e.g. privacy
recommender systems, simple interfaces, audience views). Also, friend’s information
disclosures affect the own privacy because of inference attacks. Therefore, users should
consider both sides: whether they want to befriend with others who are not concerned
about privacy as well as whether friends are fine when publishing information that
could harm their privacy.
Today’s OSNs require users to trust the OSN providers not to misuse private data and
to be able to protect the latter against adversaries. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no feasible way to prevent OSN providers from learning valuable information about
their users. Cryptography still allows OSN providers to evaluate ciphertext to infer
many bits of information including user’s social graph. Also, users of OSNs are subject
of “engineering the public” 2 and legal issues such as the requirement to grant usage
licenses on content, which is posted in OSNs, support advocates of the decentralization
of OSNs.
The decentralized alternatives, DOSNs, suffer many drawbacks so far: They intro-
duce new traffic observing opportunities (Section 4.8) and abolish the OSN provider’s
tool set to intervene in case of Cyber Bullying. Furthermore, DOSNs do not provide
the same functionality and performance compared with their centralized counterparts.
We address the functionality and performance issues in this thesis.
8.3 Future Work
In this section, we depict and discuss opportunities for future research. We identified
future research opportunities in all fields that have been targeted in this thesis.
User Behavior in OSNs
Understanding user behavior means to investigate a moving target, quickly changing
over time (Figure 2.19). OSN users undergo a learning curve in how to use the tool
and hypes, trends, fads and even revolutionary upheavals (e.g. Arabic spring) impact
OSN usage. Also, the technical environment changes (e.g. ubiquity of mobile devices),
thus causing OSN users to adopt their behavior. In the literature, dynamics have been
analyzed with respect to the development (life cycle) of online communities, the im-
pact of incidents and trends and the evolution of personal interactions. So far, nobody
either described the impact of these dynamics on OSN user models or integrated dy-
namics directly into the latter as a function over time. Future follow-up studies on the
same subject seem to be useful to understand dynamics to integrate these dynamics
into OSN user models.
We provide evidence to assume differences amongst users in different countries in
Section 3.2.3. Those differences are important in case of building OSNs that address
an international audience. However, there is no published comprehensive study that
2 http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/4901/4097, accessed on 2015-11-01
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covers all regions in the world (e.g. Asia vs. Africa) and compares usage patterns in
detail.
Audience Selection
We demonstrated C4PS to be useful in Facebook and published the FPW to allow
everybody to benefit from our work. Being a concept of general applicability, it makes
sense to apply it on other social networking services in future work. Furthermore, since
our color-coding approach is orthogonal to the related work, it can be combined with
other approaches to further improve the audience selection in OSNs:
• Recommendation systems [Fang et al., 2010] for audience selection reduce the
number of user action which are necessary to choose the desired audience. How-
ever, it does not totally abolish the need for manual adjustments. Users thus still
need to be able to understand the manual privacy controls. C4PS can mitigate
this burden.
• Venn diagrams [Egelman et al., 2011] are especially valuable tools when select-
ing various subsets of friends to be the audience.
• Our color-based interface allows to quickly grasp an overview of the actual pri-
vacy settings of the whole profile. However, the complexity that may occur in case
of using various custom access rules for different content items is not mitigated
by our approach. The concept of the audience view [Lipford et al., 2008] in com-
bination with C4PS is useful to verify settings independent from their complexity.
Future work could develop strategies to combine these approaches, integrate them
into a novel audience selection interface and measure the resulting usage errors and
efforts.
DOSN
Many remaining challenges exist in the field of DOSNs. The state of the art DOSNs
focus on basic features, such as user profile replication and private communication. In
contrast, successful OSNs offer many features to make social networking a desirable
experience. In comparison with OSNs, DOSNs suffer from lacks of performance and
functionality. The scientific and the algorithmic challenges in bridging these lacks are
to realize these features in a distributed and privacy preserving way, without relying
on the global knowledge that an omnipotent OSN provider has.
Both, our search scheme as well as the prefetching mechanism are first steps to-
wards enriching features of DOSNs and improving their performance. Future work
in this field can be done by extending the search scheme to be applicable in P2P
based and hybrid DOSNs (e.g. via super node based architecture) and by extend-
ing the prefetching by taking the history of personal content consumption habits into
account. Additionally, integrating privacy preserving distributed recommender systems
into DOSNs to provides useful content matchmaking features.
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Appendices
xvii

Appendix A: Search Scheme
Communication Cost Calculations
a length of sender address
b length of receiver address
H length of the host name
K length of key
Ri length of the i-th field name
m number of variable inner parts of the message
M length of the message
n number of variable parts
N number of participating servers
Q length of sequence number
S length of the static part of the message
Vi length of the i-th field value
X length of UUID (= 36 as max. length)
Y length of outer variable part
Register Phase
During registration (cmp. Sec. 5.3.2), four different message types are necessary to
register a profile entry in the DHT.
1. publicprofiledata/set message (A): This message consists of one static part and
one part per search field entry with a variable length, depending on the length
of the field name and the length of the field value. The static part of message is
defined as:
<iq from=" a " to=" b " type=" s e t " id="X ">
<query xmlns=" d h t s e a r c h : p u b l i c p r o f i l e d a t a ">
</ query>
</ iq>
The length S of static part is: S = 91+ X + a+ b
The variable part of message is:
xix
<value f ie ldname="Ri ">Vi</ value>
The length Z of variable part with n subparts is:
Z =
n−1∑
i=0
(28+ Ri + Vi) (.1)
guiding to the length M of the whole message with n variable subparts:
M = S+ Z = 127+ a+ b+ 28n+
n−1∑
i=0
(Ri + Vi) (.2)
2. findsuccessor/get message (B):
<iq from=" a " to=" b " type=" get " id="X " seq="Q">
<query xmlns=" d h t s e a r c h : f i n d s u c c e s s o r ">
<key>K</key>
</ query>
</ iq>
length M : M = 106+ X + a+ b+ K +Q
3. findsuccessor/result message (C):
<iq from=" a " to=" b " type=" r e s u l t " id="X " seq="Q">
<query xmlns=" d h t s e a r c h : f i n d s u c c e s s o r ">
<host>H</ host>
</ query>
</ iq>
length M : M = 111+ X + a+ b+H +Q
4. storekey/set message (D):
<iq from=" a " to=" b " type=" s e t " id="X " seq="Q">
<query xmlns=" d h t s e a r c h : f i n d s u c c e s s o r ">
<host>H</ host>
</ query>
</ iq>
length M : M = 111+ X + a+ b+H +Q
Depending on the number of fields (n) in the profile, the number of messages, which
is needed on the registration phase, varies. The effort of registration is:
• 1 message of type A with n entries
• n · log(N) messages of type B
• n · log(N) messages of type C
• n messages of type D
The total Data Volume (V ) which is necessary to register a profile at the lookup
service can be calculated by:
V = |A|+ n · log(N) · |B|+ n · log(N) · |C |+ n · |D|
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Search Phase
Conducting a search procedure (Fig. 5.1) needs 8 different types of messages. In this
section, we provide formulas to calculate their size and the overall traffic, caused by
this action. Again, some messages have of request-depending variable parts.
1. searchservers/get message (A) static part of message:
<iq from=" a " to=" b " type=" get " id="X ">
<query xmlns=" d h t s e a r c h : s e a r c h s e r v e r s ">
</ query>
</ iq>
length S of static part:
S = 88+ X + a+ b = 124+ a+ b (.3)
variable part of message:
<value f ie ldname="Ri ">Vi</ value>
length Z of variable part with n subparts:
Z =
n−1∑
i=0
(28+ Ri + Vi) (.4)
length M of whole message with n subparts in the variable part:
M = S+ Z = 124+ a+ b+ 28n+
n−1∑
i=0
(Ri + Vi) (.5)
2. findsuccessor/get message (B)
Cmp. register phase (2)
3. findsuccessor/result message (C)
Cmp. register phase (3)
4. searchhosts/get message (D)
<iq from=" a " to=" b " type=" get " id="X ">
<query xmlns=" dh t sea r ch : s ea r chhos t s ">
<key>K</key>
</ query>
</ iq>
length M of static part:
M = 96+ X + a+ b+ K = 132+ a+ b+ K (.6)
5. searchhosts/result message (E)
static part of message:
xxi
<iq from=" a " to=" b " type=" r e s u l t " id="X ">
<query xmlns=" dh t s ea r ch : s ea r chhos t s ">
</ query>
</ iq>
length S of static part:
S = 88+ X + a+ b = 124+ a+ b (.7)
variable part of message:
<host>Hi</ host>
length Z of variable part with n subparts:
Z =
n−1∑
i=0
(13+Hi) (.8)
length M of whole message with n subparts in the variable part:
M = S+ Z = 124+ a+ b+ 13n+
n−1∑
i=0
(Hi) (.9)
6. searchservers/result message (F)
static part of message:
<iq from=" a " to=" b " type=" r e s u l t " id="X ">
<query xmlns=" d h t s e a r c h : s e a r c h s e r v e r s ">
</ query>
</ iq>
length S of static part:
S = 92+ X + a+ b = 128+ a+ b (.10)
variable part of message:
<host>Hi</ host>
length Z of variable part with n subparts:
Z =
n−1∑
i=0
(13+Hi) (.11)
length M of whole message with n subparts in the variable part:
M = S+ Z = 128+ a+ b+ 13n+
n−1∑
i=0
(Hi) (.12)
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7. searchonserver/get message (G)
static part of message:
<iq from=" a " to=" b " type=" get " id="X ">
<query xmlns=" dht sea r ch : sea rchonse rve r ">
</ query>
</ iq>
length M : M = 88+ X + a+ b = 124+ a+ b
variable part of message:
<value f ie ldname="Ri ">Vi</ value>
length Z of variable part with n subparts:
Z =
n−1∑
i=0
(28+ Ri + Vi) (.13)
length M of whole message with n subparts in the variable part:
M = S+ Z = 124+ a+ b+ 28n+
n−1∑
i=0
(Ri + Vi) (.14)
8. serchonserver/result message (H)
static part of message:
<iq from=" a " to=" b " type=" r e s u l t " id="X ">
<query xmlns=" dht sea r ch : sea r chonse rve r ">
</ query>
</ iq>
length S of static part: S = 91+ X + a+ b = 127+ a+ b
variable outer part of message:
<user search id="X "></ user>
length Y of variable outer part with n subparts: Y = 25+ X = 61
variable inner part of message:
<value f ie ldname=" cm ">dm</ value>
length Z of variable part with m subparts: Z =
m−1∑
i=0
(28+ Ri + Vi)
length M of the whole message with m inner subparts in the n outer variable
parts: M = S+ n · Y + n · Zmn
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Data volume for finding IDs(V ):
• 1 message of type A with j variable parts x
• j · log(N) messages of type B
• j · log(N) messages of type C
• j messages of type D
• j messages of type E with k variable parts per message
• l messages of type F with l variable parts per message
• 2 messages of type G with m variable parts per message
• 2 message of type H with n variable parts for users and p variable parts for profile
data
This formula describes the amount of data, caused by one search request:
V = |A( j)|+ j · log(N) · |B|+ j · log(N) · |C |+ j · |D|
+ j · |E(k)|+ |F(l)|+ 2 · |G(2m−2)|+ 2 · |H(n, p)| (.15)
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